Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; April 21, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
John Mahon pled guilty to two charges: being a felon in possession of a firearm and making a false statement while attempting to reacquire the firearm. He was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines but had an alternate sentence of 180 months if the Guidelines were later deemed unconstitutional. On appeal, Mahon argued that the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) violated his Sixth Amendment rights, as established in United States v. Booker, by improperly categorizing two of his prior convictions as "violent felonies," which resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years under the ACCA.
The charges stemmed from Mahon selling his shotgun to a pawn shop and later attempting to reclaim it, during which he falsely denied prior felony convictions on an ATF disclosure form. The government cited four prior violent felonies from the 1980s—two for breaking and entering, one for attempted burglary, and one for possession of criminal tools—as the basis for the ACCA enhancement. The Probation Office supported the government's position, leading to a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months under the Guidelines.
The court affirmed the application of the ACCA but vacated Mahon's original sentence, remanding the case for imposition of the 180-month alternate sentence.
Mahon pled guilty to two counts of an indictment but contested the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement during sentencing. He acknowledged that his convictions for attempted burglary and possession of criminal tools were validly classified as "violent" felonies under the ACCA. However, he argued that his two convictions for breaking and entering did not meet the violent felony criteria established in *Taylor v. United States*, as they lacked the necessary elements of unlawful entry with intent to commit a crime. The district court disagreed, determining that both convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA, and classified Mahon as an armed career criminal based on four violent felony convictions.
On September 27, 2004, Mahon was sentenced to 210 months in prison under the Guidelines, but due to uncertainty about the Guidelines' validity following *Blakely v. Washington*, the district court also imposed a 180-month alternative sentence, the ACCA's mandatory minimum. The court expressed concerns about mandatory minimums and deemed the 210-month sentence "unduly harsh," yet felt compelled to adhere to the law.
Mahon appealed, arguing that the district court committed plain error under *Booker* by engaging in factfinding that led to the ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence, specifically the classification of two prior convictions as violent. He also requested a reconsideration of the ruling in *United States v. Bentley*, which upheld Ohio's burglary statute as fitting the generic definition of burglary per *Taylor*, citing the unfairness of the ACCA's mandatory minimum. Additionally, he sought remand for the imposition of the alternate sentence if the ACCA application was not deemed plain error.
Mahon's appeal was reviewed under the "plain error" standard due to the lack of a prior objection regarding the district court's classification of his convictions. The review process involves determining whether an error occurred, if it was plain, whether it affected substantial rights, and whether to exercise discretion to address the plain error affecting the integrity of judicial proceedings.
A Sixth Amendment violation may have occurred regarding the classification of Mahon's prior convictions as "violent felonies" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Both Mahon and the government acknowledged that two of his prior convictions—attempted burglary and possession of criminal tools—were violent. The district court determined that both of Mahon's breaking and entering convictions were violent, enabling the ACCA to apply. Under the ACCA, a violent felony is defined as a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that either involves the use of physical force or falls under categories such as burglary, arson, or extortion (18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)). The Supreme Court has established that "burglary" should be interpreted in its generic sense, distinct from state-specific definitions, to prevent inconsistencies in sentencing (Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575). The generic definition includes unlawful entry into a structure with intent to commit a crime. The ACCA mandates a categorical approach for assessing prior convictions, focusing solely on the conviction fact and statutory definition rather than the specifics of the defendant's actions. This approach aims to avoid issues related to examining individual conviction facts. The court has distinguished Ohio's breaking and entering statute into parts that align with the generic definition of burglary and those that do not, referencing a previous case (United States v. Bentley, 29 F.3d 1073) that analyzed the relevant Ohio statutes.
The Bentley court determined that subsection (A) of Ohio Revised Code 2911.13 defines generic burglary, as unlawful entry or remaining in a structure is inherent to its violation. In contrast, subsection (B) allows for violations without such unlawful entry, leading to the conclusion that convictions under subsection (B) do not constitute generic burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) as defined by Taylor. In Mahon's case, the district court reviewed the indictments for his breaking-and-entering convictions, which charged him under 2911.13 and indicated he unlawfully trespassed in an unoccupied structure. The district court found this language aligned with subsection (A), classifying both felonies as generic burglaries per the Bentley decision. Consequently, given Mahon’s acknowledgment of two additional violent felony convictions, the district court ruled he was subject to sentencing under the ACCA.
On appeal, Mahon contends that the district court's classification of his convictions as violent felonies constituted unconstitutional factfinding, violating precedents set in United States v. Booker and Apprendi v. New Jersey. He argues that assessing the violent nature of his convictions differs from merely establishing their existence and maintains that his prior convictions do not match the ACCA's definition of "burglary," thus breaching his Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court referenced United States v. Barnett, affirming that district courts can ascertain the facts and nature of prior convictions without breaching Booker. The subsequent Supreme Court decision in Shepard v. United States further complicates this issue, as it directly addresses the relationship between ACCA sentence enhancements and Booker, necessitating consideration of its implications for Mahon's case.
In Shepard, the defendant's previous conviction under a Massachusetts burglary statute was deemed broader than the generic burglary standard set forth in Taylor, which only included buildings or structures. The Massachusetts law encompassed additional locations, such as boats and vehicles. Consequently, the district court did not classify Shepard's conviction as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The First Circuit reversed this decision, allowing for the examination of police reports to assess whether the defendant's guilty plea pertained to a violent crime, specifically if the unlawful conduct occurred in a building.
However, the Supreme Court reversed again, ruling that courts may only consider specific documents—such as the statutory definition, charging documents, written plea agreements, and any factual findings agreed upon by the defendant—in determining the nature of a burglary conviction. This approach preserves the categorical analysis established in Taylor and prevents courts from engaging in impermissible fact-finding.
In the case of Mahon, the district court based its determination solely on the indictments for Mahon's prior convictions, which aligned with Ohio Revised Code 2911.13(A), recognized as a generic burglary statute. Therefore, Mahon was found to have committed a generic burglary, and no further fact-finding was necessary. The district court's approach was consistent with Shepard, ensuring compliance with Mahon's Sixth Amendment rights.
Additionally, unpublished opinions in the circuit affirm that compliance with Shepard allows for classifying prior convictions as violent felonies without jury involvement. Mahon argued that applying the ACCA was unfair due to the age of his prior felonies and the nature of his recent offense involving a shotgun for hunting. Despite the district court's discomfort with sentencing him to a 15-year mandatory minimum under the ACCA, the court emphasized its obligation to adhere to Congressional mandates and reaffirmed the ruling in Bentley regarding the classification of the Ohio statute as a generic burglary law.
Both the government and Mahon concur that the case should be remanded to the district court for the imposition of a 180-month alternate sentence. The district court had expressed that it felt "bound by the guidelines" when it issued a 210-month sentence, indicating it would have applied the lower mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) had the guidelines been advisory. This aligns with the precedent set in United States v. Oliver, where remand for resentencing was mandated under similar circumstances. The conclusion affirms the district court's application of the ACCA but vacates Mahon's sentence, directing a remand for the 180-month sentence.
Circuit Judge Merritt, in his concurring opinion, expresses concern regarding the justification for Mahon's 15-year incarceration in a case involving a pawned shotgun and notes the prior convictions are over 20 years old. He questions whether this punishment is disproportionate to the crime and highlights the potential for gross injustice when sentencing authority is concentrated in the prosecutor's hands, suggesting that due process issues may need to be considered on remand.
