Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 10, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
Johnny Lee Davis appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition following his conviction for attempted murder with a deadly weapon, for which he received two consecutive fifteen-year sentences. Davis claims that his trial counsel, Jennifer Haight, provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during sentencing. The circumstances of the case reveal that on September 10, 1997, Davis shot the mother of his children six times, leaving her paralyzed. Despite a psychiatric evaluation confirming his competency to stand trial, the report noted his troubled past, including substance abuse and prior suicide attempts.
Davis entered a guilty plea on March 4, 1998, under a plea agreement that capped his sentences at six to fifteen years for both attempted murder and the weapon enhancement. During the sentencing hearing on April 22, 1998, Haight mistakenly told the court that Davis had agreed to two fifteen-year terms, failing to argue for a lower sentence or present any mitigating evidence. The court consequently imposed the maximum sentences. After an unsuccessful direct appeal due to jurisdictional issues, Davis filed a habeas corpus petition in state court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. His petition was denied by the state district court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Davis appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and arguing that the district court wrongfully denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing to present mitigating evidence. The court dismissed the appeal, stating Davis did not provide specific facts warranting relief and incorrectly characterized his plea bargain, similar to prior misstatements at sentencing. On November 9, 2001, Davis filed an amended habeas corpus petition in federal district court, claiming ineffective assistance from his counsel, Haight, for failing to investigate or present mitigating evidence. The magistrate judge recommended denying the petition, concluding that Davis could not demonstrate prejudice from Haight's performance, which the district court adopted.
The review of the district court's decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is de novo, focusing on the last reasoned state-court decision. A writ of habeas corpus is granted only if state court decisions were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, or were based on unreasonable factual determinations. To establish relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Davis must demonstrate that a clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, was misapplied. Both parties acknowledged Strickland v. Washington as the governing precedent, but the court noted that Strickland did not address noncapital sentencing contexts, and thus, no clearly established federal law exists for such cases.
Though Nevada courts may adopt the Strickland standard, the absence of applicable Supreme Court precedent precludes granting habeas relief. Additionally, factual determinations made by state courts are upheld unless deemed objectively unreasonable. Davis contended that the Nevada Supreme Court's decision was partly based on its misunderstanding of his plea agreement.
Davis entered a written plea agreement with stipulated sentencing caps of six to fifteen years, but at his sentencing hearing, his attorney mistakenly represented that he agreed to two fifteen-year terms. This misrepresentation was accepted by the Nevada Supreme Court and contributed to the denial of Davis's habeas petition. Consequently, the court's decision was based on an unreasonable factual determination, potentially qualifying Davis for relief under 2254(d)(2). The district court's denial of the habeas petition is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing to consider mitigating evidence that was not presented at sentencing.
Davis does not qualify for relief under 2254(d)(1) due to the absence of established Supreme Court precedent for ineffective assistance of counsel in noncapital sentencing contexts. However, the erroneous understanding by the Nevada Supreme Court of Davis's stipulated sentence warrants relief under 2254(d)(2). The concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Graber questions the precedent set by Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer regarding ineffective assistance of counsel standards in noncapital cases, suggesting that the Supreme Court's decisions in Glover and Strickland may apply to formal noncapital sentencing proceedings. Graber argues that Strickland should be interpreted as applicable to noncapital sentencing that is formal and subject to standard guidelines, differing from the broader interpretation in Cooper-Smith.
