Robert Brown v. Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation

Citations: 442 F.3d 588; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 7650; 2006 WL 784953Docket: 05-1526

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 29, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Robert Brown, an autistic child, and the Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation regarding the adequacy of his Individualized Educational Program (IEP) for the 2002-2003 school year under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). After the Browns expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed IEP, they pursued administrative remedies, ultimately appealing to the State Board of Special Educational Appeals (BSEA) after an initial ruling favored Bartholomew. The BSEA upheld the hearing officer's decision, leading the Browns to file a lawsuit in district court, which also affirmed the BSEA's ruling after considering new evidence about Bobby's academic progress.

During the appeal, the Browns enrolled Bobby in a different school district and agreed to a new IEP, rendering the original case moot. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the district court's order and directed a dismissal based on this change in circumstances. Bobby, diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder at age two, had been receiving special educational services since age three, initially involving an IEP developed by an IEP Team recommending specific therapies. Additionally, the Browns independently sought alternative educational strategies, hiring an ABA therapist to implement a home-based program without consulting the school district.

On April 27, 2000, Bartholomew conducted a second case conference to revise Bobby's Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for the upcoming school year, concluding that Bobby's home-based Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) instruction would replace his occupational therapy and fine motor skills services. To fund this at-home program, the Browns and Bartholomew submitted an Application for Alternative Services to the Indiana Department of Education (DOE), citing Bobby's significant behavioral challenges, including fecal smearing, temper tantrums, physical aggression, and self-injurious behavior, which hindered his learning. The DOE denied the funding request, noting that these behaviors were not currently occurring at school and suggested increasing Bobby's school hours and one-on-one assistance instead. 

During a subsequent case conference, Bartholomew proposed a revised IEP that included a full-time aide for Bobby, but the Browns objected, asserting that the aide lacked ABA training. They instead requested an ABA-trained educator for eight hours daily. As the 2000-2001 school year progressed, negotiations between Bartholomew and the Browns stalled despite a private evaluation indicating positive results from Bobby's ABA treatment. The Browns then filed for a due process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), but a settlement was reached before the hearing. 

The settlement, formalized on February 20, 2001, established a schedule of ABA instruction: three hours of one-on-one instruction at home and school Monday through Thursday, followed by two additional hours after school, with Fridays consisting of six hours of at-home instruction. This schedule would also extend into the summer. Bartholomew agreed to contract with Rumple and two ABA-trained aides for Bobby's instruction and to train teachers at Smith Elementary in ABA methods. Additionally, Bartholomew committed to reimburse the Browns for attorneys' fees, school supplies, and costs for private ABA instruction incurred since June 2000.

In June 2001, Rumple could not meet the expected hours due to personal and professional obligations. The Browns, seeking to enhance Bobby's program with a speech-centered approach, engaged Dr. Carl Sundberg, an expert in Applied Verbal Behavior (AVB). Dr. Sundberg's AVB methodology, consisting of a structured twenty-six step program, aimed to improve Bobby's conversational skills from 30% to 70% in preparation for his transition to kindergarten. Bobby was subsequently transitioned from his ABA program to Dr. Sundberg's AVB instruction, with Rumple overseeing the program and coordinating training for school personnel and aides. Bobby began kindergarten in the 2001-2002 school year on a half-day schedule, while the terms of the prior settlement agreement remained unchanged, with Bartholomew continuing to fund Bobby's ABA aides and Rumple.

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Bobby was due for a reevaluation in April 2002. Both parties enlisted external specialists for independent assessments. Bartholomew's specialist, Dr. John Umbreit, an ABA expert, recommended Bobby attend full-day kindergarten with an instructional aide to facilitate learning essential functional skills in a typical classroom environment. Conversely, the Browns' expert, Dr. James Mulick, concluded that Bobby was not ready for a full-day program, advocating for the continuation of a half-day schedule. Dr. Mulick emphasized the necessity of intensive, individualized instruction to address Bobby's significant language deficits, which he believed placed Bobby near the range of mental retardation.

On May 20, 2002, a case conference was held regarding Bobby's educational placement for the 2002-2003 school year, attended by the Browns, their attorneys, Dr. Sundberg, and various educational personnel. Bartholomew proposed a full-day kindergarten placement at Richards Elementary, including significant support services, such as a one-on-one teaching assistant, special instruction, and therapy sessions. The Browns vehemently opposed this proposal, expressing their disagreement and leaving the meeting.

Subsequently, the Browns filed a second request for a due process hearing, claiming that Bartholomew violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by predetermining Bobby's Individualized Education Program (IEP) without their input. The Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) found no evidence of predetermination, stating that pre-conference drafts are permissible and that the Browns halted negotiations prematurely, preventing a discussion of the proposal.

The IHO also addressed the Browns' concern regarding the absence of a transition plan for Bobby's full-day placement, concluding that the impasse on placement precluded any transition discussions. Furthermore, the IHO determined that Bartholomew's proposed IEP was appropriate and reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits, allowing for the possibility of future adjustments as Bobby develops.

The Indiana Board of Special Educational Appeals (BSEA) upheld the IHO's decision, rejecting the Browns' framing of the dispute as one over methodologies. The BSEA emphasized that the IDEA does not mandate the best possible education but requires a program designed to yield meaningful results, which it found Bartholomew had provided.

A party aggrieved by a local educational agency's decision can seek judicial review in a federal district court under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The Browns filed a civil action in the Southern District of Indiana, claiming that their son Bobby was denied a free appropriate education due to substantive and procedural violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by Bartholomew. They also sought a "stay-put" injunction to maintain Bobby's 2001-2002 Individualized Education Program (IEP) and the terms of a prior settlement agreement, ensuring he remained in a half-day kindergarten placement during the court proceedings.

The district court upheld the state administrative decisions favoring Bartholomew, finding no pre-determination of Bobby's program and concluding that Bartholomew adequately involved the Browns in the decision-making process. The court determined that Bartholomew did not violate the IDEA regarding transition provisions and that the proposed placement was appropriate for Bobby's educational needs. The Browns presented evidence of pre-determination, including communications from Bartholomew officials and a home visit by Dr. Umbreit, who they claimed had a finalized IEP. However, the court found that the evidence demonstrated Bartholomew's thoughtful preparation for the May 16, 2002 meeting and that meaningful discussions occurred, culminating in a compromise. The court noted that Bartholomew's unwillingness to change the placement did not equate to pre-determination or a denial of parental rights.

The Browns argued that the 2002-2003 Individualized Education Program (IEP) for Bobby did not adequately facilitate his transition to a new educational placement, which they believed hindered his ability to receive educational benefits. However, the district court sided with the Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO), ruling that the school district, Bartholomew, was not required to create a transition plan until the parties reached an agreement on Bobby's placement, which they failed to do. The court noted that discussions did not progress sufficiently to develop a transition plan, particularly as the Browns opposed the proposed new program.

In evaluating the Browns' substantive claims regarding the IEP, the district court stated that they needed to demonstrate that the proposed IEP was not reasonably calculated for Bobby at the time it was written. The court emphasized that educational decisions cannot be judged solely in hindsight. Ultimately, the Browns did not meet this burden, as the evidence reflected a professional disagreement among autism educators rather than a failure of the IEP.

The Browns subsequently raised claims of violations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), but the court highlighted the necessity of establishing an ongoing controversy. Federal courts require "actual, ongoing controversies" for jurisdiction, meaning that the case must remain justiciable throughout the review process. If a situation becomes moot—such as when the actions sought to be enjoined are no longer a threat—the case may be dismissed. However, if a plaintiff seeks monetary damages, the case can continue even if the underlying issue has ceased.

Following the district court's decision, the Browns relocated to Greensburg, Indiana, where they enrolled Bobby in a new elementary school and established a new IEP for the 2005-2006 school year. Bartholomew argues that this change renders any disputes regarding Bobby's previous IEP moot, as a ruling in the Browns' favor would not provide any benefit to Bobby in light of his new educational arrangement.

The Browns assert a claim for monetary damages based on their rights under a stay-put injunction maintaining Bobby's 2001-2002 IEP and a settlement agreement requiring Bartholomew to pay for Bobby's ABA instruction. They allege Bartholomew breached this obligation by not reimbursing them for Dr. Sundberg's salary, who temporarily replaced Bobby's ABA consultant. Under the IDEA, a court may order reimbursement for private special education expenditures if deemed appropriate compared to a proposed IEP. However, a review of the case record shows the Browns did not clearly articulate a damages claim in the district court, where they sought only injunctive and declaratory relief. Although there were vague indications of a reimbursement claim during earlier proceedings, this was resolved prior to the hearing. On appeal, they requested a conversion of stipulated entitlements into Bobby's placement for the following school year but did not include a reimbursement claim in their district court submissions. Their request for relief focused on the continuation of Bobby's existing program, without asserting inadequacy or seeking reimbursement for Dr. Sundberg's services. The Browns only referenced relevant case law permitting reimbursement without applying it to their situation or detailing why they believed they were entitled to such compensation.

Relief for out-of-pocket educational expenses, termed "compensatory education," is exceptional and not explicitly authorized by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which allows a district court to provide "appropriate" relief as deemed necessary. Courts have established that compensatory education can be ordered as an equitable remedy to address violations, but it is at the district court's discretion. In this case, the Browns' complaint did not explicitly request reimbursement; rather, it implied acceptance of the existing program, which indicated no need for additional funds. Unlike their previous administrative filings, the complaint did not raise reimbursement claims, leading to the conclusion that such claims were abandoned. Furthermore, the Browns only mentioned compensatory education in their reply brief, which was deemed too late to preserve the claim for damages. As a result, their compensatory education claim is waived and does not maintain any live controversy necessary to avoid mootness. The Browns attempted to invoke the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues likely to recur but evade review. This exception applies in rare circumstances where the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated and there is a reasonable expectation of recurrence. Although IEP challenges typically last longer than a school year, which satisfies the first condition of the mootness exception, the overall context of the Browns' case does not meet the necessary criteria for this exception to apply.

The mootness of the case hinges on whether there is a "reasonable expectation" that Bartholomew will again propose an IEP denying Bobby a free appropriate education. This expectation must exceed mere possibility, as established by the Supreme Court. The Browns argue that Bobby's situation remains precarious due to Bartholomew's supervisory role over the local special education authority, despite his enrollment in a different school district. In contrast, Bartholomew contends it has no control over the new district's IEPs.

The case references the Supreme Court's decision in Honig, where the Court found a "reasonable likelihood" of recurrence in a similar context. However, Bobby's circumstances differ significantly from Honig; there is no direct link between Bobby's behavior and the proposed IEP as was present in Honig. Bobby's autism requires ongoing assessment and adaptation of his educational plan, making past decisions regarding his IEP potentially irrelevant. 

The analysis concludes that addressing the 2002-2003 IEP would only result in an advisory opinion without affecting the current legal relationship under the IDEA. The case parallels Downers Grove Grade School Number 58 Board v. Steven L., where a similar situation led to a conclusion of mootness due to an absence of actual injury that could be addressed by a court ruling. Ultimately, the case must be dismissed as moot.

The district court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions for dismissal due to mootness, with each party responsible for their own appeal costs. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the burden of proof in administrative hearings regarding a school district's Individualized Education Program (IEP) rests with the student and their parents, as clarified in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast. The standard established in Rowley serves as the measure for determining if an IEP provides a free appropriate education. Courts have consistently dismissed cases as moot when parents fail to articulate claims for compensatory education. In Thomas R.W. v. Massachusetts Department of Education, the court dismissed a case where parents sought only injunctive and declaratory relief without claiming damages. Similarly, in Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Connecticut Department of Education, a challenge to a past IEP was dismissed as moot because the complaint did not mention a need for compensatory education, despite earlier pleadings including such a claim.