Betty A. Simpson v. Merchants & Planters Bank

Citations: 441 F.3d 572; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6831; 87 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,302; 97 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1239; 2006 WL 686285Docket: 04-3972

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 20, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of Betty A. Simpson v. Merchants Planters Bank, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether to overturn a jury's finding of a willful violation of the Equal Pay Act. The court affirmed the jury's decision, citing sufficient evidence for the violation. Merchants Planters Bank appealed the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, leading the court to assume all facts presented by the nonmoving party, Simpson, were proven and to resolve all conflicts in her favor.

Simpson, who worked at the Bank from 1977 to 2002, alleged she was paid less than her male counterpart, J. Kendall Henry, despite their jobs being equal in skill, effort, and responsibility. To succeed under the Equal Pay Act, she needed to demonstrate that the Bank discriminated based on sex by providing unequal wages for equal work. Simpson's roles included serving as a teller, moving to the loan department, and ultimately becoming an Assistant Vice President, where she handled significant financial reporting responsibilities and implemented cost-saving measures for the Bank. Notably, she reported earning several thousand dollars less than her male predecessor when she took over his position.

Simpson completed various reports for governmental agencies, all of which were accepted without rejection. She conducted a monthly self-audit for the Arkansas State Bank and prepared a comprehensive call report for the FDIC that required approval from the Bank’s President and Board members. Simpson worked independently without direct supervision, even from the Senior Vice President, and interpreted FDIC regulations on her own. Her responsibilities included calculating the financial implications of the Bank's bond purchases, with the President frequently seeking her input on investment decisions.

Simpson served as the duty officer every fourth week, responsible for closing the Bank and setting alarms, and assumed additional duties, such as payroll and error reconciliation, when the Senior Vice President was unavailable. She supervised all Bank employees, except for the President and Vice President, during specific times.

All skills necessary for her role were acquired on the job. During her tenure, she completed various management and banking programs, including those at the University of Arkansas and investment seminars. Simpson also represented the Bank publicly through community engagement and committee participation. The Bank's response to her 2002 EEOC complaint outlined her responsibilities, which included preparing reports and managing financial tasks.

In her sole performance evaluation from 1980, she received high marks across all categories and had previously been awarded a raise. Simpson worked beyond regular hours, even while hospitalized.

At trial, Simpson contrasted her position with male employee J. Kendall Henry, who started in 1982 and pursued a degree in finance while also attending various banking and management training programs. Henry's roles included information system coordinator and loan review officer, but another employee had taken over the bank secrecy act officer position by 1998. Henry also contributed to the Bank’s internal audits.

Henry received a performance evaluation in 1996, scoring top marks in 22 out of 31 categories. The Bank's President recommended a $10,000 salary increase for Henry due to his impending graduation from the Mid South School of Banking and his training on upcoming computer systems. In 1996, Henry's salary surpassed that of Simpson, who held the title of Assistant Vice President, despite Henry being an untitled bank officer at the time. Henry was promoted to Vice President in February 1997, earning approximately $7,000 more than Simpson that year, even though he did not graduate from the banking school until 1998.

Simpson presented evidence of gender discrimination in the Bank's personnel policies, including differential treatment regarding scheduling and maternity leave. Testimony revealed that the Bank President expressed disdain for Simpson's absences and dismissed her security improvement suggestions, later adopting them when proposed by Henry. Henry enjoyed greater flexibility with work hours, while Simpson required permission to leave and was denied requests to attend essential meetings. Notably, Henry left work early on December 31, 1999, without notifying anyone, while Simpson faced scrutiny for similar actions. Rheta Griffith, a high-ranking Bank official, reportedly stated that men deserved higher pay than women.

The jury found in favor of Simpson on her Equal Pay Claim, determining that she and Henry held jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar conditions, yet she received a lower wage. The jury ruled that the pay disparity was not justified by other factors and awarded Simpson $35,664.37 in damages, concluding that the Bank's actions were willful. The Bank subsequently appealed the decision. The court reviews the case de novo, assessing whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict while favoring the verdict in its analysis.

The Bank contends that the jobs held by Simpson and Henry are not equal due to differences in their duties. Legal precedent typically evaluates job equality by identifying common core responsibilities, with higher-paid roles often including additional tasks. Relevant cases illustrate this principle: in *Horn v. Univ. of Minn.*, a female coach's role included public representation beyond shared administrative duties, while in *McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp.*, a male employee's additional tasks rendered his position unequal to a female counterpart. Similarly, in *Krenik v. County of Le Sueur*, a male engineer's supervisory duties distinguished his role from that of a female assistant.

Simpson did not demonstrate that her job was identical to Henry's or that he had no extra duties; instead, she focused on proving the equality of their roles. The Equal Pay Act (EPA) does not require jobs to be identical but rather "substantially equal." Determining job equality involves a factual analysis of skill, effort, and responsibility, rather than relying solely on job titles. 

In assessing skill, a reasonable jury could conclude that both Simpson and Henry had similar qualifications, with Simpson's longer tenure providing her with more practical experience. They both attended identical training programs, and their performance evaluations were equally positive. Henry's college degree was deemed irrelevant for determining necessary job skills, as all required skills were acquired on the job.

Regarding effort, the jury could find that both jobs demanded comparable levels of exertion, as both applied the same banking knowledge and participated in after-hours work and public representation for the Bank. 

Lastly, in terms of responsibility, a jury could determine that both positions held similar accountability levels. Simpson prepared reports for Board members and state agencies, interpreting complex regulations without oversight, while Henry conducted internal audits, reflecting a high degree of responsibility in both roles.

A reasonable jury could have concluded that Simpson received less pay than Henry for comparable work that required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, in violation of the Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). The Bank's affirmative defense claimed the pay disparity was due to Henry's college degree, additional work hours, community involvement, and recruitment by other banks. However, the jury found these justifications unconvincing, as on-the-job skills were deemed sufficient, and both employees worked extra hours. The jury also noted that Simpson had more computer training and that prior salary disparities should not justify unequal pay based on gender. 

The jury determined the Bank's actions were willful, supporting the award of liquidated damages. The Bank argued this was erroneous, citing insufficient evidence for willfulness and claiming good faith in its actions. Under the Equal Pay Act, liquidated damages equal to actual damages can be awarded unless the employer proves good faith. Additionally, a willful violation extends the statute of limitations for damages from two to three years. Willfulness requires more than negligence; it necessitates knowledge or reckless disregard for the law.

At trial, evidence was presented indicating that a reasonable jury could conclude the Bank acted with knowledge or reckless disregard for the Equal Pay Act's prohibitions. Sharp, the Bank's counsel and Board member responsible for employee salaries, likely knew about the Act due to his legal background, though mere awareness does not constitute willful violation. Further circumstantial evidence suggested willfulness, including Sharp's oversight of a personnel policy that treated male and female employees differently and a statement from another Board member indicating a preference for higher pay for male employees. Given this evidence, the jury could reasonably find the Bank willfully violated the Equal Pay Act.

The Bank failed to establish a good faith defense, which supported the affirmance of the district court's award of liquidated damages. Regarding attorney's fees, the Bank contested the district court's decision not to reduce these fees further. The court followed guidelines set by the Supreme Court, calculating fees based on reasonable hours worked multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate, and allowing for reductions based on the degree of success. The Bank's argument for a percentage reduction in fees based on the relief obtained versus sought was rejected, citing prior case law that discourages a proportionality rule in civil rights cases. The court determined that the twenty-percent reduction in fees was not an abuse of discretion, leading to the affirmation of the district court's decisions regarding liquidated damages and attorney's fees. Additionally, the issue of the statute of limitations related to willfulness was noted but not fully briefed, leaving it outside the current review.