United States v. Carrie Hamilton, Richard Miles, and Alice Miles
Docket: 04-20616
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; March 21, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
Carrie Hamilton, Richard Miles, and Alice Miles appeal their sentences related to a Medicare fraud scheme involving Affiliated Professional Home Health (APRO). The defendants were charged with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to defraud Medicare, structuring currency transactions, money laundering, mail fraud, health care fraud, and illegal remunerations. They received significant prison sentences: Richard Miles was sentenced to 97 months, Alice Miles to 168 months, and Hamilton to 204 months, alongside supervised release and special assessments. They were also ordered to jointly repay $4,292,246.72 to the United States.
In their first appeal, the Fifth Circuit partially reversed the convictions, specifically for some money laundering and healthcare kickbacks, while affirming others. The panel found that the district court erred in calculating the loss amount and improperly enhanced their sentences under guidelines that erroneously classified Medicare as a financial institution. Consequently, the court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing, although it upheld other aspects of the district court's rulings.
On remand, the Probation Office issued a Supplemental Presentence Report, reducing the total loss figure to $4,266,246.74 from an original $26,000 attributed to kickback counts. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, appellants argued that their sentences could not be enhanced based on facts not determined by a jury. However, the Fifth Circuit's United States v. Pineiro I ruled against the application of Blakely to federal sentencing guidelines. The district court resentenced the appellants, rejecting their Blakely-based objections due to the Pineiro I ruling and the argument's waiver, as it was not preserved during the initial appeal. Hamilton was sentenced to 171 months, Richard Miles to 63 months, and Alice Miles to 135 months, each receiving supervised release and special assessments. The district court also adjusted the restitution amount to align with the Probation Office’s recommendations. The appellants appealed again, contesting the loss calculation and arguing that the district court erred by not reevaluating the method of calculating loss under the mandate rule from United States v. Marmolejo. Their challenge regarding the inclusion of lawfully obtained profits in restitution calculations was framed not as a Sixth Amendment issue but as a methodological objection. The Government contended that the law of the case doctrine prevented the district court from reexamining this issue on remand.
The mandate on remand for resentencing is strictly limited, preventing the district court from re-evaluating issues beyond those specified in the appellate court's directive. In *Marmolejo*, the court upheld a district court's decision to exclude new evidence during resentencing because it was not part of the issues on remand. Defendants are required to raise all relevant issues during the original sentencing; the district court must then identify which issues are permissible based on the remand order, focusing on those arising from the correction of the sentence.
There are three exceptions to this mandate rule: (1) if evidence at a later trial is significantly different; (2) if there is a change in law by a controlling authority; and (3) if the previous decision is clearly erroneous and would lead to manifest injustice. In this case, the district court correctly determined that it could not reconsider the loss calculation except to make adjustments due to a reversal of certain convictions. The appellants' claims regarding the loss calculation were not properly before the court on remand, as those issues had already been fully addressed and denied by a prior panel.
The *Miles* panel had affirmed the loss calculation associated with fraudulent overcharges to Medicare, holding the appellants jointly accountable for over $4 million in restitution. This affirmation established the law of the case, precluding any further reconsideration of the loss amount on remand. The appellants argued that the intervening changes in law due to *Blakely* and *Booker* should allow reconsideration; however, the Government contended that these changes were not sufficient to meet the controlling authority standard necessary to trigger the intervening authority exception to the mandate rule.
In Matthews II, the defendant claimed that his sentence, stemming from a carjacking and conspiracy conviction, should be reconsidered based on the legal principles established in Apprendi, which he argued constituted an intervening change of law. The district court, however, rejected this claim and resentenced him according to the government's recommendations. On second appeal, the defendant contended that the mandate rule allowed for reconsideration of the enhancement on one conviction but not another. The panel found that Apprendi did indeed represent a significant change in law that overruled the earlier decision affirming the enhancement.
The ruling in Apprendi, which also underpins subsequent cases like Blakely and Booker, highlighted that the facts supporting sentence enhancements must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury, as per the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Appellants in the current case did not assert this argument during initial sentencing or appeal, differentiating their situation from Matthews I. The court noted that the issuance of Blakely prior to the resentencing did not qualify as an intervening change in law that would warrant an exception to the mandate rule.
The court affirmed the Appellants' sentences and the restitution calculations, citing the district court’s rationale. Appellants contended that the district court improperly relied on facts not established by a jury or admitted, violating Booker. They argued that their initial Sixth Amendment challenge preserved their right to raise this issue, while the Government contended that the Appellants waived their challenge by not raising it on initial appeal. The court indicated that the mandate rule did not prohibit reconsideration of a sentence if the issue had not been waived in the prior appeal, but concluded that the Appellants had indeed waived their Sixth Amendment objection. Consequently, the court reviewed the sentences for plain error, rejecting the Appellants' claims.
Appellants must demonstrate plain error, as per FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b). The district court committed a clear error by enhancing Appellants' sentences based on facts not included in the indictment, admitted by the Appellants, or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The reliance on Pineiro I to contest the enhancements and loss amount was identified as plain error. To establish reversible error, Appellants need to show that this error affected their "substantial rights," specifically that it influenced the outcome of the district court proceedings. The sentencing hearing transcript reveals no indication that the district court intended to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines or felt constrained by them, making it unclear what the judge would have done under an advisory Guidelines scheme. Consequently, Appellants are unable to demonstrate plain error based on this record. Therefore, the court affirms the Appellants' sentences, agreeing with the district court's reasoning and concluding that the Appellants could not prove the court erred under Booker. Additionally, Harold Miles was acquitted of charges unrelated to this appeal, while the other defendants objected to various sentence enhancements and loss calculations, which they argued were not properly alleged or proven.
