Hanan Haddad v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General
Docket: 04-4296
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 9, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
Hanan Haddad, a Jordanian citizen, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision, which denied her motion to reopen removal proceedings as untimely. Haddad contended that her divorce from Khalid Ishaq constituted a "changed circumstance" that should exempt her from the standard deadline for filing such motions. However, the court clarified that the exception applies only to changed country circumstances, not personal ones, thus affirming that Haddad remained subject to the deadline. The court further noted that her motion to reopen was filed significantly after both the denial of her initial appeal and her divorce, leading to the conclusion that it was not submitted within a "reasonable" timeframe. As a result, the court denied Haddad's petition for review. The background details included that both Haddad and Ishaq entered the U.S. on visitor visas, were placed in removal proceedings in 1996, and had their asylum application denied in 1999, with the BIA affirming that decision in 2002. Prior attempts by Haddad to remand her case for a new asylum application were also denied by the court.
Haddad petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of her motion to reopen removal proceedings, which she filed over twenty months after the BIA's prior decision. Jurisdiction is confirmed under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and the standard of review for the BIA's decisions is for abuse of discretion. The BIA initially considered Haddad's divorce as a basis for filing under the "changed circumstances" exception to the standard ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen. However, the BIA ultimately rejected the motion, citing it was not filed within a reasonable timeframe after the divorce.
The court found the BIA's classification of Haddad's divorce as a changed circumstance was incorrect, as it did not pertain to changed conditions in Jordan, thus subjecting her to the ninety-day filing requirement. Since Haddad's motion was untimely, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying it. Additionally, despite a prior court suggestion that Haddad could file a motion based on her divorce, the legal framework clearly indicates that such a motion would not be valid if filed late.
Haddad's denial of the motion to reopen her asylum case does not preclude her from submitting a new asylum application, despite the general one-year filing limit for such applications as stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), applications that are untimely or successive may still be considered if Haddad can demonstrate changed circumstances that materially affect her eligibility for asylum. Specifically, as Haddad was previously included as a dependent in another's asylum application, the loss of her spousal relationship qualifies as a changed circumstance as per 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(i)(C).
The conclusion affirms that Haddad can pursue this option for relief, even though it may seem contradictory that an application could be considered when filed anew but not when attached to a motion to reopen. Additionally, it highlights that while a spouse or child of an asylum grantee may qualify for derivative asylum benefits, such benefits depend on the relationship existing at the time of the principal applicant's approval (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21).
Haddad’s divorce occurred before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial of her husband's asylum application, suggesting she could have requested to sever her case from his during the appeal process. The document also notes a minor error in the BIA's timeline calculations concerning the appeal's duration. The denial of her husband's application does not preclude Haddad from obtaining asylum through her own application, but there is no assurance of success, as her new application could still be deemed untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii), and the court lacks jurisdiction to review such denials (8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)).
