Kassan Supreme Messiah v. Phillip Duncan, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York

Citation: 435 F.3d 186Docket: 04-5311

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; January 18, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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Kassan Supreme Messiah petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus following his conviction on multiple charges, including murder, stemming from a 1994 homicide. He challenged the trial court's handling of his Batson v. Kentucky claim regarding a peremptory strike against a juror, asserting that the court either failed to rule or made an unsupported ruling on the strike's validity. The Court of Appeals addressed whether specific findings are necessary for a court to properly adjudicate a Batson challenge. It concluded that a trial court meets its obligations at "step three" of the Batson framework by clearly indicating its decision after considering the challenge and the parties' arguments. The court ultimately found Messiah's claims to lack merit, affirming the District Court's dismissal of his petition. During jury selection, the prosecutor struck John Woodbury, a prospective juror with relevant experience, prompting Messiah's concerns about racial bias in the strike.

The prosecutor dismissed juror Woodbury using a peremptory strike, citing concerns that Woodbury's background in social work could make him sympathetic to the defendant, along with the fact that his wife worked at a law firm. Defense counsel, Aslaksen, objected, noting that Woodbury was the only black juror on the panel at that time, which prompted a rebuttal from the court denying that claim. Aslaksen reiterated concerns about racial representation among the jurors both before and after a weekend break in jury selection. The prosecutor disagreed with Aslaksen's assessment of the panel's diversity and defended his decision to strike Woodbury, claiming that Woodbury's professional background and behavior observed during jury selection indicated potential bias. Aslaksen contested the prosecutor's assertions about Woodbury's conduct, emphasizing the necessity of including jurors of color to safeguard the defendant's rights. The proceedings continued with further objections regarding the elimination of another black juror, John Rodgers, with Aslaksen seeking clarification on the prosecutor's reasons for that strike.

During a court proceeding, Mr. Neary expressed uncertainty about a juror's racial identity and justified his use of a peremptory challenge based on the juror’s background as an investment banker and interests that he deemed unrepresentative of average jurors. Defense counsel, Mr. Giamboi, argued the importance of having jurors of color for fair representation but was met with skepticism from the court, which questioned the validity of his objections. The court upheld the ruling on the challenge, indicating dissatisfaction with the defense's arguments.

Later, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory strike against Calvin Whitfield, citing his past arrest and family ties to incarceration as reasons for potential bias. Defense counsel countered by highlighting Whitfield's recent cooperation with police, asserting that the prosecutor's concerns were unfounded. Whitfield was ultimately not seated as a juror.

Subsequently, the prosecutor challenged George Purnell for cause due to his negative experiences with the legal system, which he believed would impede his fairness. The court initially leaned towards granting the challenge but reversed its position following a strong objection from the defense, which pointed out that Purnell was the last Black juror available. As a result, Purnell was allowed to serve as the third alternate juror.

Messiah did not contest the prosecutor's juror strikes, except for those against Woodbury, Rodgers, Whitfield, and Purnell. The seated jury included only one member from a racial minority, Purnell, who was an alternate and did not participate in deliberations. After being convicted, Messiah moved to set aside the verdict, alleging that the prosecutor's peremptory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court denied this motion.

Messiah appealed his conviction, arguing racial discrimination in juror strikes, but the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, noting that some of his claims were unpreserved for appellate review. He sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, which was denied. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to exclusion from a lineup, which was also denied.

On December 20, 1999, Messiah filed a federal habeas corpus petition, again asserting violations of the Equal Protection Clause due to discriminatory strikes. A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing all claims except for the Batson claim regarding John Woodbury, indicating that the trial court had not ruled on this objection, thus necessitating an evidentiary hearing. The District Court accepted some of these recommendations but ultimately dismissed Messiah's petition, agreeing with the assessment that the claims concerning panelists Rodgers and Whitfield were meritless.

The District Court overturned Judge Pitman's finding that the state trial court did not address the Batson challenge concerning the exclusion of juror Woodbury, asserting that the trial court dismissed the pretext claim by instructing defense counsel to "stop that nonsense." The District Court deemed the trial court's rejection of Messiah's Batson challenge as "not clearly unreasonable." On January 7, 2005, a panel granted Messiah a certificate of appealability focused solely on his Batson claims. Messiah argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his petition, claiming the trial court failed to rule on his challenge against Woodbury's exclusion and that the trial court's rejections of his claims regarding three panelists lack sufficient record support. Respondents counter that Messiah's claims are procedurally defaulted due to the Appellate Division's dismissal on independent state grounds. However, the court found it unclear whether the Appellate Division recognized the procedural default and opted to review the claims, ultimately concluding they lack merit as the trial court had ruled on the challenge to Woodbury and supported its decisions regarding the three panelists with adequate record evidence.

The Batson framework, established in Batson v. Kentucky, outlines a three-step process for determining if a jury panelist's exclusion was based on discriminatory motives, violating the Equal Protection Clause. Initially, the movant must establish a prima facie case suggesting improper exclusion grounds, often identified through patterns of strikes against protected group members. If successful, the non-movant must then provide a race-neutral rationale for the strike, which need not be persuasive at this stage. Finally, the trial court assesses whether the movant has sufficiently demonstrated that the strike was motivated by discrimination, maintaining that the burden of proof lies with the movant throughout the process. The final determination focuses on the credibility of the non-movant’s explanation in light of all surrounding facts.

Federal courts are generally prohibited from reviewing state court decisions based on independent and adequate state procedural grounds. According to the Supreme Court, if a petitioner defaults on federal claims in state court due to such a procedural rule, federal habeas review is barred unless the petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice, or demonstrate that not considering the claims would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The prohibition applies only when the last state court decision explicitly states that it rests on a state procedural bar. 

In this case, respondents argue that Messiah’s Batson claims cannot be reviewed because the Appellate Division relied on the procedural rule established in *People v. Allen*, which requires a party claiming a Batson violation to raise a claim of pretext after the opposing party presents a race-neutral reason for a strike. However, it is not clear that the Appellate Division explicitly relied on Allen in ruling on Messiah’s claims, as the opinion's language was ambiguous. Messiah's trial counsel raised a claim of pretext regarding the striking of a juror, which complicates the determination of whether the Appellate Division applied Allen. 

Because the opinion does not clearly indicate which claims were rejected on state procedural grounds, the court is not barred from reviewing the merits of Messiah’s Batson claims. The standard of review for the District Court's denial of Messiah’s habeas corpus petition is de novo under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) altered the review standard for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions, particularly concerning Batson claims. Prior to AEDPA, such claims were reviewed de novo, including mixed findings of fact and law, while affording great deference to state courts' credibility assessments of race-neutral explanations for juror strikes, as established in Hernandez v. New York. AEDPA introduced a more deferential standard for reviewing state court factual findings and legal conclusions when claims have been adjudicated on their merits.

In the case of Messiah, it is unnecessary to determine if his claims were adjudicated on the merits for AEDPA review, as his claims would fail under the previous pre-AEDPA standard as well. Specifically, Messiah contends that the trial court did not rule on his Batson challenge regarding panelist Woodbury, or that any ruling made was unsupported by the record. However, the same conclusion regarding the trial court's rulings would be reached regardless of the standard applied, whether pre-AEDPA or AEDPA. Thus, the distinction between these standards is not pivotal for the Batson claims involved, as they would not succeed under either review framework.

A trial judge has a duty at the third stage of the Batson inquiry to evaluate the credibility of the non-moving party's race-neutral explanations for peremptory strikes of jurors. This requires an explicit adjudication of such explanations, though a judge is not obligated to use specific wording to fulfill this duty. The key issue at this stage is whether the race-neutral explanation provided by counsel can be believed. A clear rejection of a Batson challenge can indicate that the court finds the prosecutor's explanation credible. While detailed findings are not required, the judge must allow parties to make their records and can express their ruling through acceptance or rejection of the challenge.

In the case of Woodbury, after a Batson challenge was made and a race-neutral explanation provided, the trial judge dismissed defense counsel's assertion that Woodbury was the only Black juror by stating, "You can stop that nonsense." The District Court interpreted this as a Batson ruling, suggesting the judge found the defense's claim to be without merit. However, the argument was made that the judge's comments did not constitute an adjudication of the credibility of the explanations and were merely a response to defense counsel's claim about the composition of the jury panel. The context indicates that the judge's remark was not a proper adjudication of the Batson claim.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed despite errors, due to the presence of a Batson adjudication later in the trial proceedings. After a comment from the trial judge, defense counsel inquired about their peremptory strikes, to which the judge confirmed the acceptance of five strikes, including that of juror Woodbury. The judge did not find the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for striking Woodbury unpersuasive, indicating a clear Batson ruling. 

Messiah did not argue that the trial judge hindered the defense from creating a complete record, contrasting with other cases where judges failed to allow full argumentation on peremptory strikes. The judge's acceptance of the prosecutor's reasoning following the Batson challenge was deemed sufficient.

Messiah contends that the trial court's rejection of the Batson challenge lacked record support, arguing that the prosecutor's reasons for striking Woodbury—his profession as a social behavior counselor and his wife's employment at a law firm—were pretextual, especially since four white jurors with volunteer experience were not struck. However, Messiah does not dispute Woodbury's qualifications as a social service professional, which the prosecutor could reasonably believe would predispose Woodbury to sympathize with the defendant more than part-time volunteers. 

Additionally, the prosecutor found Woodbury's claim of never discussing his wife’s legal work dubious, suggesting a potential bias. Thus, the prosecutor's skepticism regarding Woodbury's credibility and concerns about possible influences from his wife’s profession were deemed reasonable grounds for the strike.

The distinctions between Woodbury and the white panelists, along with the required deference to the trial judge's credibility assessment, support the ruling on the Batson challenge regarding Woodbury's exclusion. In addressing the challenge to panelist John Rodgers, the prosecutor claimed ignorance of Rodgers being a minority and cited inattentiveness during voir dire and an interest in boxing as reasons for striking him. The prosecutor's concerns about inattentiveness and potential undue sympathy for a professional boxer were deemed rational. Despite Messiah's assertion that the prosecutor's reasons were disingenuous due to the non-striking of a white panelist, William Cade, the record indicated no inattentiveness on Cade's part, and Cade's limited interest in amateur boxing was seen as less likely to elicit sympathy for professional boxers. The court concluded that there was no Batson violation in excluding Rodgers. 

Regarding panelist Calvin Whitfield, the prosecutor asserted that Whitfield's prior prosecution and familial connections to incarcerated individuals could lead to undue sympathy for Messiah. Messiah argued the failure to strike white panelists with similar familial issues indicated pretext, but the prosecutor's reasoning for excluding Whitfield was considered valid given the context of his prosecution by the same office. The District Court found no error in rejecting the Batson challenge concerning Whitfield.

DeLuca's son experienced an unspecified incident involving police related to his towing business, but both DeLuca and McCowen denied any personal involvement with the criminal justice system or the Westchester County District Attorney's Office. DeLuca expressed no negative feelings towards the police due to the incident, and neither he nor McCowen reported having any relatives in prison. Given the significant differences between the cases of Whitfield, DeLuca, and McCowen, along with the deference granted to the trial court's credibility determinations, the court upheld the rejection of Messiah's Batson challenge regarding the exclusion of panelist Whitfield. The ruling confirmed that as long as both parties in a Batson dispute can present their records, the trial court's clear acceptance or rejection of a peremptory strike is sufficient for adjudication, even without detailed findings. The trial court's decisions on Messiah's Batson challenges, including that of panelist Woodbury, were adequately supported by the record, leading to the dismissal of Messiah's habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was subsequently affirmed. Additionally, the trial judge noted the presence of at least five minority jurors remaining on the panel, contradicting defense counsel's claims. Various legal standards and procedural rules, including references to New York Criminal Procedure Law, were discussed, emphasizing the importance of the adequacy of state court adjudications in habeas corpus claims.

AEDPA's applicability is affirmed, as rejecting the claim on the merits would imply it is not procedurally barred, barring a showing of cause and prejudice. The court has not determined if the Allen rule constitutes an adequate and independent state procedural ground, leaving open the possibility that the state court's decision was based on a ground that does not meet this criterion. Consequently, the case does not present the same issues as Ryan, and the court avoids addressing the conflict between Ryan and DeBerry regarding whether AEDPA deference should apply in uncertain circumstances of state court claim adjudication. Judge Jacobs concurs in dismissing Messiah's petition but disagrees with the majority's characterization of the trial judge's ruling on the Batson challenge. He argues that the trial judge's comments do not meet the requirement for explicit step-three Batson rulings, as they merely reflect the number of peremptory challenges without addressing the Batson motion itself, although he acknowledges the existence of another sufficient basis for affirmance.

The Batson motion challenging the strike of juror Woodbury is dismissed on the grounds that Messiah's defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's race-neutral rationale, preventing a step-three Batson adjudication under New York law. The trial judge's acknowledgment of the prosecutor's strikes, including Woodbury's, after hearing arguments does not satisfy the necessary step-three Batson ruling because it lacks an explicit adjudication of the prosecutor's credibility regarding race-neutral explanations. Previous cases (Jordan v. Lefevre, Barnes v. Anderson, Galarza v. Keane) emphasize the requirement for trial courts to explicitly assess and credit race-neutral justifications for peremptory strikes to uphold the Equal Protection rights established in Batson v. Kentucky. While the majority believes the judge's denial of a mistrial motion fulfills the explicitness requirement, the rejection concerning the Woodbury strike lacks individualization and context specific to the Batson challenge. The majority's reliance on McKinney v. Artuz, where the trial court's statement was deemed sufficiently explicit, is deemed not analogous to the circumstances of this case.

The judge granted the Batson motion, allowing a juror to be seated despite a peremptory challenge, confirming that the necessary step-three Batson analysis was completed. When a judge notes that a struck juror is no longer present, it can indicate either a completed Batson analysis or a failure to consider the motion. The defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s non-discriminatory rationale, failing to trigger a step-three Batson adjudication as outlined in People v. Allen. The trial judge did not issue an explicit ruling on Batson due to the absence of a motion. The Supreme Court's Batson ruling permits states to create their own procedures for adjudicating Batson claims, provided they do not conflict with federal rights. New York's Allen rule aligns with this precedent, as seen in federal cases. The Appellate Division referenced Allen, indicating that the defense failed to meet its requirements, justifying the dismissal of a petition unless the state court’s decision contradicted established federal law. The Appellate Division's use of Allen was not clearly an independent procedural basis for rejecting the appeal, allowing for federal review despite a potential default. However, Allen's applicability is crucial as it prevents the Batson inquiry from progressing and hinders the development of a record for review. The trial judge's bypassing of the Batson issue stemmed from Messiah's waiver of the motion. The discussion distinguishes DeBerry v. Portuondo, highlighting that while an Allen-like rule exists, it does not necessitate a waiver of Batson claims if there is no objection to a non-discriminatory rationale in state court, focusing instead on the implications of state procedural rules in the current appeal.