Garcia v. State

Citations: 319 Ga. App. 751; 738 S.E.2d 333Docket: A12A2011; A12A2012

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; February 14, 2013; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Ramiro Garcia was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, making an improper lane change, and driving without a license, while co-defendant Jose Calderon was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and methamphetamine and possession of cocaine. Both defendants appeal their convictions and the denial of new trial motions, citing insufficient evidence for their drug convictions. Garcia argues for a severance of his trial from Calderon's, while Calderon contests the admission of similar-transaction evidence and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Their appeals are consolidated due to the charges stemming from the same facts.

On October 2, 2009, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security agent, acting on information from a confidential informant regarding drug trafficking at a Mexican restaurant and a residence on Sirocco Court, initiated surveillance. Garcia was observed arriving at the residence, leaving with a white plastic bag, and subsequently driving on Interstate 75, where he was stopped for a traffic violation and found without a valid license. An inventory search of his truck revealed over one kilogram of cocaine in the center console.

Following Garcia's arrest, officers obtained a search warrant for the Sirocco Court residence. They arrested Calderon near the restaurant after he noticed surveillance. During the search of the residence, officers discovered large quantities of cocaine and methamphetamine, along with digital scales, a laptop, and cash, confirming that Calderon resided at the location. A second search warrant was executed two days later after receiving additional information about undiscovered drugs. The appeals court affirmed both convictions.

Officers conducted a search of an inoperable vehicle in a garage, discovering secret compartments containing a substantial quantity of methamphetamine. During a subsequent search of the residence, they found a photograph of Calderon and various documents, including receipts and a vehicle title, all linked to him. Both Calderon and Garcia faced a joint indictment for trafficking in cocaine, with Calderon facing additional charges for trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana, while Garcia was charged with improper lane change and driving without a license. Before trial, the State sought to introduce evidence of Calderon’s prior trafficking conviction from 2004, which the trial court permitted after a pre-trial hearing. Garcia requested to sever his trial from Calderon's, but the court denied this motion as untimely and unmeritorious.

During the trial, testimony included accounts from drug-task-force officers regarding surveillance and searches, alongside the property owner confirming Calderon’s residency. A forensic chemist testified that over 10 kilograms of cocaine and more than 8.5 kilograms of methamphetamine were recovered. The State also presented evidence regarding Calderon’s previous drug trafficking offense under the alias Jesus Alvarez, established through fingerprint comparison. The jury convicted both defendants on all charges. Following the trial, they sought new counsel and filed motions for new trials, with Calderon alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied these motions, leading to appeals by both defendants. Garcia argued the evidence was insufficient for his cocaine trafficking conviction, claiming shared access to his vehicle, a contention the court rejected, emphasizing that evidence must be viewed favorably to the verdict and that the jury's findings should be upheld if supported by competent evidence.

Georgia law differentiates between actual possession, defined as direct physical control over an object, and constructive possession, which requires a person to have both the power and intention to control an object, demonstrated by a connection beyond mere proximity. Evidence of mere presence at a crime scene is insufficient for a conviction. The jury can infer a defendant's power from access to contraband, while surrounding circumstances inform their intention. For constructive possession, slight evidence of access and intention suffices to leave the issue for the trier of fact.

In the case of Garcia, officers observed him leaving a residence with a bag that likely contained cocaine and later found over a kilogram of cocaine in his truck. The presumption is that the owner or driver of a vehicle has control over its contents, which applied here as Garcia was the sole occupant of the truck, negating his argument that someone else had equal access. 

Calderon similarly contended that he did not knowingly possess cocaine and methamphetamine found in his rental home, citing equal access by others. However, substantial evidence indicated his constructive possession, including over 10 kilograms of cocaine and over 8.5 kilograms of methamphetamine found in the house he frequently entered, alongside personal items linking him to the residence. Calderon’s assertion of equal access lacked supporting evidence, reinforcing the jury’s finding of his possession.

Camareno was apprehended by police while attempting to break into a residence, which the owner only visited to collect a rent check. The argument that either the owner or Camareno had access to the drugs does not exculpate Calderon, as the jury must determine if such evidence sufficiently rebuts Calderon's possession of the drugs. The evidence was deemed adequate for a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Garcia's motion to sever his trial from Calderon’s was denied, with the court maintaining that this decision is at the trial court's discretion. Factors considered include potential confusion due to the number of defendants, risk of evidence being improperly applied to co-defendants, and whether their defenses were antagonistic. Garcia’s late motion and failure to demonstrate prejudice from a joint trial contributed to the denial. The trial court found no significant confusion given the small number of defendants and the similarity of their charges. Additionally, the court noted that both defendants denied knowledge of the drug possession, indicating non-antagonistic defenses. The court's omission to instruct the jury on the specific applicability of similar-transaction evidence did not affect the outcome. Evidence presented by the State, including Calderon’s fingerprints linked to a prior trafficking offense, was substantial. Finally, Calderon’s challenge against the admission of his 2004 trafficking conviction as similar-transaction evidence was also rejected, as the trial court’s discretion in admitting such evidence, when meeting the established criteria, was not abused.

To establish the admissibility of similar-transaction evidence for proving motive, intent, course of conduct, or bent of mind under Williams, the State must demonstrate: (a) that the similar transaction occurred and (b) that there is a sufficient connection or similarity to the alleged crime. The focus should be on the similarities rather than the differences between the crimes. In this case, evidence was presented that Calderon, using the alias Jesus Alvarez, was arrested in 2003 for trafficking methamphetamine, with significant quantities found in his vehicle and residence. He subsequently pleaded guilty to this charge in 2004, and a fingerprint comparison confirmed that Calderon and Alvarez are the same person. The trial court ruled the prior trafficking conviction admissible due to its relevance to Calderon’s course of conduct, given the current charges also involve trafficking large amounts of drugs. Under Georgia law, if a defendant is linked to another drug crime with sufficient similarity, that crime can be used to prove identity, motive, or course of conduct, justifying the trial court's decision.

Calderon also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that improper comments made by his attorney during opening statements and the failure to move for a mistrial following a curative instruction constituted deficient performance. To succeed in this claim, he must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was not only deficient but also prejudicial enough to likely change the trial's outcome. There is a presumption favoring the reasonableness of trial counsel's conduct. The trial court's factual findings on ineffective assistance claims are upheld unless clearly erroneous, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

Following Calderon’s arrest, a consent order was issued to suppress a handgun and cash found in his vehicle. The order also restricted references to the absence of money or guns during the trial. However, during opening statements, Calderon’s counsel claimed that "zero" was found in the vehicle, leading the State to argue this violated the suppression order and allowed the admission of the suppressed evidence. Calderon’s counsel disagreed, asserting that his statement did not breach the order.

Calderon contended that any violation of the court order regarding his remarks was unintentional. The trial court deemed the remarks improper but ruled they did not warrant admitting the handgun or cash as evidence. The court issued a curative instruction to the jury, clarifying that references to the search of Calderon’s vehicle made during opening statements were inadmissible and should be disregarded. Calderon later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's statement that "zero" was found in the vehicle and the failure to request a mistrial after the curative instruction. The court determined that without trial counsel's testimony regarding the strategy behind his actions, the decisions were presumed strategic and insufficient to support an ineffective assistance claim. Furthermore, the court held that a conviction would not be reversed if the opening statement was made in good faith and the jury was instructed not to consider it as evidence, which the trial court did. Therefore, any motion for a mistrial would have been meritless, and Calderon failed to demonstrate that the outcome would have been different despite any alleged deficiencies. The trial court's denial of Calderon's ineffective assistance claim was affirmed, with the judgments upheld.

The document references various Georgia appellate cases regarding drug possession and trial procedures. Key points include:

1. **Equal Access Rule**: The jury may convict a defendant of drug possession if there is no unrebutted evidence of equal access to the contraband. This principle is supported by cases such as *Miller v. State* and *Garcia v. State*, where ownership or direct access to the vehicle or residence containing the drugs was pivotal.

2. **Constructive Possession**: In *Lott v. State*, the court held that defendants could have constructive possession of drugs found in a residence they did not own, based on their presence and living situation. Similarly, in *Castillo v. State*, the defendant's identification of an apartment as hers and evidence linking her to it supported a finding of possession.

3. **Pretrial Motions**: Under OCGA § 17-7-110, all pretrial motions must be filed within ten days post-arraignment unless extended by the court. 

4. **Severance of Defendants**: The trial court's denial of a motion to sever defendants was deemed appropriate in *Lankford v. State*, as the number of defendants was small enough to mitigate confusion.

5. **Defensive Strategies**: In *Jones v. State*, it was found that defenses were not antagonistic when both defendants denied involvement in a shooting. 

6. **Admissibility of Prior Convictions**: The document discusses the admissibility of prior drug-related convictions to demonstrate a defendant's character or intent, as seen in cases like *Watt v. State* and *Celestin v. State*.

7. **Comments in Court**: The case *Butler v. State* noted that comments on obvious facts typically do not prejudice a jury.

Overall, the text outlines the legal standards and case law relevant to possession, trial procedures, and evidentiary rules in Georgia.

A strong presumption exists that a lawyer’s conduct is within a reasonable range of professional assistance, as established in Henderson v. State. The opening statements of both parties were not transcribed; however, during a bench conference, Calderon’s counsel did not contest the State’s interpretation of his comments. Relevant case precedents indicate that failing to request a mistrial does not amount to ineffective assistance if it is evident that the trial court would likely deny such a request. Additionally, if Calderon’s counsel had objected to the court’s instruction, it would have been seen as attempting to benefit from his own prior mistake, which cannot be grounds for claiming prejudice. The principle that one cannot complain about a result they caused or aided is supported by Borders v. State. Furthermore, in Lowe v. State, it was determined that a defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from alleged deficient performance of counsel, given the overwhelming evidence against him regarding cocaine possession.