Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Darla Motley Juan Jamerson v. Bernard Parks Daryl Gates Gerald Chaleff Herbert Boeckman T. Warren Jackson Robert M. Talcott Raymond C. Fisher Guadalupe Sanchez Gregory Kading Al Ruegg James Black Lawrence Webster Dean Hansell
Citations: 432 F.3d 1072; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29008; 2005 WL 3556971Docket: 02-56648
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 29, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed key issues related to parole-related searches in the case of Motley and Jamerson v. Parks et al., affirming the necessity for probable cause regarding a parolee's residency before conducting a warrantless search. The court determined that officers had probable cause to search the plaintiffs' residence, as it was established that the parolee, Janae Jamerson, resided there at the time. The court chose not to rule on whether particularized suspicion of wrongdoing was required for such searches, citing pending Supreme Court consideration of that issue. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment favoring the officers on the illegal search claim and dismissed the Monell claims against former LAPD chiefs Parks and Gates. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for Officer Kading concerning the excessive force claim. The facts indicate that Jamerson, a gang member, had a parole condition allowing searches of his property, while his girlfriend, Darla Motley, asserted sole responsibility for the apartment where they both lived, despite Jamerson's temporary incarceration. On March 18, 1999, LAPD Officer Albert Ruegg conducted a briefing for officers from various agencies regarding planned searches of ten parolees' residences in the Newton Street area, part of a task force formed to address gang-related violence. Janae Jamerson, one of the identified parolees, was noted to have gang connections, but officers acknowledged they had no reasonable suspicion of his involvement in any crime and were targeting parolees to improve neighborhood safety. Prior to the briefing, Ruegg instructed his team to prepare information packages on suspected gang-member parolees, confirming that Jamerson was on active parole and providing his last known address. Later that morning, a team of four officers approached what they believed to be Jamerson's residence, with two officers going to the back and two to the front. LAPD officer Gregory Kading, along with his partner, knocked on the front door, identifying themselves as police and claiming to have a search warrant. However, they did not possess a warrant, nor was Jamerson's parole officer present. When resident Motley informed them that Jamerson was in custody, the officers insisted on conducting the search under the threat of arresting her and placing her infant son, Juan, in foster care. Feeling coerced, Motley allowed them entry. Once inside, with firearms drawn, the officers searched the apartment for Jamerson. Kading entered Motley's bedroom, where he pointed his firearm at Juan while searching the room, only holstering it when additional assistance arrived. The officers took approximately twenty minutes to search the bedroom. After the search, Motley contacted Jamerson's parole officer, who confirmed the search was unauthorized and that Jamerson remained in custody. Subsequently, Motley relocated to San Pedro out of fear for her and her son's safety in the Newton Street area. Motley, representing herself and her son Juan, initiated a Section 1983 lawsuit claiming that law enforcement officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights through excessive force and conspiracy, and that the officers' employing agencies were liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The officers sought summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity, which the district court granted for all claims. On appeal, Motley contends that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity regarding the unlawful search and excessive force against her infant son, as well as the Monell claims against specific officers. The qualified immunity standard allows for a private right of action against law enforcement officers who violate constitutional rights while acting under authority. However, officers may be shielded from trial if they reasonably misinterpret the law, even if their actions were constitutionally inadequate. The Supreme Court's Saucier v. Katz framework requires courts to first determine if the officer's actions constituted a constitutional violation. If a violation is found, the court must then assess whether the violated right was clearly established at the time of the incident. If not, qualified immunity protects the officer from further litigation. The parties in this case propose to bypass the initial inquiry and assume a constitutional violation occurred, focusing instead on whether the rights were clearly established. The Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of defining the constitutional right first, as this sets precedents for future cases and clarifies legal standards for both law enforcement and the public. The Supreme Court has underscored the need to clarify the constitutional standards for law enforcement actions concerning their belief about an individual's residence. The crucial determination is the level of certainty required for officers to believe that Jamerson lived at a specific address. Additionally, there is a constitutional issue regarding whether officers need particularized suspicion of wrongdoing by Jamerson, which diverges from the Saucier inquiry because the Supreme Court is concurrently reviewing a similar case (Samson v. California). In this extraordinary situation, the court will bypass the initial Saucier step and focus solely on whether it was clearly established that some suspicion of wrongdoing was necessary at the time of the search. For a Section 1983 illegal search claim, the requirement of probable cause is essential in establishing a residence for a parole search. Law enforcement must have reasonable belief based on observations to justify a parole search at a specific address, as established in prior cases such as United States v. Dally. The court highlights that in Perez v. Simmons, officers were required to have reasonable grounds to believe that the subject of a warrant resided at the searched location. This standard is critical to uphold Fourth Amendment protections. In Watts v. County of Sacramento, it was reiterated that officers must possess a reasonable belief regarding a suspect's residence before executing a search, reinforcing the necessity of this standard to prevent unlawful searches. A warrantless search of a parolee's residence is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if law enforcement officers have a reasonable belief that they are at the correct address where the parolee resides. The condition of parole allowing for such searches does not extend to third-party residences without reasonable certainty that the parolee lives there. The presence of guests does not diminish Fourth Amendment protections, and law enforcement must obtain consent or a warrant to search a third party's home unless exigent circumstances exist. Recent case law reinforces that the standard for determining residency should align with probable cause, requiring substantial evidence that a suspect lives in a particular location before officers can enter to execute a warrant. These standards aim to protect citizens from unreasonable privacy invasions while allowing law enforcement some flexibility to act on reasonable assumptions. Ultimately, officers must have probable cause to believe a parolee resides at the address being searched before conducting a warrantless search under a parole condition. Officers had probable cause to believe Jamerson resided with Motley based on information from the LAPD regarding Jamerson's parole status and address. Officer Ruegg supervised the operation and had assigned a team member to verify Jamerson's details about a month prior to the search. Officer Kading had prior interactions with Jamerson, who, along with his grandmother, confirmed his residence at the targeted location. Kading informed the team that Jamerson lived in the rear unit and was aware of his parole status. Under Section 1983, a supervisor can be liable if they initiate actions leading to a constitutional violation, even without direct involvement. However, supervisors are not required to conduct independent investigations unless there is evidence indicating that existing investigations were inadequate. There is no indication that Ruegg was aware of any deficiencies in the investigation regarding Jamerson. Law enforcement officers are generally permitted to rely on information from their colleagues to ensure effective operations. This principle is reinforced by the "collective knowledge doctrine," which allows probable cause to be established based on the combined knowledge of all officers involved, regardless of whether all critical information was shared with each officer. Only a few officers typically plan and lead a search, while many others assist in its execution. The leading officers are responsible for ensuring they have lawful authority, while line officers have lesser responsibilities. All officers, however, must make appropriate inquiries regarding the facts they receive and further investigate if details are insufficient. Officers involved in a search must understand the nature and scope of the warrant. The critical issue is whether an officer's reliance on information was objectively reasonable. During a search briefing, officers received details about Jamerson's parole status, and it was determined that their reliance on this information was reasonable. An officer with a good-faith belief in their authority cannot be held liable for erroneous information provided by others. When engaging with probable cause, it involves assessing probabilities based on factual contexts. The officers had probable cause to believe Jamerson resided with Motley, thus lawfully searching the residence, even though only Motley was present. Summary judgment was granted in favor of ATF Agent Webster since he did not participate in the search. Officers can maintain their belief in the validity of their information until presented with convincing evidence to the contrary. Motley's claim that Jamerson did not live there did not undermine the prior information, as residents may mislead police about each other's presence. In conclusion, the officers had probable cause to search the apartment, and it was not clearly established at the time that they needed particularized suspicion of wrongdoing by Jamerson. Parolees are subject to specific conditions that impose greater restrictions on their activities than those typically applied to the general public, as established in Morrissey v. Brewer. States have the authority to supervise parolees closely and infringe upon their privacy rights due to the state's "special needs" in managing the parole system, although parolees retain some Fourth Amendment protections. The key standard regarding searches under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, but legal clarity on the necessary level of suspicion for conducting searches of parolees was not well-defined at the time of the searches in question. The Supreme Court's decision in Griffin allowed for searches of parolees based on "reasonable grounds" without specifying the lowest threshold for suspicion. Subsequent rulings, including Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott and United States v. Knights, addressed related issues but left unresolved whether a search could be conducted without any particularized suspicion. By March 1999, the legal status surrounding suspicionless searches of parolees remained unclear, indicating that the issue was not clearly established in the context of constitutional law. The excerpt outlines the legal framework governing searches of probationers and parolees within the Ninth Circuit, emphasizing that the absence of a Supreme Court ruling does not nullify the existence of clearly established rights. Key points include: 1. **Binding Precedent**: Past decisions regarding the legality of searches of probationers and parolees are binding for law enforcement officers in the circuit. 2. **State Law Compliance**: Searches must comply with state law to be deemed constitutional. Previous cases indicate that parole searches are valid if they align with state law requirements. 3. **Search Conditions**: Validity of a search condition under California law must be established, alongside its correct application in specific circumstances. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is necessary to trigger such searches. 4. **Case References**: - *United States v. Johnson* emphasized the need for a reasonable request for a search under state law. - *United States v. Wryn* stated that warrantless searches are reasonable if authorized by state law or probation agreements, though it didn’t confirm that state law itself must not violate the Fourth Amendment. - *United States v. Watts* linked the constitutionality of probation searches to adherence to state law and the concept of "special needs" that justify deviations from standard Fourth Amendment protections. 5. **Clarification in Conway**: The case clarified that a probation search is permissible if conducted under state law that meets the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, which was upheld in that case due to statutory authorization based on reasonable cause. Overall, the excerpt illustrates the evolving nature of judicial interpretations surrounding the standards for searches of individuals on probation or parole, grounded in state law compliance and constitutional considerations. In the year Conway was decided, the court reaffirmed its stance against using a parolee’s search condition as a pretext for unrelated law enforcement investigations, emphasizing that a warrantless search must be a legitimate probation search, not a cover for criminal inquiry (United States v. Ooley). The court indicated that a search cannot be merely a "subterfuge" to avoid obtaining a warrant and noted the absence of a requirement for reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on the probationer's part at that time. Although the Supreme Court in Knights later rejected the focus on the search's purpose, it overturned prior rulings that invalidated searches deemed mere subterfuge for criminal investigations. The court acknowledged that, generally, post-incident cases should not inform whether the law was clearly established at the time of the incident. Regarding the search of Motley's apartment, the court determined that the legal framework for conducting parole-related searches was not sufficiently clear for officers to understand that their warrantless and suspicionless search violated her rights. California law had recently changed to allow suspicionless searches of parolee residences, which may have led the officers to reasonably believe they were compliant with both California and federal law. Although the court recognized that their understanding of the law was incorrect following subsequent rulings, this could not have been anticipated in March 1999. Motley referenced two cases to argue that reasonable suspicion has long been required for searches, but neither established a clear precedent. In United States v. Davis, the court indicated that reasonable suspicion governs the bounds of a probation search but focused on whether a specific item in the probationer’s residence fell within the search's scope rather than establishing a generalized requirement for suspicion of wrongdoing. The court characterized Davis as addressing probable cause related to items intended for search rather than a broader requirement for suspicion against the parolee. Lastly, the ambiguity surrounding United States v. Dally on this issue was noted. A parolee may be searched if the parole officer has a reasonable belief that a search is warranted, as outlined in the parole agreement which requires consent for searches and prior permission for residence changes. In this case, the search was deemed authorized by California law due to the parolee’s failure to respond to calls and the discovery of another residence. The court did not clarify whether the search was justified by the parolee’s new residence or by his violation of parole terms. In the related case of Moreno v. Baca, an individual was stopped, detained, and searched by officers who later discovered he was on parole. The court ruled that officers must be aware of a parole condition before conducting a search. Moreno established that knowledge of the individual’s parole status is crucial for justifying a search, and that reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing must be known to the officer at the time of the search. In the current case, the officers searching Motley's apartment are granted qualified immunity as they had probable cause to believe that parolee Jamerson resided there, and it was not clearly established that specific suspicion of wrongdoing was required for the search. Additionally, Motley's claim of excessive force against an officer during the search, involving a firearm pointed at her infant, was also dismissed, with the officer granted qualified immunity. A reversal and remand have been issued regarding claims of excessive force by law enforcement, which are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. The constitution prohibits the use of force against individuals who are helpless or subdued, as illustrated by various case law, including Robinson and Drummond, where excessive force was identified in scenarios involving firearm threats and prolonged pressure on restrained detainees. Additionally, even the mere display of force, such as brandishing a weapon, can be subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as established in Robinson and McDonald, where threatening actions without justification were deemed unreasonable. In the current case involving Officer Kading, keeping a firearm trained on an infant, despite the initial context of a gang-related sweep, is considered to violate the Fourth Amendment's standards. The analysis then shifts to qualified immunity, assessing whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently clear to a reasonable officer as unlawful. For qualified immunity to apply, the asserted right must be clear enough that a reasonable official would recognize the violation. The precedent, as noted in Camarillo and Anderson, underscores that officials are not protected if the unlawfulness of their actions is apparent from existing law, regardless of whether similar prior cases have established liability in analogous situations. Officer Kading's actions, specifically holding an infant at gunpoint, were deemed objectively unreasonable due to the lack of threat posed by Juan to Kading or other officers. The court determined that any use of force was unwarranted, as a reasonable officer should recognize that such conduct constitutes excessive force. The absence of prior cases directly prohibiting this specific action does not grant Kading qualified immunity, as the law was clearly established regarding excessive force in this context. The district court's summary judgment favoring Officer Kading on the excessive force claim was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Regarding Monell claims, the court agreed with the district court that there was insufficient evidence to establish liability against former LAPD chiefs Parks and Gates, affirming the dismissal of these claims. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling on the search, granting summary judgment in favor of the officers, as well as the summary judgment for city officials concerning the Monell claims. The ruling concluded with a partial affirmation and reversal, stating that the parties would bear their own costs on appeal. Notably, the court acknowledged that some material facts contradicted the officers' testimonies but maintained that Motley's account should be accepted due to the summary judgment posture and the qualified immunity inquiry. Proceeding to the second step of the Saucier analysis is warranted in this case. Motley claims that information used in the case was stale and unreliable due to its compilation in November 1998, but both the district court and the reviewing court find no support for this argument in the record. The task force began collecting broad information in November 1998, but specific information regarding the address was developed shortly before March 18, 1999, the date of the search. At a deposition, it was revealed that LAPD directed officers to the rear residence based on their information. Additionally, it is noted that Jamerson's infant son continued to reside at the 40th Place apartment, suggesting it remained Jamerson's residence despite his temporary absence; however, this issue does not need to be resolved as probable cause existed on the search date. The document also emphasizes that there is no constitutional distinction between probation and parole concerning the Fourth Amendment, referencing Moreno v. Baca. It discusses various circuit rulings on parole-related searches but notes that many do not apply due to differing state requirements for reasonable suspicion. The only pre-March 1999 cases addressing warrantless and suspicionless searches of parolees reached conflicting conclusions. The document suggests that imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement could undermine the purpose of search conditions, while also noting some circuits have avoided addressing the constitutionality of California’s law allowing suspicionless searches. Ultimately, the document does not take a position on the imposition of search conditions without reasonableness limitations for all probationers, nor does it conclude that the law was clearly established based on the surveyed case law. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of warrantless searches for probationers, provided these searches are reasonable and aid in rehabilitation. This principle aligns with other judicial precedents, including State v. Morgan, which establishes that good faith searches by parole officers to ensure compliance with release conditions are permissible unless they are excessively frequent, conducted at unreasonable times, or prolonged, indicating arbitrary or oppressive conduct. Various state rulings support that random warrantless searches of probationers can be justified if they relate to supervision and rehabilitation, as seen in State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity and State v. Perbix. Conversely, some jurisdictions mandate a standard of reasonable suspicion before conducting such searches, as highlighted in cases like Commonwealth v. LaFrance and State v. Velasquez. Although the legal interpretations vary, they generally affirm that probation conditions must be reasonable according to established statutes. The excerpt also discusses the definition of a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, clarifying that it occurs when government actions physically limit a citizen's liberty. Circuit Judge Reinhardt, joined by Judges Fletcher, Pregerson, and Paez, dissents regarding the majority’s ruling on the search of a probationer's residence. While agreeing that the Supreme Court's certiorari grants justification for bypassing the first prong of the Saucier test and acknowledging that the law concerning reasonable suspicion for searches of probationers or parolees is not clearly established, Reinhardt contends that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Jamerson resided at Motley's home. He argues that the information regarding Jamerson's residence was outdated and that Officer Ruegg, responsible for verifying parolee information, did not ensure its accuracy despite knowing that such information could be stale. Reinhardt emphasizes that Ruegg’s failure to verify the residence information, coupled with his supervisory role, renders him liable under Section 1983 and ineligible for qualified immunity. Furthermore, the dissent highlights that the searching officers were aware of Jamerson's last known address, but they did not confirm its relevance or current status. Upon arrival at Motley's residence, they were informed by Motley that Jamerson was in custody, yet instead of verifying this with Jamerson's parole officer, the officers provided false information regarding Jamerson's release and their legal authority to conduct the search. Motley consistently stated that Jamerson was in custody and did not reside at her home, prompting the officers to verify his custody and residence status, which they failed to do. Although officers can rely on information from colleagues, they are still obligated to conduct reasonable inquiries. The officers lacked a search warrant and had a clear duty to confirm the accuracy of their information regarding Jamerson's residency but did not seek verification, despite the ability to do so via a quick phone call to his parole officer. The officers' actions, including the use of deliberate falsehoods, indicated a lack of reasonable belief that Jamerson resided at Motley's home and suggested an attempt to circumvent proper inquiry through intimidation. Consequently, Officers Kading, Sanchez, and Black did not possess probable cause for believing that Jamerson lived there and are not entitled to qualified immunity. This dissent notes that the analysis does not extend to Officer Webster, who was in training and did not participate in the search.