In the Interest of K. L. M.

Citations: 316 Ga. App. 246; 729 S.E.2d 452; 2012 WL 2161410Docket: A12A0272, A12A0273

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; June 15, 2012; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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The juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights regarding her children K. L. M. and K. M. S. Following her appeal, the mother argued that the court lacked sufficient findings and that the evidence did not warrant the termination of her rights. The appellate court vacated the lower judgments and remanded for properly supported orders. The court emphasized reviewing evidence favorably towards the juvenile court's decisions, without weighing evidence or credibility. 

The background reveals that the mother cohabited with the father, a registered sex offender, since around 2002, and had three children, including K. L. M. and K. M. S. Reports of domestic violence led Texas authorities to initiate custody removal proceedings in 2009, prompting the mother to flee to Georgia with K. L. M. and K. M. S., leaving her third child, H. H., in the father’s girlfriend’s custody. The Berrien County Department of Family and Children Services investigated, leading to the children being taken into care due to sanitation issues, medical neglect, and inadequate living conditions. 

The juvenile court deemed the children deprived and issued a reunification plan requiring the mother to secure stable housing, maintain employment, and end her relationship with the father. The mother refused to pay for utility deposits despite having employment and was found to be sending money to the father, contradicting her claims of no contact. Evidence indicated she maintained a relationship with him, despite a counselor's warnings about manipulation. This led the Department to pursue a non-reunification plan and file for termination of parental rights. At the termination hearing, the mother acknowledged her inaction regarding obtaining custody of H. H. from the father’s girlfriend.

The Department reported the mother's living conditions with her sister as unsuitable for the children, citing insufficient space and a severe odor from the home. The mother had not paid child support since the children's removal. The Department concluded that returning the children to her would result in their continued deprivation. During the juvenile court proceedings, the mother could not convincingly explain her relationship status with the father, which was a concern due to his status as a registered sex offender. Evidence showed significant improvements in the children's health and well-being since their placement in foster care. Both the guardian ad litem and the CASA recommended terminating the mother's parental rights, emphasizing her ongoing relationship with the father and inadequate housing.

The juvenile court, taking judicial notice of previous proceedings, found clear and convincing evidence of the children's deprivation due to the mother's lack of proper care. The court determined that this deprivation was likely to continue, posing a risk of serious harm to the children, thus concluding that terminating the mother's rights was in their best interest. The mother argued that the court's findings were insufficient and that evidence did not support the termination. The process for terminating parental rights involves two steps: first, establishing parental misconduct or inability, and second, determining if termination serves the child's best interests. The mother acknowledged prior deprivation findings but contended that the court did not assess the current status of deprivation at the time of the termination order. However, unappealed deprivation orders bind parents, establishing the existence of conditions that constituted deprivation, provided the Department demonstrates these conditions persisted at the termination hearing.

The juvenile court's findings of deprivation were based on the father's status as a registered sex offender living near the mother, who was deemed a flight risk, and the unhealthy living conditions of the children. These conditions persisted at the time of the termination hearing, with the mother still residing in the unsuitable home and continuing her relationship with the father despite evidence of its negative impact. The mother did not challenge the initial deprivation orders, which bound her to those findings. Her failure to secure appropriate housing, terminate her relationship with the father, and fulfill child support obligations contributed to the conclusion that the children were deprived. The court emphasized that the mother's lack of progress in complying with the reunification plan further supported this finding.

Additionally, the mother's prior failure to appeal the juvenile court's determinations regarding her lack of proper parental care and control rendered those findings binding. Evidence indicated that if the children were returned to her, they would likely revert to a state of deprivation due to her continued poor choices, including maintaining contact with the father and neglecting her responsibilities. The court noted that while past deprivation alone isn't sufficient for termination, a parent's history is relevant in assessing the likelihood of ongoing deprivation. Despite counseling for domestic violence, the mother's non-compliance with the reunification plan and her ongoing relationship with the father reinforced the likelihood of continued deprivation.

The mother was unable to provide a convincing rationale for the juvenile court to trust her claims of having ended her relationship with the father. The court found that past evidence of deprivation justified the conclusion that the deprivation of her children, K. L. M. and K. M. S., would likely persist if returned to her custody. The mother’s ongoing relationship with an abusive individual, lack of stable housing, and failure to take significant steps toward securing a home indicated a likelihood of continued harmful behavior. 

The court assessed the potential for harm to the children if returned to the mother, while also considering the risks of them remaining in foster care. It is mandated that any order terminating parental rights must include explicit findings that demonstrate the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious harm due to deprivation. A mere acknowledgment of legal standards is inadequate; the judge must detail both the facts and reasoning behind their conclusions.

In this case, while the juvenile court noted the likelihood of serious harm from continued deprivation, it failed to provide specific factual findings regarding the children's relationship with their mother, their foster care status, or their need for stability. This lack of detail impedes a proper evaluation of whether the court’s findings regarding serious harm were justified. As a result, the judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded for the juvenile court to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the potential for serious harm from continued deprivation.

Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, and his associates represented the appellee. The judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with directions, with Judges Mikell and Blackwell concurring. While the father's parental rights were terminated, this was not a matter in the current appeal. The child H. H. was not part of the deprivation petition, and previous deprivation orders went unappealed. Although the mother was not explicitly ordered to pay child support, she had a statutory obligation to support her children in foster care, as established by Georgia law, regardless of court orders or income status. The mother's argument that the juvenile court improperly relied on hearsay evidence regarding the continuation of deprivation was dismissed. The foster mother testified about K. L. M.'s claims of sexual abuse by her father and others; however, this testimony was deemed inadmissible due to a lack of evidence that K. L. M. was available to testify. The juvenile court did not reference the foster mother's hearsay testimony in its order, nor did it rely on these statements in its decision.