Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. McTaggart

Citations: 313 Ga. App. 103; 720 S.E.2d 217; 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3720; 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1011Docket: A11A1022

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; November 15, 2011; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Roger and Glenda McTaggart initiated a personal injury lawsuit against Yamaha Motor Corporation and its affiliates after Roger was injured when his Yamaha Rhino rolled over onto his leg. The McTaggarts claimed the Rhino was defective due to the absence of a door. The jury awarded them $317,002 in damages. Yamaha appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion for a new trial, arguing errors in the denial of directed verdicts, jury instructions, and the exclusion of its affirmative defenses from the special verdict form. The appellate court found that evidence indicated Roger assumed the risk of his injuries and reversed the trial court's decision. The McTaggarts purchased the 2006 Yamaha Rhino, which lacked doors and windows but included safety features such as a steel roof cage and warning stickers about the risks of rollovers. Roger declined an aftermarket door installation for easier access. On the day of the incident, after minimal movement, the vehicle rolled over, injuring Roger's leg. Initially, the McTaggarts alleged both negligence and strict liability based on a latent stability defect and the lack of doors, but they later focused solely on the door issue. The jury's award included amounts for pain, medical expenses, lost wages, and loss of consortium for Glenda. Yamaha's appeal followed the trial court's denial of a new trial.

Yamaha contends that the trial court incorrectly denied its motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that the evidence clearly showed Roger assumed the risk of his injuries. Assumption of risk requires that the plaintiff is aware of a dangerous condition stemming from the defendant's negligence and voluntarily chooses to proceed. To establish this defense, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood the associated risks; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks. The knowledge involved must be specific to the risk that caused the injury, rather than general risks related to the activity. 

Although generally a jury decides on assumption of risk, in clear cases, a jury's resolution may not be necessary. In this case, while the jury found that the Rhino's defective design caused Roger's injuries, Yamaha argued that Roger's assumption of risk should bar his recovery. Evidence indicated that Roger had both actual and subjective knowledge of the dangers linked to the Rhino's doorless design. He chose the Rhino for its doorless feature, which he found convenient due to his size, and acknowledged understanding the warnings about keeping limbs inside the vehicle. Roger laughed off the warnings, indicating he believed common sense sufficed. With seven months of experience operating the Rhino and extensive prior experience with various off-road vehicles, he recognized the dangers of rolling over and the importance of staying with the vehicle. Thus, the evidence supported that Roger voluntarily accepted the risks, which would prevent his recovery for injuries sustained.

Roger, an experienced operator of the Rhino vehicle, understood the safety measures provided by its roll bar and seat belt, which could protect him during a rollover. He acknowledged that extending limbs outside the vehicle during such an event could result in severe injury. Despite recognizing this risk, Roger chose to operate the Rhino, valuing its ease of entry and exit. On appeal, the McTaggarts contended that Roger did not appreciate the possibility of inadvertently extending his foot outside the vehicle in a rollover. However, Roger's testimony confirmed his awareness of the dangers, as he indicated he would attempt to brace himself if possible and acknowledged that operators typically do not intentionally extend limbs during rollovers. This established that Roger knowingly assumed the risks associated with operating the vehicle. The court found that the trial court erred in denying Yamaha’s motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that Roger voluntarily accepted the risks of injury. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Yamaha. Further considerations of Yamaha's arguments were deemed unnecessary.

Miller, P. J. and Ellington, J. concurred in a decision dated November 15, 2011, with a reconsideration denied on December 1, 2011. The appellants were represented by Jones Day, specifically David M. Monde, while the appellees were represented by Childers, Schlueter, Smith, with C. Andrew Childers as counsel. Glenda's claim involved loss of consortium. The case referenced ASC Constr. Equip. USA v. City Commercial Real Estate, where the trial court granted a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding Roger's driving behavior and its connection to the accident or his injuries. The jury did not award punitive damages. In related case citations, the court emphasized that the risk-utility analysis from Banks v. ICI Americas did not prevent summary judgment on the basis of assumption of risk. The jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on negligence claims but found that Yamaha's failure to provide adequate warnings did not proximately cause Roger's injuries. Evidence was presented showing Yamaha had received numerous customer complaints about leg injuries from rollover accidents involving Rhinos and was aware of simulation test results indicating that participants often instinctively extended their legs during rollovers. Reports indicated between 50 and 200 injury complaints in a seven-month timeframe. Comparisons were made regarding voluntary assumption of risk in similar cases, noting differences in general versus specific risks assumed by plaintiffs.