United States v. Frank Estrada, Also Known as "The Terminator," Also Known as "Big Dog," Also Known as Frankie Estrada, Also Known as "Mustard" Edward Estrada, Also Known as "French Fry," Also Known as "Fry" Isaias Soler, Also Known as "Eso" Nelson Carrasquillo William Rodriguez, Also Known as Billy Rodriguez, Also Known as William Gomez, Also Known as "Billy the Kid" Charles Dejesus, Also Known as "Chino" Eddie Lawhorn, Also Known as "Fat Boy" Yamarr Shipman, Also Known as "Country," Also Known as "Mar" Michael Hilliard, Also Known as "Mizzy" Rosario Cotto, Also Known as "Sato" Pablito Cotto Benito Rosario Jermaine Jenkins, Also Known as "Fats" Makene Jacobs, Also Known as "Madee" Joseph Butler, Also Known as "Pee Wee" Viviana Jiminez Kelvin Vereen, Also Known as "Nino" Daniel Herredia, Also Known as D-Nice Felipe Santana, Also Known as "Omar Soto" Tamarius Maner, Also Known as "Trigger" Gloria Vargas Hector Cruz, Also Known as "Casper" Hector Gonzalez, Also Known as "June Bug" Enrique Martinez, Also Known a

Citations: 430 F.3d 606; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 25680Docket: 02-1543-

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; November 28, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendants-appellants Felix DeJesus and Ricardo Rosario appeal their sentences imposed by the District Court for the District of Connecticut following their jury convictions for conspiring to possess significant amounts of heroin and crack cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and § 846. DeJesus received a sentence of 360 months, while Rosario was sentenced to 240 months. The appeal challenges several district court rulings, including a motion to suppress evidence and various evidentiary matters such as limitations on cross-examination of cooperating witnesses and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines.

The court ruled that DeJesus's statement, made during his arrest about possessing a gun, was admissible under the public safety exception to the Miranda rule, as it occurred before he received Miranda warnings. Furthermore, the court found that the district court's policy against permitting impeachment of witnesses with the statutory names of their offenses violated Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1), although this error was deemed harmless in this instance. The background section indicates that DeJesus filed a motion to suppress statements made during an illegal custodial interrogation, as well as the seizure of a gun and narcotics, which were addressed at a suppression hearing prior to the trial.

On February 5, 1997, the Connecticut Fugitive Task Force arrested DeJesus at a Bridgeport apartment based on an arrest warrant for probation violations, aware of his prior assault convictions. When Sergeant Juan Gonzalez approached DeJesus, who was already lying on the floor, DeJesus made statements suggesting the presence of a gun in a nearby jacket. After handcuffing him, Gonzalez discovered a gun and heroin in that jacket. The district court denied DeJesus's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling it was seized during a lawful arrest but did not address claims related to Miranda rights concerning his statements about the gun. On appeal, the government acknowledged that DeJesus's statements were made in response to questions without Miranda warnings.

During the trial, the government presented several cooperating witnesses. The district court limited the defense's ability to impeach witness Jose Lugo by only allowing reference to the fact of a felony conviction without specifying its nature, as it deemed the burglary conviction not relevant to credibility. In contrast, the court allowed more extensive questioning regarding witness Ismael Padilla's larceny convictions, examining whether they implicated truthfulness. Ultimately, the court maintained that the nature of non-credibility-related felonies would not be disclosed, applying similar reasoning to other witnesses, including William Rodriguez and Joseph Butler, thereby limiting impeachment to the fact and date of their convictions without revealing the specifics.

The district court denied DeJesus's motion to suppress statements and physical evidence, asserting that the evidence was obtained through a lawful arrest and a valid search incident to that arrest. The court focused solely on the Fourth Amendment aspect, neglecting DeJesus's Fifth Amendment argument regarding the lack of Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation. However, the appellate court can affirm the denial based on any legally sufficient grounds, even those not considered by the district court.

On appeal, the government acknowledged that officers questioned DeJesus without first providing Miranda warnings but contended that his pre-Miranda statements were admissible under the "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. This exception allows for the admission of statements and evidence obtained when public safety is at risk, as established in New York v. Quarles. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that police could ask questions necessary for public safety without first issuing Miranda warnings, citing a scenario where the location of a gun posed a danger to the public.

The Court emphasized that this public safety exception is narrow, indicating that officers are capable of distinguishing between safety-related questions and those aimed solely at gathering evidence. The potential applicability of this exception has been addressed in a limited number of cases within the Second Circuit.

In Khalil, the appellant contested the district court's decision to allow testimony regarding his response to a specific question posed by police after they discovered bombs in a bag during a raid. The informant had alerted police to the presence of explosives and potential threats. Officers asked multiple questions related to public safety without providing Miranda warnings; however, the last question pertained to the appellant's intent to kill himself in detonating the bombs. The court found this question could provide insight into the bomb's stability, ruling that any error in admitting this response was harmless.

In Reyes, the case involved a narcotics arrest where the officer, prior to handcuffing Reyes or delivering Miranda warnings, asked if he possessed anything that could harm the officer. After Reyes revealed he had a gun, he subsequently indicated he had drugs in his car. The district court initially suppressed Reyes's statements but the appellate court reversed this decision, applying the public safety exception. The court justified the officer's inquiries due to the known dangers associated with drug dealing and the specific context of the arrest, which raised legitimate concerns for public safety. The court cautioned against misapplying the public safety exception as a routine practice in drug-related arrests, emphasizing the need for flexibility in dangerous situations while maintaining the integrity of Miranda rights.

The public safety exception to the Miranda rule was analyzed in the case of Newton, where police, responding to a report that a parolee had threatened to kill his mother and her husband while possessing a firearm, handcuffed the suspect without providing Miranda warnings. The officer asked about "contraband," to which the suspect disclosed the presence of a firearm. The court ruled that the question fell under the public safety exception, as the officers had a reasonable belief of imminent danger due to the suspect's threats and the volatile situation, justifying the admission of his statement at trial.

Key principles from the court's analysis include: 
1. Miranda warnings are not necessary for questions prompted by a genuine concern for public safety or the safety of officers, as long as the questions relate to an objectively reasonable need to protect from immediate danger.
2. Pre-Miranda questions must not be purely investigatory or aimed solely at eliciting testimonial evidence, although they can be broad enough to cover safety issues without disqualifying the exception.
3. The public safety exception should not be applied routinely; rather, it should be assessed based on the unique facts of each case, allowing flexibility in situations where public and officer safety are at risk. 

Overall, the court emphasized the importance of context and the immediacy of danger when evaluating the application of the public safety exception.

The arresting officers were aware that DeJesus had prior misdemeanor and felony assault convictions and was recognized as a drug dealer involved in a significant narcotics operation. A confidential informant indicated that DeJesus stored drugs at the apartment where he was apprehended. Additionally, a woman was present at the apartment during the arrest, heightening the officers' concerns for their safety. Given DeJesus's violent history and the likelihood of firearms being present due to his drug dealing activities, the officers had an objectively reasonable fear for their safety.

The officers' inquiries about the presence of guns in the apartment were specifically aimed at mitigating immediate danger rather than collecting incriminating evidence. These questions were necessary as the scene had not yet been secured. The discovery of drugs in DeJesus's jacket, which occurred in response to these questions, was deemed incidental. The court concluded that the public safety exception, as established in Quarles, applied in this case, allowing for the admission of DeJesus's statements, the firearm, and the drugs as evidence. This exception is not to be used broadly for questioning individuals in custody on narcotics charges but should only apply when there is a clear, reasonable need to protect law enforcement or the public from imminent harm.

DeJesus contends that the district court improperly restricted the impeachment of government witnesses to only the fact and date of their felony convictions, omitting the statutory names of the offenses, which he argues violated the Confrontation Clause and Fed. R. Evid. 609. He also asserts that the court incorrectly categorized Ismael Padilla's larceny convictions under Rule 609(a)(1) instead of recognizing them as crimen falsi under Rule 609(a)(2). The court disagreed with DeJesus regarding the misapplication of Rule 609(a)(2), affirming that Padilla's larceny convictions did not involve dishonesty or deceit as required for automatic admissibility under that rule. The court referenced prior cases establishing that larceny, particularly in the context of shoplifting, does not inherently imply dishonesty necessary for Rule 609(a)(2) classification. However, the court acknowledged a misapplication of Rule 609(a)(1), noting that limiting impeachment to the mere fact of felony convictions was incorrect, yet found this error to be harmless and did not infringe upon the Confrontation Clause.

The court conducts a de novo review regarding the interpretation of Rule 609(a)(1) to determine if it mandates the admission of a witness's statutory offense names alongside evidence of their felony convictions. Rule 609(a)(1) stipulates that evidence of a witness's felony conviction is admissible, subject to Rule 403's balancing test. The core issue is whether "evidence" includes the statutory name of the offense or if merely stating the conviction, sentence, and date suffices. Both Rule 609(a)(1) and (a)(2) aim to admit evidence of convictions for impeachment, sharing identical language regarding the nature of the evidence. Under Rule 609(a)(2), there is a presumption that essential facts, including the statutory name, date, and sentence, are included in the admitted evidence. This presumption should similarly apply to Rule 609(a)(1). The distinction lies in that Rule 609(a)(2) requires the admission of crimes involving dishonesty as inherently probative of credibility, while Rule 609(a)(1) allows for discretion in admitting felony convictions not involving dishonesty, also subject to Rule 403 considerations. The prevailing legal opinion supports that while details of a crime may be limited under Rule 609(a)(1), essential facts, including the offense name, are generally required to assess credibility. This stance is supported by various precedents emphasizing that the specifics of a conviction significantly impact a witness's credibility assessment. The document concludes that a mere fact approach, which would exclude the statutory name, fails to align with Rule 609's language and intent.

Impeachment of witness credibility under Rule 609 is generally limited to the offense's name, conviction date, and sentence. It may be inappropriate to restrict impeachment solely to the fact of prior convictions without detailing the nature and number of offenses. The structure of Rule 609 supports this, indicating that varying degrees of credibility impact exist among different felonies, even those not classified as crimen falsi. District courts are required to conduct an individualized balancing analysis under Rule 609(a)(1) to determine the admissibility of a witness's felony convictions, avoiding a broad-brush approach. Evidence of a witness's felony convictions must be assessed for probative value against prejudicial effects in accordance with Rule 403. The jury should evaluate the probative nature of specific convictions unless their prejudicial impact substantially outweighs this value. Factors relevant to a district court's discretion under Rule 609(a)(1) include the nature of the crime concerning its probative value on veracity. All felonies are presumed to have some relevance to a witness's truthfulness. However, district courts must weigh the specific offenses against Rule 403 criteria to determine admissibility. Even felonies not directly related to dishonesty can significantly contribute to assessing credibility.

An influential case, Gordon v. United States, established a distinction between crimes affecting a person's integrity, such as deceit, fraud, and theft, and acts of violence, which generally have minimal relevance to honesty and veracity. The Gordon court articulated that convictions based on dishonest conduct relate to credibility, while violent or assaultive crimes typically do not. This distinction has been supported in various jurisdictions, indicating that while many felonies associated with dishonesty fall under Rule 609(a)(2), other crimes like theft and escape, although not explicitly included, still hold significant probative value regarding a witness's credibility. In contrast, crimes of impulse or carelessness yield little insight into a person's propensity for calculated wrongdoing, like perjury. 

Crimes requiring planning or preparation are deemed more indicative of veracity since they reflect intentional violations of law rather than impulsive actions. Furthermore, premeditated violent crimes may also suggest a willingness to break the law for personal gain. The gravity of an offense may influence perceptions of truthfulness, as more serious crimes can indicate a stronger disregard for the law. However, particularly heinous acts might lead jurors to form prejudicial views about a witness without providing substantial probative value regarding credibility. The analysis posits that it is inconsistent to assume that crimes on one side of Rule 609(a) are inherently more probative of credibility than those on the other side, suggesting a need for a nuanced evaluation of how various offenses relate to witness credibility.

Congress recognized that crimes involving stealth, such as smuggling and burglary, while not classified as crimes of dishonesty, reflect a lack of credibility and should generally be admissible unless significantly prejudicial. Rule 609(a)(1) requires district courts to analyze the relationship between a witness's prior convictions and their truthfulness when deciding on admissibility for impeachment purposes. The original Rule, enacted in 1974, focused solely on the prejudicial effect against the defendant, allowing prior felony convictions to be admitted if they did not harm the defendant. The 1990 amendments expanded this perspective, emphasizing the need to protect all litigants from unfair prejudice and applying a balancing test under Rule 403 to determine admissibility for any witness's prior convictions. The Advisory Committee noted that impeachment of government witnesses could lead to unfair prejudice and embarrassment, though the likelihood of such prejudice was deemed low in most criminal cases. Trial courts are expected to be skeptical of government objections to the impeachment of its witnesses, and prior convictions should typically be admitted unless a substantial danger of prejudice is demonstrated. Overall, when evaluating the admissibility of conviction evidence against non-defendant witnesses, courts usually favor allowing such evidence, particularly when offered by the accused to impeach prosecution witnesses.

The accused, seeking to impeach government witnesses through evidence of prior convictions, places the onus on the government to protect its witnesses from such impeachment. According to Rule 403, the government must demonstrate that the probative value of a witness's conviction is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or other exclusion grounds. Advisory Committee notes suggest that while prior convictions generally do not inflame juries, they may still unfairly prejudice the government's case or embarrass witnesses. Impeachment evidence should only be excluded under Rule 609(a)(1) if there is a significant risk of prejudice outweighing the conviction's relevance to the witness's truthfulness. A particular concern arises when impeaching cooperating witnesses whose crimes relate to the same conspiracy, as this may unfairly prejudice the defendant and must be carefully considered.

The district court's policy to exclude the names of cooperating witnesses' felony convictions resulted in a blanket rule treating all felony convictions under Rule 609(a)(1) as equally credible. By presenting only generic felony convictions to the jury, the court acknowledged the general probative value of such convictions but neglected the necessary balancing required by Rule 403. This failure led to an improper shortcut around the required analysis of the specific conviction's relevance to truthfulness against potential prejudice or confusion. The court's ruling suggested that felony convictions under Rule 609(a)(1) would be admissible unless balancing issues arose, but it bypassed this analysis by omitting relevant details about the convictions. Rule 403 mandates that district courts disclose the name, date, and sentence of convictions unless their probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks outlined. The discretion for this determination lies with the district court, and its balancing will only be overturned upon clear evidence of abuse.

In United States v. Washington, 746 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1984), the discretion of the trial judge in balancing evidence admissibility under Rule 609(a)(1) is emphasized, particularly the necessity for a Rule 403 analysis concerning the essential facts of a conviction. The court suggests that evidence of witness Padilla's larceny convictions could be admissible if they were felonies, as such crimes relate to a witness's propensity for truthfulness, unlike crimes of violence which may be less relevant. The district court should be cautious when the government objects to the impeachment of its witnesses with prior felony convictions, requiring a clear showing of potential prejudice to justify limiting such impeachment.

While the district court made an error in applying Rule 609(a)(1), it did not infringe on DeJesus's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The court acknowledges that the right to cross-examination is not absolute but emphasizes that it is effectively denied when a defendant cannot expose facts that would allow jurors to assess a witness's reliability. The Supreme Court has recognized a Confrontation Clause violation when cross-examination limitations could significantly alter a jury's perception of a witness's credibility.

In this case, DeJesus was allowed substantial cross-examination of prosecution witnesses regarding their credibility, including their criminal records and cooperation agreements. For instance, witness Lugo's prior felony convictions and sentencing details were examined, and defense counsel questioned Padilla about his felony history and cooperation offer. This indicates that the district court provided DeJesus sufficient opportunity to challenge the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses.

Rodriguez was questioned by both the prosecutor and defense counsel regarding his felony convictions, including a guilty plea for capital murder. Defense counsel also examined Butler, a cooperator with three felony convictions and a seven-year prison sentence, focusing on the potential benefits he sought from his cooperation. Estrada, another cooperator, was discussed in relation to his five-year prison sentence, bribery of corrections officers, ordering a witness's execution, smuggling heroin into prison, and hiring an attorney to prevent a co-conspirator from speaking to law enforcement. Estrada testified that part of his cooperation agreement was to protect his sister from murder charges. 

Despite the evidence regarding the credibility of the cooperating witnesses, the district court's limitation on cross-examination did not violate the Confrontation Clause. DeJesus claimed a constitutional error due to this limitation but failed to prove a violation. The evidentiary error regarding the exclusion of specific felony offense names was deemed harmless. Applying the harmless error standard from Kotteakos v. United States, the court determined that the error did not significantly influence the jury's verdict. The court allowed cross-examination concerning cooperation agreements and the witnesses' criminal records, ensuring that the jury was informed about the witnesses' past offenses and sentences. Overall, the government's case remained strong enough to support a conviction independently of the witnesses' testimonies.

Rodriguez's credibility was challenged due to his guilty plea to capital murder, while Estrada was questioned about ordering the execution of a witness in a different case. Despite this impeachment, the government presented a robust case supporting DeJesus's conviction without relying solely on the testimonies of witnesses with prior felony convictions. Multiple unchallenged witnesses testified about DeJesus's involvement in the Estrada narcotics organization. Jermaine Jenkins identified him as a lieutenant distributing narcotics, Hector Cruz corroborated his role in drug sales, and Yamarr Shipman stated DeJesus supplied street-level sellers with crack. Sergeant Juan Gonzalez provided evidence of heroin and a firearm found in DeJesus's jacket during his arrest. Collectively, these testimonies constituted overwhelming evidence of DeJesus's participation in the conspiracies, rendering the district court's evidentiary error harmless. Consequently, the district court's judgments of conviction are affirmed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with United States v. Crosby. Additionally, notes clarify Connecticut assault laws and Rule 609 regarding the admissibility of witness convictions for credibility attacks.