Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota; September 11, 1984; Minnesota; State Appellate Court
On May 22, 1984, the court of appeals ruled that appellant A.J.M. lacked standing to contest the validity of a search warrant, affirming a trial court's delinquency finding. Following a remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court addressed the appeal concerning a juvenile delinquency order for burglary and theft exceeding $150, supported by evidence obtained from a search warrant. A.J.M.'s counsel sought to suppress this evidence, arguing it stemmed from an illegally warranted search, but the motion was denied, and A.J.M. was found guilty.
The central issue was whether a supporting affidavit for a search warrant, based on a citizen informant tip that was up to eleven days old, adequately established probable cause. The facts indicated that on July 7, 1983, the Foster residence was burglarized while they were on vacation, resulting in a significant theft. A neighbor, J.P., expressed intent to burglarize the Fosters to Greg Foster, and later, a citizen informed the police of overhearing an argument between J.P. and his mother regarding stolen jewelry. This prompted the police to draft a search warrant for J.P.'s residence, where they found a jewelry box containing items matching the Fosters' stolen property.
J.P. subsequently confessed, implicating A.J.M. and others in the crime. A.J.M. contended that the warrant lacked probable cause due to the staleness of the information and argued that his confession, obtained after the illegal search, should also be suppressed. The affidavit asserted that probable cause existed for believing the stolen jewelry was still in J.P.'s home based on this overheard conversation, raising questions about the timeliness and reliability of the information leading to the issuance of the warrant.
Federal case law indicates that no specific number of days can definitively validate or invalidate information for a search warrant. Magistrates are guided by practical considerations of everyday life, as articulated in Brinegar v. United States. In this case, a concerned citizen reported that stolen jewelry and coins were in J.P.'s bedroom, following a recent argument between J.P. and his mother about the stolen goods. A reasonable officer, given this information, could conclude that the conversation was recent and that probable cause existed for a search due to the nature and size of the stolen property, even if the information was eleven days old.
The appellant argues that labeling the informant as a "concerned citizen" does not sufficiently establish credibility. However, the affidavit contained multiple corroborating facts: the victim’s son had prior knowledge of J.P.’s intent to burglarize their home, and J.P. had previously visited the house, suggesting familiarity with its contents. On July 18, 1983, the concerned citizen overheard J.P. argue with his mother about the stolen jewelry, reinforcing the belief that it was still in J.P.'s possession.
The standard for probable cause, as outlined in Illinois v. Gates, requires that the magistrate, using common sense, determines whether there is sufficient evidence to believe that contraband will be found in the specified location. The magistrate's task involves considering the totality of the circumstances, including the credibility of the informant. The affidavit provided substantial corroboration of the citizen's statements, establishing a fair probability that the stolen items were at J.P.'s home. The trial court's admission of the evidence seized under the warrant was thus affirmed.
