Court: South Dakota Supreme Court; August 20, 1980; South Dakota; State Supreme Court
Appellant John R. Seheitler appeals the second judicial circuit court's decision denying his petition to vacate the order that changed appellee Shirley Jean Larson's surname to Seheitler. The marriage between appellant and appellee took place on February 11, 1978, after which appellee adopted the surname Seheitler. Following their annulment on November 13, 1978, appellee sought to revert to Seheitler through a petition filed on December 14, 1978, with all necessary notice published and no objections raised. The court granted the name change on February 5, 1979, affirming appellee's right to change her name due to her established use of it and the absence of any opposition.
Appellant's petition to vacate the name change order was filed on June 25, 1979, citing potential embarrassment and health issues, although he did not specify these ailments. The circuit court denied this petition on July 9, 1979, noting that it was untimely and lacked substantial merit. The key issue on appeal is whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the case, with appellant relying on SDCL 15-6-60(b) for relief from the order, which must be sought within a reasonable time, not exceeding one year. Although his petition was filed within four months, the court's jurisdiction is questioned due to the applicability of SDCL 15-6-81(a), which states that Chapter 15-6 does not govern proceedings that conflict with other statutory provisions, specifically those in Chapter 21-37 regarding name changes.
The outcome affirms the circuit court's order, as it lacked jurisdiction to review appellant's claims.
A conflict exists between Chapters 21-37 and 15-6, as their purposes and procedures differ significantly. Chapter 15-6 governs civil procedures in South Dakota circuit courts, aiming for just and efficient resolutions, while Chapter 21-37 pertains to change of name proceedings, which do not involve traditional parties (plaintiffs or defendants) or an adversarial process. Instead, these proceedings focus on a petitioner’s legal identity, requiring only a hearing where the petitioner explains the name change. Notice of the hearing must be publicly published, allowing for objections, which was duly complied with by the appellee, providing constructive notice to the appellant.
The court referenced Ogle v. Circuit Court, which established that individuals can change their names without legal proceedings, with statutory provisions primarily ensuring accurate recordation rather than replacing common law rights. Unlike the no-notice provision in SDCL 25-4-47 for restoring a maiden name after divorce, Chapter 21-37 requires prior notice for objections. Therefore, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address the appellant’s grievances under SDCL 15-6-60(b) and upheld the circuit court's decision on the name change. The request for attorney’s fees by the appellee was deemed meritless, and other issues raised are considered moot, with all Justices concurring.
