Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 7, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed an appeal by the United States regarding the district court's decision to suppress evidence obtained from a search of Jason Mark Kennedy's vehicle, which included two packages of methamphetamine and over $6,000 in cash. The government contended there was probable cause for the search based on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement or a valid impound and inventory policy. Kennedy countered that there was insufficient evidence of probable cause since there was no indication of when the contraband was last seen in his car, nor evidence that a proper inventory search would have revealed the hidden drugs.
The incident began when Dana Ruud reported to the police that Kennedy had unlawfully entered her residence, taken her safe, and fled in a black Chrysler 300M, providing the license plate number and Kennedy's address. Officer Abbott confirmed the vehicle's registration and learned of Kennedy's suspended driver's license and a possible felony warrant. Upon locating the vehicle, Officer Abbott initiated a traffic stop, arrested Kennedy for driving without a license, and found a significant amount of cash during a pat-down search.
Kennedy claimed he was collecting money owed to him by Ruud. Officer Abbott subsequently conducted an initial inventory search of the car and arranged for it to be towed following police procedures. Afterward, Officer Abbott interviewed Ruud, who detailed the altercation with Kennedy, including unauthorized entry into her home and the theft of her safe. The district court upheld the suppression of evidence, which the appellate court affirmed.
Ruud informed Officer Abbott that Kennedy was involved in methamphetamine trafficking, specifically mentioning that Kennedy stored drugs under a loose speaker in his car trunk. Officer Abbott, having observed Ruud's reliability based on corroborated information, was urged by Ruud to check under the speaker. Following this tip, Officer Abbott discovered two large packages of methamphetamine and over $6,000 in cash in the trunk. Kennedy was subsequently indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). A motion to suppress the evidence was referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Lebedoff, who found that Ruud had not provided timely information necessary for establishing probable cause, leading to the conclusion that the search was invalid. The magistrate noted that while a full inventory search could have been appropriate, there was no evidence to suggest that such a search would have revealed the drugs without Ruud's questionable information. The district court accepted the magistrate’s recommendation, resulting in the suppression of the evidence. The government appealed this decision. The appellate court will review the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress de novo, considering only clear errors in findings of fact. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, establishing that warrantless searches are generally deemed unreasonable unless the government can demonstrate an exception to this requirement.
The 'automobile exception' allows police to perform warrantless searches of vehicles if they possess probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Probable cause is established when, based on the totality of circumstances, there is a fair probability that relevant evidence will be discovered. Courts assess probable cause using a common sense approach that considers all relevant circumstances.
In this case, the Government's assertion that Officer Abbott had probable cause to search Kennedy's trunk primarily relies on information from an informant, Ruud. Kennedy contends that this information was too outdated to justify probable cause at the time of the search. It is established that probable cause must exist at the time of the search, and there is no strict formula for determining when information becomes stale; it varies according to the specifics of the case, including the nature of the alleged crime and the sought property.
The magistrate judge found that while Ruud's information indicated a possibility of narcotics being concealed in Kennedy's vehicle, it did not provide a concrete basis for Officer Abbott to conclude drugs were present at the time of the search due to a lack of specific timing in Ruud's statements. This assessment was upheld as not clearly erroneous, as the magistrate's interpretation of the evidence was deemed reasonable and plausible. The Government bore the burden of proving that probable cause existed at the time of the search, not merely at an earlier point. Although the Government argued that Ruud's use of the present tense indicated current probable cause, the ultimate determination hinges on the case's circumstances, not solely on the informant's verb tense.
Ruud's use of present tense in the affidavit did not meet the Government's burden of proof regarding the ongoing nature of suspected criminal activity connected to narcotics. The magistrate judge noted that time is less significant when crimes are continuous, but information about mobile and easily concealed narcotics can become stale without evidence of an active operation. Kennedy was not under an ongoing narcotics investigation; he was stopped for a burglary suspicion and arrested for driving without a license. The only lead was an isolated conversation with a former girlfriend, who failed to provide critical information. Consequently, the magistrate judge found that Officer Abbott lacked reasonable belief that narcotics were in the vehicle, and this finding was not clearly erroneous.
The magistrate also referenced United States v. Button, emphasizing that relying on present tense statements from hearsay informants is problematic, as it lacks a temporal reference. Button warned that without clear timing, the role of magistrates could be undermined, reducing them to merely rubber-stamping requests. The requirement for law enforcement to have a reason to believe contraband is present remains critical for justifying searches, whether warrantless or warrant-based, as warrantless searches are typically considered unreasonable unless proven otherwise. Ultimately, the magistrate concluded that the Government failed to establish probable cause at the time of the search, leading to the necessity of suppressing the evidence obtained.
The Government maintained that the stop, arrest, and impoundment of Kennedy's vehicle were lawful under Coon Rapids Police Department policy. The impoundment justified an inventory search, which does not require probable cause as established in relevant case law. Inventory searches are based on reduced privacy expectations for vehicles and the need to protect property and guard against claims of loss or damage. The reasonableness of such searches is assessed based on the totality of circumstances and adherence to standardized police procedures, which mitigate concerns of investigatory motives. The Coon Rapids Police Department had established procedures in place for impounding and inventorying vehicles, confirming that the vehicle was properly impounded. The specific procedures required officers to inventory contents of the vehicle, including locked areas, without damaging the vehicle, and to seek probable cause for any locked containers if they could not be opened. The legality of the inventory search conducted by Officer Abbott hinges on compliance with these departmental procedures.
The Government argues that Officer Abbott's search under the loose speaker in Kennedy's trunk was justified under department policy. It claims that the speaker qualifies as 'property of value not permanently affixed,' necessitating handling to list it on the tow sheet, and that the area beneath the speaker is comparable to 'boxes, briefcases, and containers' permitted for search under department guidelines. However, the court finds these arguments unsupported due to a lack of evidence at the suppression hearing. The burden of proof lies with the Government to show compliance with inventory search procedures, which it failed to do. No evidence was presented that would demonstrate an officer's typical practice would include searching beneath the speaker, nor was there testimony linking the search to established procedures. Consequently, the Government could not establish that the search fell within the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement. The district court's judgment is therefore affirmed. Furthermore, the Government's claim that the large amount of cash found on Kennedy supported probable cause is undermined by Officer Abbott's lack of testimony regarding any prior experience or beliefs related to cash and narcotics, as he verified the cash amount only after conducting the search.
Circuit Judge Gruender dissents, arguing that the magistrate judge erred in the legal analysis of probable cause, which led to an incorrect determination of staleness regarding evidence of methamphetamine in Kennedy's trunk. Gruender contends that, without the magistrate's legal error, a reasonable officer could have believed there was a fair probability of finding methamphetamine in the specified location. The Court acknowledges the magistrate judge's factual finding that there was no basis for Officer Abbott to conclude Ruud's information about the methamphetamine's presence was current but emphasizes the need for deference to this finding, ruling it was not 'clearly erroneous.'
However, Gruender highlights that the magistrate judge incorrectly applied legal principles from United States v. Button, which led to the assumption that Ruud's information was outdated by six months. This assumption, based on the most remote point of a time frame without specific details from Ruud, was deemed a legal conclusion subject to de novo review. Gruender argues that the magistrate judge should have analyzed whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person could believe methamphetamine was currently present, rather than defaulting to the assumption of staleness as dictated by Button. Ultimately, Gruender criticizes the magistrate's failure to adequately evaluate the evidence in light of the circumstances surrounding Ruud's observations.
The magistrate judge incorrectly assumed that Officer Abbott's belief regarding the presence of methamphetamine under the speaker was based on outdated information, thus preempting a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. The case referenced, Button, determined that an affidavit lacked probable cause due to the staleness of information provided by an informant over a six-month period. The Button court noted that the present tense used by the informant did not clarify the timing of the information, which could have been from any point in that timeframe. In contrast, Officer Abbott acted immediately on Ruud's statement about Kennedy's drug activities, eliminating any concern about the timeliness of the informant's information. The magistrate judge's application of Button was inappropriate because it involved indeterminate delays, while this case pertained to immediate action under the automobile exception. The magistrate's flawed assumption prevented a proper analysis of probable cause based on all circumstances. The automobile exception applies if there is probable cause, which requires a determination of whether a reasonable person could believe contraband would be found in the specified location, considering the timeliness of the information. Courts must adopt a common sense approach to evaluate the existence of probable cause.
An eyewitness's recent knowledge can establish probable cause, as illustrated in Cundiff v. United States. Officer Abbott, based on corroborated information from Ruud regarding a safe and Kennedy's involvement, could reasonably conclude that Ruud's information was current. Abbott was aware of Ruud and Kennedy's significant relationship and that Kennedy possessed a large sum of cash. Ruud indicated that Kennedy was involved in methamphetamine trafficking and insisted that Abbott check under a speaker in Kennedy's car, suggesting urgency and reliability in her claim. This context provided sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that methamphetamine could be found there, justifying the search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The magistrate judge misapplied the legal standard regarding the age of Ruud's information, which should not have been assumed to be six months old. Consequently, a reasonable officer in Abbott's position would have believed there was a fair probability of finding contraband under the speaker. The dissent argues for reversing the district court's suppression of evidence from the vehicle search, highlighting a flawed interpretation of legal precedent.
