Jimmy D. Carty v. Craig Nelson, Warden Bill Lockyer, Attorney General

Citations: 426 F.3d 1064; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22314; 2005 WL 2621467Docket: 03-56766

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 17, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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Jimmy D. Carty, a California prisoner, was sentenced in April 1991 to sixteen years for multiple counts of committing lewd acts upon a child. Eight years into his sentence, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a civil commitment petition under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP Act) just before Carty's scheduled parole. In a June 1999 hearing, Carty was deemed a sexually violent predator and committed to Atascadero State Hospital. Carty's appeals to the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court were unsuccessful.

Near the end of his initial civil commitment term in May 2001, the District Attorney sought Carty's re-commitment, resulting in a second two-year commitment in October 2001. While serving this second term, Carty filed a pro se habeas petition in April 2003, challenging the validity of his original commitment on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated due to the reliance on inadmissible hearsay in the commitment hearing.

In May 2003, the District Attorney initiated a third commitment proceeding, which was unsuccessful, as a jury found in October 2003 that Carty should no longer be civilly committed, leading to his release. Despite this, the district court denied Carty's habeas petition with prejudice shortly before his release. Carty appealed this denial, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, maintaining jurisdiction over the case. Additionally, the SVP Act mandates evaluations for prisoners convicted of specific violent sex crimes to assess their potential danger as they approach release.

A comprehensive evaluation for civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act must be performed by at least two psychiatrists or psychologists from the Department of Mental Health, following a standardized protocol. Both evaluators must concur that the prisoner has a mental disorder and poses a danger as defined in section 6600 for proceedings to advance. If they agree on civil commitment, the Department will submit a petition to the county where the conviction occurred, along with psychiatric evaluations and supporting documents.

If the county's designated counsel agrees with the evaluators, a commitment petition is filed in the superior court. A probable cause hearing follows, during which the prisoner is entitled to counsel. The judge assesses whether there is probable cause to believe the prisoner may engage in sexually violent behavior upon release. If no probable cause is found, the petition is dismissed; if probable cause exists, the prisoner remains in custody pending a civil commitment trial.

The civil commitment trial allows the prisoner a jury trial, access to counsel, and the opportunity to present expert testimony and relevant records. If the prisoner cannot afford counsel or experts, they are provided at the court's expense. A jury must reach a unanimous verdict to determine if the prisoner is a sexually violent predator (SVP) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the court or jury finds insufficient evidence, the prisoner is released at the end of their sentence. Conversely, if deemed an SVP, the individual is civilly committed for two years to a treatment facility designated by the California Department of Mental Health.

An SVP (Sexually Violent Predator) can only be civilly committed for a maximum of two years unless a new petition for commitment is filed and re-commitment is granted, following established legal safeguards. Annually, the committed SVP has the right to a 'show cause' hearing to evaluate if their condition has changed, potentially reducing their danger to others. If the court finds a change in the SVP's condition, another hearing occurs where the State must demonstrate ongoing danger. If the State fails to prove this, the SVP is released; if successful, recommitment for an additional two years follows.

Carty's case involved a plea agreement in April 1991 for seven counts of committing lewd acts against children, including sexual contact with his sons. His guilty plea on five counts was made under a provision allowing him not to admit specific conduct details. Following his plea, he was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. In April 1999, one day before his parole release, the San Diego County District Attorney petitioned for Carty’s civil commitment under the SVP Act, requiring proof of two predicate crimes, a mental disorder posing danger, and likelihood of re-offending.

Carty waived his right to a probable cause hearing and later to a jury trial. On June 24, 1999, a civil commitment hearing occurred, relying solely on documentary evidence without witness testimonies. Carty's attorney did not object to the admission of expert reports supporting the claims of predicate crimes and mental disorder but contested the probation report's admissibility as proof of 'substantial sexual conduct,' arguing it contained inadmissible hearsay.

The superior court admitted a probation report as evidence against Carty, leading to a ruling that his actions constituted 'substantial sexual conduct,' resulting in his designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP) and a two-year civil commitment. Carty appealed this decision, arguing that the probation report was inadmissible due to hearsay and that its admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, citing a statutory hearsay exception that allows for the use of documentary evidence in SVP proceedings, and clarified that the civil nature of the commitment process does not trigger Sixth Amendment protections. The court found that Carty had the opportunity to challenge the report's accuracy and call witnesses, thus upholding his due process rights. After the appeal was denied by the California Supreme Court, Carty filed a pro se habeas petition in federal court, reiterating his claims regarding hearsay and constitutional rights violations. While this petition was pending, a second civil commitment proceeding was initiated against him, resulting in another two-year commitment. Subsequently, a federal magistrate recommended denying Carty’s habeas petition, to which he objected. A third commitment proceeding was initiated while he was serving his second term.

While the San Diego County District Attorney's re-commitment petition was pending, District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez reviewed Carty's objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, ultimately denying Carty's habeas petition on July 31, 2003. The district court determined that the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that Carty was not denied due process during his civil commitment process was not in conflict with established federal law. Following this, a commitment hearing on October 24, 2003, resulted in a jury's unanimous decision that Carty was no longer a sexually violent predator (SVP), leading to his unconditional release.

Carty, represented by appointed counsel, is appealing the denial of his habeas petition, arguing that a favorable ruling would nullify his initial civil commitment and second re-commitment, thereby eliminating the requirement to verify residency and employment every ninety days under the California SVP Act. The court must first determine if Carty's case presents a live controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution. It assesses whether Carty suffers or is threatened with an actual injury that could be redressed by a favorable decision.

The San Diego County District Attorney argues that Carty's release from civil commitment negates any collateral consequences from his prior SVP status and that a judicial decision would not provide redress. However, the court disagrees, identifying that Carty's obligation to verify his address and employment every ninety days constitutes a collateral consequence sufficient to maintain the case, despite the state arguing that this requirement is independent of his civil commitment status.

Carty experiences a continuing and concrete injury due to his status as a former Sexually Violent Predator (SVP), exposing him to potential incarceration for up to one year if he fails to verify his residence and employment every ninety days, as mandated by Cal. Penal Code § 290(a)(1)(E)(g)(5). This situation satisfies the "injury in fact" requirement for standing under Article III. The State argues that Carty's challenge to his June 1999 civil commitment is moot since he is no longer under that commitment. However, Carty references the precedent set in Hubbart v. Knapp, which indicated that claims can be capable of repetition yet evading review, particularly in cases where the duration of commitment is too short for full litigation. Carty's case is distinguishable from Hubbart's, as he was released after a jury determined he was no longer an SVP in October 2003, thus failing to establish a likelihood of facing the same commitment again.

Carty contends that his second re-commitment proceeding in October 2001 was flawed because the District Attorney did not prove "substantial sexual conduct" a second time and relied on findings from the original 1999 commitment. He argues that the District Attorney could not have legally pursued re-commitment without the prior unconstitutional commitment. Carty seeks permission to amend his April 2001 federal habeas petition to contest the October 2001 re-commitment on similar grounds as those used against the 1999 commitment. This argument holds merit; if the court finds the initial civil commitment unconstitutional, it could also invalidate the subsequent re-commitment, potentially relieving Carty from additional reporting obligations as an SVP. Therefore, Carty's appeal retains relevance and is not moot, as the court could provide him with meaningful relief.

Carty's appeal regarding the violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights was denied by the district court during his civil commitment proceedings. The San Diego County District Attorney utilized documentary evidence, which included hearsay, to establish Carty's engagement in 'substantial sexual conduct' against his child victims. Carty argued that this use of evidence violated his constitutional rights, but the court found no error in denying his habeas relief.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state court decision can only be overturned if it is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court clarified that a decision is 'contrary' if it reaches an opposite conclusion on a legal question or misapplies relevant Supreme Court precedent. Carty's claims regarding his Sixth Amendment rights were rejected as the commitment proceedings are civil, not criminal, meaning the Sixth Amendment's right to confrontation does not apply. The court noted that while civil commitment entails significant liberty deprivation requiring due process, it does not equate to a criminal prosecution, and thus, the procedures are less stringent. Consequently, Carty's argument regarding the violation of his rights in the commitment proceedings was dismissed.

Carty claims that his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated during civil commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act. Originally, the SVP Act prohibited documentary evidence, but it was amended following complaints from prosecutors about the need to re-litigate prior convictions in court. Carty contends that the superior court improperly admitted statements from his child victims, documented in his probation report, and argues that he lacked the same protections afforded to California residents in general civil commitment cases. 

To evaluate Carty's due process challenge, the analysis references the Supreme Court's ruling in Vitek v. Jones, which established essential due process rights for prisoners facing involuntary mental health commitments, including written notice, a hearing with evidence disclosure, the opportunity to present testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and legal representation. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks upheld the Kansas SVP Act against a substantive due process challenge, affirming that such involuntary commitment statutes are permissible as long as they adhere to adequate procedural and evidentiary standards. The Court emphasized that the SVP Act's procedural protections do not equate civil commitment with criminal prosecution, highlighting legislative intent to confine only a narrowly defined group of dangerous individuals under stringent standards. Ultimately, the Court determined that the Kansas SVP Act met due process requirements and was considered a civil rather than a criminal proceeding for constitutional purposes.

The California Supreme Court's opinion in Otto addresses the constitutionality of the SVP Act procedures, specifically the statutory hearsay exception, affirming that they do not infringe on a defendant's due process rights. Otto contested the inclusion of child victim statements from a probation report used to demonstrate 'substantial sexual conduct' during his civil commitment proceedings, arguing these statements lacked reliability. The court rejected this argument, noting that Otto had pled no contest, with the factual basis for his plea supported by police reports detailing his offenses. Furthermore, Otto received the probation report prior to sentencing and did not challenge its contents. Regarding his confrontation claims, the court observed that Otto had the chance to confront his victims when the charges were filed but opted for a plea deal instead. Similarly, Carty, who also accepted a plea bargain in 1991 without challenging his probation report, is found to have received the necessary procedural protections during his civil commitment hearing in June 1999. Consequently, Carty's due process challenge is rejected based on the precedents set in Vitek, Hendricks, and Otto.

Carty did not cite any Supreme Court case mandating that the San Diego County District Attorney must present only live testimony at civil commitment hearings under the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act. In these hearings, the superior court must ascertain facts about sex offenses, which often occur in private, and where plea deals frequently prevent full factual determination in criminal trials. Thus, the primary witnesses are typically the victim and the offender. The SVP Act includes a special hearsay exception designed to alleviate the emotional burden on victims, as noted in Otto, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d at 333, 26 P.3d 1061. Carty contends that the use of victim statements in the probation report was unfair and argues for live witness testimony to allow for cross-examination. However, Carty had the option to go to trial instead of accepting a plea bargain eight years prior, and his failure to contest the victims' statements at sentencing weakens his position, consistent with Otto's reasoning. The superior court's use of documentary evidence during Carty's initial civil commitment hearing in June 1999 was deemed sufficiently reliable under California's hearsay exception per Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 6600.1. Such evidence can include trial transcripts and probation reports. Additionally, the prosecutor may rely entirely on hearsay if it demonstrates reliability. Carty was given a chance to challenge the probation report's documentary evidence during the hearing. The court also thoroughly assessed medical reports and victim statements, determining that only two of five acts constituted 'substantial sexual conduct.' Despite Carty's reliance on Supreme Court cases, he was afforded constitutional safeguards during the June 1999 hearing, including legal representation, the opportunity to contest evidence, and a waiver of a jury trial, ultimately being adjudicated as an SVP requiring civil commitment. These proceedings met the higher standard of proof necessary for civil commitments, as established in cases such as Addington, Humphrey, and Baxstrom.

Due process requires an individual assessment prior to civil commitment, as established in Demore v. Kim. The California Court of Appeal determined that the documentary evidence used in Carty's June 1999 civil commitment hearing did not make the proceedings fundamentally unfair or violate his substantive due process rights, aligning with federal law as defined by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the district court's denial of Carty's habeas petition was affirmed. Key legal provisions include the requirement for independent evaluations when there is a disagreement between mental health professionals regarding commitment criteria, and the definition of "substantial sexual conduct" applicable to the SVP Act, which includes masturbation. Prior convictions can be used as evidence in determining sexually violent predator status, but they cannot solely dictate the outcome. Carty's claim that section 6600(a)(3) violates the Equal Protection clause was also found unpersuasive, as the state’s rationale for relieving victims from testifying about trauma was deemed sufficient under rational basis review. Additionally, the state’s request for judicial notice of certain documents was granted.