Linda Ekstrom Stanley v. Department of Justice, Ellen B. Vergos v. Department of Justice

Citations: 423 F.3d 1271; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19440; 2005 WL 2174433Docket: 04-3298

Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; September 9, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Linda Ekstrom Stanley and Ellen B. Vergos appealed decisions from the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that dismissed their appeals due to lack of jurisdiction. Both appellants were appointed as bankruptcy Trustees before a 1996 proclamation by Attorney General Janet Reno, which classified the Trustee position as confidential and exempted it from civil service protections under Title 5 of the United States Code. Although the memo from the Director of Trustees indicated that those appointed prior to the proclamation would retain appeal rights, both Stanley and Vergos were later removed by Attorney General John Ashcroft after reappointment. The MSPB ruled that they did not qualify as "employees" under 5 U.S.C. 7511(b), affirming that the Trustee position was excepted from the competitive service as determined by the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the MSPB's ruling, noting that only those classified as "employees" under the statute can appeal, and confirmed that the Trustees' roles were correctly deemed to fall within the exempted categories.

Attorney General Reno's 1996 Order classified the Trustee position as "confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy-advocating," a designation that is not subject to judicial review due to its discretionary nature. The focus is on whether United States Trustees fall outside the competitive service by statute, specifically referencing 5 U.S.C. 7511(b)(2)(C). Prior to 1986, Trustees could only be removed "for cause," but the amendment removed that language, allowing the Attorney General to remove Trustees without cause. This change indicates that Trustees are excepted from competitive service, which requires removal "for cause" as per McCormick v. Dep't of the Air Force. The appellants' employment circumstances, including their personnel forms stating their appointments were excepted and their appointments occurring without a competitive examination, further affirm their status as excepted. Although appellants argue that their continuous service excludes them from Reno's order, their reappointment after their initial terms means they are classified under Reno's designation like any newly appointed Trustee. Thus, the designation applies fully to them regardless of their prior statuses.

Appellants contend that section 581(b) prohibits their removal before the end of their five-year terms. However, it is established that inferior officers can be removed prior to the completion of their statutory terms, as supported by case law, specifically Parsons v. United States and Pievsky v. Ridge. The interpretation of the act indicates that the term of office expires after four years, rather than guaranteeing a full five-year duration. Moreover, construing section 581(b) as mandating a full five-year term would render section 581(c) ineffective, conflicting with the principle that statutes should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions. If Congress intended to restrict the Attorney General's removal authority during the five-year term, it would have omitted section 581(c). Consequently, the Merit Systems Protection Board's decision is affirmed. 

Additionally, it is noted that although Stanley and Vergos appealed separately, their cases involve the same issues. Relevant statutory provisions concerning appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board and employee rights during disciplinary actions are also highlighted. Section 581(b) specifies that United States trustees are appointed for five-year terms but continue to serve until their successors are appointed.