David Brengettcy v. William Horton, John Daley, Officer Farrow, John Does I-X, and the County of Cook, Illinois

Citations: 423 F.3d 674; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19362; 2005 WL 2155656Docket: 03-3813

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 8, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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David Brengettcy, the plaintiff, was involved in a physical altercation with Officer William Horton while awaiting trial at the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC), resulting in two days of hospitalization. Following this incident, Brengettcy was convicted of aggravated battery on a peace officer and sentenced to three years in prison. He filed a grievance against Horton and other officers on August 23, 2000, claiming that Horton attacked him while he was handcuffed and that he was subsequently kicked down a staircase.

After not receiving a response to his grievance, Brengettcy submitted additional grievances in late 2000. In January 2001, he initiated a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, citing the Heck v. Humphrey precedent and claiming that Brengettcy failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Although the motions were initially denied by Judge Bucklo, the case was later reassigned to Judge St. Eve, who subsequently ruled in favor of the defendants based solely on the exhaustion argument.

The appellate court, viewing the facts in Brengettcy's favor, deemed the district court's ruling premature and determined that the defendants' additional arguments were ineffective, thus remanding the case for further proceedings. Brengettcy detailed his encounter with Officer Horton, describing verbal assaults and physical strikes initiated by Horton after he attempted to explain his actions in returning to the first floor.

Brengettcy reported that he defended himself against an attack by Horton by backing up towards other officers and subsequently punching Horton. After calling for assistance, reinforcements arrived within two minutes. Brengettcy alleged that, after being handcuffed, he was beaten and kicked by the officers, including being kicked down stairs, leading to a loss of consciousness and hospitalization. His medical records indicated injuries to his throat, shoulder, wrist, back, leg, and dental damage. 

He filed a grievance with the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) on August 23, 2000, within the required timeframe, but received no response within the stipulated 30 days. After inquiring about the status of his grievance, he was told by Officer McCullen that grievances sometimes get lost. He filed another grievance on November 27, 2000, which also went unanswered.

Brengettcy submitted a pro se verified complaint to the Northern District of Illinois on January 9, 2001, alleging excessive force by Officer Horton. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on May 3, 2001, claiming that Heck v. Humphrey barred his civil rights claims. However, on July 24, 2001, the court denied the motion, clarifying that while Brengettcy's conviction implied he struck Horton, it did not imply that Horton's use of force was lawful. Following this, the court appointed counsel for Brengettcy, who filed a second amended complaint on February 21, 2002, adding more defendants and withdrawing one. 

The defendants filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Brengettcy provided evidence of his grievance filings from late 2000. On July 10, 2002, the court denied this second motion, stating that the lack of a response to Brengettcy's grievance did not require him to wait an unreasonable amount of time before pursuing his federal lawsuit. The case was subsequently transferred to Judge St. Eve on September 6, 2002.

On August 13, 2003, Defendant Horton filed a motion for summary judgment, citing two main reasons: failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the Heck bar. Additionally, Horton claimed collateral estoppel, asserting that the excessive force issue had been resolved against Brengettcy in a prior state criminal case. Horton pointed out that Brengettcy had submitted only one grievance related to the incident, dated November 27, 2000, and noted that Brengettcy did not appeal this grievance. However, Horton failed to mention that the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) did not respond to Brengettcy's grievances and that Brengettcy had inquired about the status of his grievance prior to the November 27 filing.

Brengettcy's counsel did not respond to Horton's motion in accordance with Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), which required a specific format for responses. Consequently, the district court accepted Horton's statement of facts as undisputed. The court found that Brengettcy's single grievance was filed three months after the incident and that he did not appeal it, concluding that Brengettcy was barred from pursuing his lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

In his appeal, Brengettcy's new counsel contended that Horton misinterpreted the deposition testimony, which only confirmed that Brengettcy did not appeal the November 27 grievance. The counsel emphasized that Brengettcy had previously testified to filing other grievances, contradicting Horton's assertion. Additionally, Horton had not initially included all relevant pages of Brengettcy's deposition in his summary judgment motion. The appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude judgment as a matter of law.

Two district court judges issued conflicting rulings on similar issues in this case. Generally, a successor judge should not reconsider a transferor judge's decision when both judges are at the same judicial level. This principle is supported by the law of the case doctrine, which maintains the expectation that a judge change should not reset the proceedings. Although a second judge may revise prior rulings if convinced they are incorrect, differing legal or factual views are insufficient grounds for such revision.

In this instance, Judge St. Eve's review differed from Judge Bucklo's, as Bucklo addressed a motion to dismiss, while St. Eve considered a motion for summary judgment. The critical question is whether new evidence presented with Horton's motion provided a compelling reason for the second judge to revisit the earlier decision. If so, her ruling would be reviewed de novo; if not, the original ruling remains the reference point.

Additionally, the appeal may hinge on Brengettcy's lawyer's failure to adhere to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) before the second judge. While such noncompliance typically results in an admission of the moving party's facts, it does not create a jurisdictional barrier for the district court or the appellate court. Local rules regulate court practice but do not affect jurisdiction. Thus, the evaluation of the record will rely on the facts presented by Horton, acknowledging the limitations posed by the noncompliance.

Horton’s submission of new evidence with his summary judgment motion did not provide a compelling reason for Judge St. Eve to overturn Judge Bucklo's decision. The additional evidence included portions of Brengettcy's deposition and Horton's statement of facts, alongside verified complaints and grievances already considered by both judges. The missing pages from Brengettcy's deposition were not highlighted, and the issue at hand was whether there was sufficient basis for Judge St. Eve to revisit previous rulings. Despite the local rules allowing for a single party’s version to be considered, the facts must be viewed favorably for the nonmoving party. The conclusion was that Horton's evidence did not offer new material to challenge Judge Bucklo's assessment of the defenses. Brengettcy's complaints maintained that a grievance was filed on August 23, 2000, which Horton contradicted. Moreover, Horton did not claim that the CCDOC responded to Brengettcy's grievances, meaning the relevant facts remained unchanged. There was no compelling reason to alter Judge Bucklo's ruling on exhaustion.

The determination does not affirm Judge Bucklo's correctness but focuses on whether Brengettcy's case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA, which mandates exhaustion before bringing actions regarding prison conditions. Exhaustion is an affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove. A prisoner must file complaints and appeals according to the prison's administrative rules. However, if prison officials fail to respond, administrative remedies may be deemed unavailable, allowing for exhaustion despite non-compliance with grievance processes. This interpretation prevents prison officials from exploiting the exhaustion requirement through delays.

Judge Bucklo found that Brengettcy had reasonably exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his grievance filed on August 23, 2000, as prison officials did not respond within the required 30 days, nor did they provide notice of a delay. The CCDOC's policy lacks guidance for prisoners in cases of non-response, which supports Brengettcy’s position that he could not appeal due to the absence of a decision. Consequently, Horton was not entitled to judgment based on exhaustion claims. 

The court did not address Horton's argument about Brengettcy waiving his claim related to Rule 56, as the record did not support reopening Judge Bucklo's exhaustion conclusion. However, the court expressed concern over Horton's handling of the Rule 56 process, indicating that his omission of deposition pages was misleading.

Horton also claimed that Brengettcy's allegations were barred by collateral estoppel or the Heck doctrine due to his prior conviction for battery. Judge Bucklo clarified that Brengettcy's excessive force claim post-assault does not contradict his conviction and thus is not barred by Heck. 

Regarding collateral estoppel, the court examined Illinois preclusion law and concluded that the excessive force issue was not identical to any issues decided in Brengettcy's state criminal trial. The trial did not result in a final judgment on the excessive force claim, as the court's decision not to provide a self-defense instruction only addressed Brengettcy's justification for his actions, without commenting on the appropriateness of the force used by Horton in response.

The district court erred by dismissing, on its own motion, the defendants Pharaoh Halbert, John Daley, John Does I-X, and the County of Cook, without providing Brengettcy notice or an opportunity to demonstrate good cause for his failure to serve them under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). The court's decision to dismiss these defendants was improper, and on remand, Brengettcy must be allowed to show good cause for his earlier failure or request an extension of time. However, the dismissal of John Does I-X was appropriate, as there were no individuals to serve. Any attempt by Brengettcy to add new defendants must comply with relevant rules. The judgment for the defendants is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.