Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; August 18, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
Keith Harbin-Bey, a Michigan inmate, filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) officials, including Lyle Rutter, Bill Martin, Robert Mulvaney, William Overton, and Michael Powell. Harbin-Bey claimed that being designated as a member of a Security Threat Group (STG) without a hearing violated his constitutional rights. Initially, the district court dismissed all claims except for one alleging retaliation by Rutter, which was later resolved in Rutter's favor through summary judgment.
Harbin-Bey, a Moorish-American Muslim affiliated with the Vice Lords gang, began expressing concerns about the STG policy in letters to family and inmates in 2001, suggesting it infringed on prisoners' rights and hinted at potential legal action against Rutter. His letters included coded gang references, which Rutter intercepted, subsequently issuing a Notice of Intent to conduct an administrative hearing and ordering Harbin-Bey to cease STG-related correspondence. Harbin-Bey argued that his references were religious, but Rutter did not respond.
In March 2002, Harbin-Bey was designated as an STG leader without a hearing, prompting him to complain about the lack of due process. In May 2002, he was denied a magazine subscription due to gang-related content, which he contended was unjust. Later, in July 2002, he received another Notice of Intent classifying him as "STG II" for sending a photo that displayed an STG tattoo. Harbin-Bey protested this classification, requesting a hearing and asserting his right to equal protection under the law. The court ultimately affirmed the district court's judgment.
In August 2002, Harbin-Bey filed three grievances against Rutter—alleging violations of his constitutional rights, retaliation, and mail tampering—all of which were denied. He appealed these denials and subsequently filed a lawsuit in January 2003, claiming that the enforcement of prison STG policies infringed upon his constitutional rights, including equal protection, due process, access to courts, freedom from mail censorship, freedom of religion, and retaliation. Harbin-Bey sought both equitable and monetary relief. The district court dismissed all claims except the retaliation claim against Rutter, ruling that the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, and denied Harbin-Bey's motion to alter the judgment. Rutter later successfully moved for summary judgment on the retaliation claim, leading to Harbin-Bey's appeal.
On appeal, Harbin-Bey reiterated all claims except for the freedom of religion claim and contended that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to supplement the retaliation claim and in ruling that he had not exhausted administrative remedies regarding defendants Martin and Powell. The review of the district court's dismissal and summary judgment is conducted de novo, where factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must show a violation of constitutional rights by a state actor, and a complaint fails to state a claim if no relief is available under any conceivable facts consistent with its allegations. The court found no error in dismissing Harbin-Bey's equal protection, access to courts, and First Amendment claims.
Harbin-Bey's claim asserts that his designation as a Security Threat Group (STG) leader violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it resulted in permanent exclusion from community placement and visitor restrictions without a prior hearing—a right afforded to prisoners designated under different classifications. He argues this constitutes unequal application of state law. However, the Equal Protection Clause permits states to classify individuals as long as the classification serves a legitimate state interest. Inmates are not considered a suspect class, and the designation does not involve a fundamental right since prisoners lack a constitutional entitlement to specific security classifications. The evidence indicates that Harbin-Bey's designation was based on gang affiliation rather than religious beliefs. The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) policy on STG classification is justified by the need to maintain prison order, and differentiation among inmate groups is permissible to prevent violence. The MDOC's criteria for STG designation are non-discriminatory and include factors such as the group's history, structure, propensity for violence, and associated illegal acts. The procedural protections given to classifications like "homosexual predators" do not extend to STG members, as the STG policy does not target a suspect class or infringe on fundamental rights. Courts typically afford legislative choices leeway when distinguishing characteristics relevant to state interests are present.
Harbin-Bey has not provided legal authority to support the claim that prisoners are entitled to a hearing before receiving a special designation, as the state is not required to offer such hearings. The differentiation in hearing availability for various prison classifications does not violate federal constitutional standards, provided the distinctions are not arbitrary. The need for immediate attention to threats to prison security justifies the differing treatment for Security Threat Group (STG) classifications.
Harbin-Bey referenced Sandin v. Conner to argue that denial of a hearing and judicial review constitutes unequal application of the law. However, the Supreme Court in Sandin recognized that only extreme restraints could invoke due process rights. The district court noted that an increase in security classification, such as being labeled an STG member, does not impose "atypical and significant" hardships compared to standard prison life. Relevant precedents affirm that prisoners do not possess a constitutional right to remain in a specific security classification or prison, and adverse consequences do not automatically trigger due process protections.
The court concluded that Harbin-Bey's STG designation aligns with the principles laid out in Jones and Sandin, rendering his claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses unfounded. Additionally, Harbin-Bey's argument regarding access to courts, based on his inability to seek judicial review of his designation, was dismissed for failure to state a valid claim for relief.
Harbin-Bey's argument regarding the contestation of his Security Threat Group (STG) designation is incorrect, as MDOC Policy Directive 04.04.113 allows prisoners to file grievances on this matter. After exhausting the internal grievance process, prisoners can pursue claims in federal court, as established in **Brown v. Toombs**. The court mandates that prisoners filing § 1983 claims related to prison conditions must demonstrate exhaustion of state administrative remedies. To succeed in a claim of interference with access to the courts, a plaintiff must show actual injury, as outlined in **Thaddeus-X v. Blatter**, which links the requirement to constitutional standing. Harbin-Bey has failed to show any cognizable injury from his STG designation, leading to the dismissal of his access-to-courts claim by the district court.
On his First Amendment claim regarding the censorship of periodicals, Harbin-Bey disputes the district court's dismissal, arguing that the rejection of his FHM magazine was not rationally related to legitimate security goals. He claims the policy was an exaggerated response and suggests that allowing magazines with offending content removed would not impose undue burden. A prisoner's right to receive mail is subject to regulations that must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, as established in **Turner v. Safley** and **Thornburgh v. Abbott**. The court typically grants deference to prison policies aimed at maintaining security and order. The **Turner** case outlines four factors to assess whether restrictions on incoming publications are justified: (1) the rational connection between the policy and the asserted governmental interest, (2) alternative means for inmates to exercise their rights, (3) the impact on prison resources and other inmates, and (4) the absence of ready alternatives. The relevant policy prohibits incoming mail with gang symbols and mandates that entire publications be accepted or rejected, without the option of removing prohibited content. Harbin-Bey contends that this regulation is disproportionately severe given that alternatives exist for regulating incoming publications.
Harbin-Bey did not provide sufficient evidence to support his argument that requiring prison officials to screen each magazine for prohibited materials would not be unduly burdensome, as determined by the district court. His subscription to FHM was terminated by the publisher, not the prison, which only rejected one issue. The district court found that the policy in place was reasonably related to maintaining prison security, justifying the dismissal of Harbin-Bey's First Amendment claim regarding the rejected issue.
Regarding Harbin-Bey's retaliation claim against Rutter, the district court correctly granted summary judgment. Harbin-Bey alleged retaliation after filing grievances against Rutter and threatening legal action, claiming Rutter interfered with his outgoing mail. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) engagement in protected conduct, (2) an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness, and (3) a causal connection between the two. Harbin-Bey failed to demonstrate any adverse action by Rutter; he did not provide evidence that Rutter interfered with his mail or that any actions taken were motivated by his grievances. Furthermore, Harbin-Bey did not lose privileges from the Notices of Interference (NOIs) issued by Rutter, which simply prevented him from sending prohibited materials. The court concluded that an inmate of ordinary firmness would not be deterred from exercising their rights due to Rutter's actions. Harbin-Bey's claim of circumstantial evidence for retaliation was deemed insufficient, as mere allegations without material facts do not support a valid claim under § 1983. The district court's decision to grant Rutter summary judgment was therefore upheld.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harbin-Bey's motion to supplement his complaint regarding his retaliation claim against Rutter. The court ruled that Harbin-Bey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies through the prison's grievance process concerning Rutter's alleged misconduct, as he filed a new grievance only after initiating the lawsuit. Under established precedent, prisoners cannot exhaust administrative remedies while a federal suit is pending.
Additionally, the district court correctly determined that Harbin-Bey had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding claims against Martin and Powell, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory prior to filing a § 1983 action, regardless of whether the administrative process allows the specific relief sought. Harbin-Bey submitted grievances against Rutter but failed to provide evidence of grievances filed against Martin and Powell, leading to the conclusion that he had not exhausted those claims.
The district court also clarified that it could not grant a continuance in the absence of exhaustion and noted that grievances must specifically mention the offending parties to allow for administrative resolution before court involvement. Claims may be dismissed without requiring exhaustion if they are deemed frivolous or fail to state a valid claim. In this case, the court found that Harbin-Bey did not state a claim against Martin and Powell that warranted relief.
Consequently, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
