Rutka v. City of Meriden

Citations: 145 Conn. App. 202; 75 A.3d 722; 2013 WL 4419034; 2013 Conn. App. LEXIS 428Docket: AC 34909

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; August 27, 2013; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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John Rutka appeals the trial court's judgment favoring the city of Meriden regarding four mechanic's liens on his property. The court ruled against Rutka on two property maintenance liens, ruled in his favor on one, and dismissed his challenge to an anti-blight lien due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rutka contends that the trial court erred in denying his application to discharge the two maintenance liens, dismissing the anti-blight lien, and restricting his ability to present evidence.

The plaintiff owns property at 11 Colony Place, which faced blighted conditions for seven years. The city, upon discovering these issues in 2004, warned Rutka about citations for code violations. After he failed to address these violations, the city assessed fines and placed an anti-blight lien in November 2005, totaling $3,800. In 2009, the city undertook corrective measures, leading to three property maintenance liens placed in 2009, 2010, and 2011, amounting to $1,224.02, $2,693.46, and $8,920, respectively.

Rutka filed for the discharge of the liens on March 6, 2012. A four-day hearing occurred in 2012, where the city presented evidence including photographs and documentation of maintenance work performed. The court affirms the judgments regarding the property maintenance liens but remands the anti-blight lien dismissal for further proceedings.

Extensive testimony was presented regarding three property maintenance liens involving the plaintiff and the defendant, Kilroy. Witnesses discussed the plaintiff's property conditions, the cleanup efforts by the defendant's employees, and photographic evidence of the property’s state. Kilroy testified that an investigation indicated the property was in poor condition, posing a serious fire hazard due to rubbish accumulation, which was corroborated by an administrative search warrant admitted at trial.

On August 1, 2012, the court granted the plaintiff's request to discharge the second lien dated January 20, 2010, because it was not filed within the required thirty-day period under § 49-73b. However, the court denied the plaintiff’s applications regarding the other two liens (dated November 19, 2009, and September 1, 2011), concluding that the defendant demonstrated probable cause for their validity. Additionally, the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's application to discharge a November 2005 anti-blight lien was granted, as the court found it lacked jurisdiction to review such liens under § 49-73b.

The plaintiff's appeal focuses on the denial of his applications to discharge the two remaining property maintenance liens and the granting of the motion to dismiss the anti-blight lien application. The court noted that under § 49-73b, municipal liens can be discharged following the procedures in §§ 49-35a to 49-37. It emphasized that the defendant needed to establish only probable cause to uphold the liens, a standard that requires less than a preponderance of evidence, reflecting a reasonable belief in the facts supporting the liens.

The trial court's determination of probable cause for placing property maintenance liens on the plaintiff's property is under scrutiny for potential clear error. Once probable cause is established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the liens are invalid. The court examined four days of testimony and documentary evidence, particularly focusing on testimony from Kilroy regarding the hazardous conditions of the plaintiff's property, which justified the defendant's intervention. The court found credible evidence, including historical data dating back to 2005, supporting the existence of probable cause for the liens due to public safety concerns.

The appellate court emphasizes the trial court's role as the fact finder, noting that it must assess witness credibility based on direct observation, which the appellate court must respect. The plaintiff's argument that photographs submitted as evidence were misleading because they were taken post-intervention was deemed insufficient, as other evidence corroborated the existence of prior blighted conditions. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment regarding the liens and addressed the plaintiff's claim about the dismissal of his application to discharge a 2005 anti-blight lien. While the trial court correctly determined it lacked authority under § 49-73b to discharge the lien, the appellate court disagreed with the assertion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim under § 7-148aa.

The standard of review for appeals regarding motions to dismiss based on subject matter jurisdiction is plenary, meaning the court examines the legal conclusions of the trial court without deference. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court's authority to adjudicate the specific type of controversy presented. A court cannot address the merits of a case if it lacks jurisdiction. The distinction exists between subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to act under specific statutes. The trial court, in this case, determined it lacked jurisdiction to discharge an anti-blight lien under § 49-73b, asserting that no statutory provisions allowed for the reduction or discharge of such liens. Consequently, it ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application to discharge the lien. 

General Statutes § 52-123 states that circumstantial errors in court proceedings do not invalidate the process if the intent and cause are clear. This statute, viewed as remedial, replaces the common law rule that misnomers could negate jurisdiction. The court found that the plaintiff's application, which referred to "mechanic's liens," was appropriately interpreted as three property maintenance liens and one anti-blight lien, indicating that the misnomer did not prejudice the defendant.

The court determined that the plaintiff's application to discharge an anti-blight lien using a form designated for mechanic's liens did not hinder the court's jurisdiction to consider the claim. While both the trial court and defendant contended that § 49-73b does not apply to anti-blight liens, the court found that such liens fall under § 7-148aa, which governs their discharge. This statute establishes that unpaid penalties from municipal blight ordinances create liens on the associated real estate and permits these liens to be managed like property tax liens. Consequently, the trial court possesses the authority to adjudicate whether the anti-blight lien can be treated and discharged as a property tax lien under § 7-148aa, which affirms the principle of favoring jurisdiction and the preference for trials on the merits.

The case is remanded to the trial court to assess whether the plaintiff can establish a cause of action under this statute. Additionally, the plaintiff's claims regarding the denial of evidence during the hearing were deemed inadequately briefed, leading the court to decline to review those matters.

Analysis is essential for presenting issues on appeal; mere assertions without thorough briefing will lead to abandonment of those issues. Parties must articulate their arguments clearly in briefs for the court to consider claims of error. Challenges not adequately briefed will not result in reversal of trial court judgments. Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards of compliance with procedural and substantive law as represented parties. In this case, the plaintiff failed to substantiate claims of error regarding the trial court's actions, resulting in abandonment of those issues due to inadequate briefing. The judgment was reversed concerning the dismissal of the anti-blight lien discharge application and remanded for reconsideration, while being affirmed in all other respects. The court noted challenges in understanding the plaintiff's claims due to insufficient analysis. Additionally, the anti-blight lien certificate referenced a recently renumbered code, with the relevant ordinances now found in Chapter 159, which was enacted under the authority of Connecticut General Statutes.

Chapter 159-7, enacted by the defendant city's council, establishes that any unpaid fines from anti-blight citations create a lien on the associated real property from the date of the fine, in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 7-148aa. This lien is to be recorded, maintained, and enforced similarly to property tax liens and takes precedence over other liens filed after July 1, 1997, except for taxes. The statute was amended in 2012 to replace "fine" with "penalty." General Statutes § 49-73b allows municipalities to recover expenses incurred for maintaining or remedying blighted properties through a lien on the real estate, which also takes precedence over other encumbrances, except municipal tax assessments. To be valid, the municipality must file a certificate of the lien within 30 days of completing work and notify the property owner. Municipal liens under this section can be foreclosed like mortgages and discharged per specified statutes. In this case, the plaintiff's request to discharge liens did not cite a specific statute and was labeled as "mechanic's liens." The court interpreted the November 2005 lien as an anti-blight lien and the other three as property maintenance liens, determining that the authority to discharge all liens was evaluated only under § 49-73b, which does not permit discharges of anti-blight liens under § 7-148aa.

General Statutes § 49-35b outlines the process for a lienor to establish the validity of a lien during a court hearing. The lienor must demonstrate probable cause for the lien's validity, while any person entitled to notice can contest this by presenting clear and convincing evidence. The court may deny the application if probable cause is established, discharge the lien if not, reduce the lien amount if excessive, or conditionally discharge the lien upon the posting of a sufficient bond to indemnify the lienor.

The plaintiff claims that due process was violated due to the use of an improper ex parte civil search warrant for maintenance work on his property, arguing that the warrant lacked statutory authority. However, the defendant cited Section 49-73b, which grants authority for addressing blight and placing liens for remedial work, as well as General Statutes § 29-305, allowing fire marshal inspections via administrative search warrants. The court finds no merit in the plaintiff's due process claim.

The plaintiff also contends that the court erred by considering his application to discharge property maintenance and anti-blight liens under the same ordinance, Chapter 159. The court clarifies that while the ordinance is titled "Property Maintenance," it is based on the anti-blight statute § 7-148aa. The maintenance liens were placed under § 49-73b, not any city ordinance. The defendant properly enacted an ordinance for blight enforcement and followed legal procedures for citations and judgments under § 7-152c. The plaintiff did not contest the citations or appeal the judgment but instead sought to discharge the liens.