State v. Shipman

Citations: 142 Conn. App. 161; 64 A.3d 338; 2013 WL 1582258; 2013 Conn. App. LEXIS 206Docket: AC 34672

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; April 23, 2013; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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Somen Shipman, the defendant, appeals his jury conviction for two counts of murder, one count of capital felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. He challenges the Supreme Court's decision to allow the state to reconsider the trial court record regarding the races of jury venirepersons and contests the trial court's acceptance of a peremptory challenge against a black venireperson. The appellate court declines to review the first claim and affirms the trial court's judgment. 

The relevant facts indicate that in October 1996, Shipman, along with Torrance McClain and Norman Gaines, was involved in drug trafficking in Bridgeport. Following a conflict between Ronald Marcellus and Gary Louis-Jeune regarding drug territory, Marcellus asked Shipman to handle the situation. On October 29, 1996, Shipman and Gaines shot and killed Louis-Jeune and his girlfriend, Marsha Larose. After McClain's arrest in December 1996, he implicated Shipman and Gaines in the murders. 

Shipman was subsequently charged and found guilty on all counts, resulting in a life sentence without the possibility of release, along with a concurrent twenty-year sentence for conspiracy. In June 2000, Shipman appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which initially granted a motion to rectify the record concerning the jury venirepersons. However, in November 2011, the state successfully moved for reconsideration, leading the Supreme Court to conclude that Shipman did not adequately raise a disparate treatment claim during the trial, thus denying the rectification of the record. The appeal was later transferred to the appellate court.

The defendant asserts that the Supreme Court improperly granted the state's motion to reconsider the rectification of the trial court record. The Appellate Court refuses to substitute its judgment for that of the Supreme Court, emphasizing that it is bound by the Supreme Court's decisions, which are final on matters of Connecticut law. The Appellate Court cannot reanalyze or reconsider the Supreme Court's ruling that the defendant is not entitled to record rectification.

Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court wrongly allowed the state to exercise a peremptory challenge against a black juror, T.G., violating the equal protection clause. The defendant claims the court incorrectly found the state's reasons for excluding T.G. were not pretexts for discrimination and improperly introduced its own race-neutral justification. The Appellate Court is not persuaded by these arguments. 

During jury selection, T.G. demonstrated familiarity with the crime scene and disclosed that his father was a police officer involved in drug tasks. Following voir dire, the prosecutor provided reasons for excluding T.G., citing concerns about his knowledge of the area and potential biases due to his father's occupation. These reasons were articulated during a court colloquy, which the court acknowledged in response to the defendant's Batson request for clarification on the exclusion reasons.

Mr. Hopkins argued for the seating of a black juror, T.G., emphasizing that his responses during questioning did not reveal any bias or prejudice. He highlighted concerns about a lack of minority representation on the jury panel, noting that previous absences of black candidates were due to valid reasons like illness or job issues. Mr. Satti responded by suggesting a broader inquiry into the state's past practices regarding jury selection, referencing a previous acceptance of a minority juror who was later excused for unrelated reasons. The Court acknowledged that the state’s attorney had shown consistent concern about jurors’ knowledge of the relevant area, which was deemed a race-neutral reason for excusing T.G. The Court also expressed concern about T.G.'s familial ties to narcotics enforcement, which could affect his impartiality in a case involving drug transactions. After T.G. was excused, the defendant did not request additional information about the races of other jurors, leaving only T.E.'s race documented in the record.

The defendant did not raise a Batson claim until after the jury's guilty verdict and his subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded that the record should not be altered, and the review is based on the existing record. Batson claims revolve around the proper use of peremptory challenges, which, while allowing subjective and objective criteria, cannot be employed to exclude jurors based on race or gender. The United States Supreme Court emphasized that racial discrimination in jury selection poses serious constitutional concerns, undermining the integrity of trials and the judicial system's fairness. Under Connecticut law, when a Batson claim is made, the opposing party must provide a neutral justification for excluding a juror. The claiming party then has the opportunity to challenge this justification as insufficient or pretextual. The trial court must determine if purposeful discrimination exists, with the burden on the claiming party to prove this by a preponderance of the evidence. Specific factors indicating potential discrimination include irrelevant reasons for exclusion, inadequate questioning of the juror, differential questioning based on race or gender, and inconsistent treatment of similarly situated jurors. The assessment of explanations for peremptory challenges is not binary; the court evaluates all evidence to determine discriminatory intent, considering how dubious explanations might affect the credibility of other justifications. Ultimately, the determination relies on a comprehensive evaluation of all circumstances involved.

The trial court's determination regarding discriminatory intent is a factual finding that hinges on its assessment of the attorney’s demeanor and credibility during the peremptory challenge process. Such findings are given significant deference and can only be overturned if deemed clearly erroneous, which occurs when there is no supporting evidence or when the reviewing court is firmly convinced a mistake was made. The defendant argues that the court incorrectly concluded that the state's reasons for excluding T.G. were not a guise for racial discrimination, asserting that the state treated nonminority jurors differently. However, the appeal is hindered by the lack of information on the races of the relevant jurors, which is essential for comparing the treatment of T.G., a Black juror, with nonminority jurors. The defendant's failure to raise this claim in the trial court undermines his appeal. Additionally, the defendant challenges the court's finding that the state's rationale for excluding T.G. was not pretextual, particularly criticizing a reason related to T.G.'s father's police background as implausible. The court disagrees with this interpretation of the record and maintains that the reasons provided were valid.

In Purkett v. Elem, the Supreme Court clarified the application of the second step under Batson, emphasizing that the prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory challenge only needs to be facially valid, not persuasive or plausible. The court noted that an implausible justification becomes relevant only at the third step, which assesses potential pretexts for discrimination. In this case, the defendant challenged the prosecutor's exclusion of juror T.G. based on concerns about T.G.'s father's involvement in a drug task force. However, the prosecutor indicated that T.G.'s potential knowledge of drug dealing, rather than bias toward the police, was the primary reason for exclusion. The court found no clear error in the prosecutor's reasoning or the trial court's determination that it was not a pretext for discrimination. The defendant argued that the trial court improperly relied on its own race-neutral concerns about T.G. after the exclusion, but the court's observations did not substitute for the state's rationale and did not influence the Batson evaluation. The court affirmed that the state did not engage in purposeful discrimination and upheld the judgment.

Gaines was convicted of murdering Louis-Jeune and Marsha Larose, with the Supreme Court affirming his conviction (State v. Gaines, 257 Conn. 695, 778 A.2d 919 (2001)). The court opted to protect the privacy of the jurors by using initials to refer to them. The defendant acknowledged that the court could not effectively review his Batson claim without rectifying the record to show the races of the relevant jurors. He contended that the precedent set by Hodge, which limits review of disparate treatment claims raised for the first time on appeal, has been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court cases Miller-El v. Dretke and Snyder v. Louisiana. However, the court found it unnecessary to address this argument since those cases did not involve situations where the record lacked the necessary facts for reviewing a disparate treatment claim not raised at trial. The defendant also suggested assuming all relevant jurors were Black, and he claimed the court improperly substituted its rationale for the state’s reason in exercising a peremptory challenge against juror T.G. The court clarified that it acknowledged the state's credible race-neutral justification based on the totality of circumstances, including its observations of T.G.’s demeanor, confirming the legitimacy of the peremptory challenge.