Pervis T. Payne v. Ricky Bell, Warden

Citations: 418 F.3d 644; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14952; 2005 WL 1903716Docket: 02-5551

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 22, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case Pervis T. Payne v. Ricky Bell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of Payne's habeas corpus petition after his death sentence for the murders of Charisse and Lacie Christopher. The court had previously reversed a district court's denial, citing a violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding the aggravating circumstance instruction of heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Cone, which emphasized proper deference to state court decisions, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing and ordered supplemental briefing. Upon review, the court concluded that the Tennessee state courts' decisions regarding Payne's conviction and sentence were reasonable applications of established Supreme Court law. Consequently, it affirmed the district court's denial of the habeas corpus petition. Payne raised three constitutional claims on appeal: violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, a breach of rights under Brady v. Maryland related to evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Ultimately, the court upheld the original convictions and sentences, including the death penalty for the murders and a thirty-year sentence for assault with intent to commit murder.

Charisse Christopher, a 28-year-old divorced mother, lived in Hiwassee Apartments in Millington, Tennessee, with her two young children, Nicholas and Lacie. On June 27, 1987, her neighbor and the defendant's girlfriend, Bobbie Thomas, was away visiting her mother, and the defendant had left his overnight bag and three cans of Colt 45 malt liquor in the hallway of Thomas's unit. At approximately 3:10 p.m., the resident manager, Nancy Wilson, reported a disturbance, prompting police response.

Officer C.E. Owen arrived first, noticing a black man, the defendant, exiting the building covered in blood, carrying the overnight bag and tennis shoes. Owen initially assumed the blood belonged to the defendant from a domestic altercation. When questioned, the defendant claimed to be the complainant before striking Owen with the bag and fleeing the scene.

Owen called for backup, and Officer Boyd joined him. They were let into Christopher's apartment by Wilson, where they discovered blood throughout the unit and three bodies in the kitchen. Charisse and Lacie were pronounced dead at the scene, while Nicholas was found breathing and was later hospitalized after suffering multiple stab wounds, requiring several surgeries.

Medical examinations revealed that Charisse had sustained 42 knife wounds, including defensive wounds, leading to her death from excessive bleeding. The medical examiner suggested death likely occurred within about 30 minutes after the attack, with unconsciousness following shortly after the stabbings.

Lacie Christopher's cause of death was determined by the medical examiner to be from nine stab wounds impacting the chest, abdomen, back, and head, with one severing the aorta, leading to rapid fatality. The defendant was arrested at a townhouse belonging to his ex-girlfriend, Sharon Nathaniel, where he attempted to hide in the attic. Upon his arrest, he was dressed only in dark pants and exhibited erratic behavior, including contracted pupils and foaming at the mouth. A search revealed a "pony pack" containing cocaine residue, a B.D. syringe wrapper, and blood on his clothing and body, alongside scratches on his chest. 

Additionally, a weekend bag used to strike an officer was found containing bloody clothing. Blood types were established, with Type O found on the defendant's shirts and shoes, and Type A on his pants. A baseball cap belonging to the defendant was found on Lacie's arm, indicating possible involvement. Several Colt 45 beer cans, linked to the defendant through fingerprints, were discovered in the apartment, alongside Charisse Christopher's body, which was positioned near a back door. 

Forensic evidence indicated Charisse was menstruating, with a specimen showing acid phosphatase, suggestive of semen, though no sperm was identified. A butcher knife, identified as the murder weapon, was located near Lacie's body in the kitchen. The defendant asserted his innocence, claiming to have seen an unidentified black man fleeing the scene and suggested he was merely retrieving his belongings when he encountered the gruesome scene. His testimony described a panicked reaction upon discovering the victims.

The individual in question found a woman with a knife in her throat, appearing to struggle to remove it while her words were unintelligible. Distressed and feeling nauseated, he approached, noticed a phone on the wall, and attempted to call for help but did not know the necessary number. Despite having previously seen the woman occasionally in the neighborhood due to her children playing with his, he felt compelled to assist her and could not leave her side. He recounted pulling the knife from her neck, nearly vomiting, and witnessing the woman's desperate grip as if she sought his help. He got blood on his clothes while kneeling near two children, one of whom was crying. He denied washing up in the bathroom, despite a witness testifying otherwise. 

Motivated by urgency, he left the apartment to seek help by knocking on doors. Upon exiting, he panicked at the sight of a police car, fearing he would be suspected of the crime due to being covered in blood. He noted a torn shoulder strap on his shirt, which he couldn't recall when it happened. He claimed to have a Colt 45 beer can with him, which spilled as he ran, scattering his belongings. He attributed what witnesses described as scratches on his body to weightlifting. Additionally, the defendant presented five character witnesses who corroborated his reputation for truthfulness, including Ruth Wakefield Bell, who recognized him but did not let him in when he knocked on her door the day of the incident. She stated there was nothing unusual about his appearance at that time.

Payne was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder. At the sentencing phase, the State introduced evidence including testimony from the victim's mother, Mary Zvolanek, and a police detective who presented a videotape of the crime scene. In contrast, Payne's defense called four witnesses: his parents, his girlfriend Bobbie Thomas, and Dr. John T. Hutson, a clinical psychologist. 

Bobbie Thomas described Payne as caring and supportive, emphasizing that he had positively influenced her children and asserting that it was inconsistent with his character to commit the crimes. Dr. Hutson conducted intelligence testing on Payne, revealing a Verbal IQ of 78 and a Performance IQ of 82, indicating below-average intellectual functioning. He noted that while Payne scored near the normal range in personality assessments, he displayed signs of potential psychosis. Dr. Hutson characterized Payne as "somewhat naive" and exceptionally polite. Additionally, Payne's parents testified to his lack of a criminal record and history of substance abuse, portraying him as a good son and worker. The jury received instructions according to former TENN. CODE ANN.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-2-203 mandates that the death penalty can only be imposed if a jury unanimously finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and weighs it against any mitigating circumstances. In the case of Payne, the jury unanimously determined that three aggravating circumstances applied to the murder of Lacie: (1) the victim was under twelve years old while the defendant was over eighteen; (2) the defendant created a risk of death to multiple persons; and (3) the murder was particularly heinous, involving torture. For Charisse's murder, two aggravating circumstances were identified: the creation of a risk of death to others and the heinous nature of the crime. The jury did not find two additional aggravating circumstances related to rape and avoiding arrest. Although mitigating evidence was presented, Tennessee law does not require juries to specify such circumstances, resulting in no record of the jury's assessment of mitigating factors.

Payne was convicted and sentenced to death on February 16, 1988. His conviction was affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court on April 16, 1990, and the U.S. Supreme Court later upheld the use of victim impact testimony in sentencing. Payne filed a post-conviction relief petition on January 13, 1992, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing in 1996. He also filed a writ of error coram nobis in 1992 for new evidence, which was denied in 1997. Appeals for both denials were consolidated, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the decisions on January 15, 1998, with the Tennessee Supreme Court denying further review. In November 1998, Payne initiated federal litigation with twenty-four claims, leading to summary judgment on twenty-three claims in 2001 and 2002; one claim was withdrawn. On February 3, 2003, the district court granted a certificate of appealability concerning the constitutionality of the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance while denying it for all other claims.

On December 5, 2003, the panel granted Payne's motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include two issues: (1) whether the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland by withholding exculpatory evidence related to Daryl Shanks, Charisse's boyfriend, and (2) whether Payne's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during sentencing by failing to investigate adequately and call several mitigating witnesses. The panel denied the motion concerning other claims. The district court initially denied relief on the Brady claim, determining that the suppressed evidence was not material to the conviction. It also denied the ineffective assistance claim, stating that the state court's rejection of Payne's claim was not an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court law.

Regarding the "Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel" (HAC) aggravating circumstance, the case was found not materially distinguishable from Bell v. Cone, where the Supreme Court reversed a habeas corpus grant. The Tennessee Supreme Court's handling of Payne's challenge to the HAC aggravator was deemed consistent with established federal law, meeting the standards for federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a state court decision can only be overturned if it is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable factual determination. The court clarified that a decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it reaches an opposite conclusion on a legal question.

A state court decision is deemed to involve an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent if it identifies the correct legal standard but applies it in an objectively unreasonable manner. The use of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator did not violate Payne's Eighth Amendment rights, as determined by the Tennessee state court, which found no conflict with established federal law. Consequently, a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is not warranted.

During the sentencing phase, the jury was instructed that the death penalty could be imposed only upon a unanimous finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, which included the HAC aggravator. The trial judge provided definitions for "heinous," "atrocious," "cruel," "torture," and "depravity," aligning with Tennessee statutory language and precedent from State v. Williams. These definitions included interpretations such as "grossly wicked" for heinous, "extremely evil" for atrocious, and "infliction of severe physical pain" for torture.

The jury instructions given to Payne's trial were notably similar to those in Bell v. Cone, where the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the jury's instruction was unconstitutionally vague. Despite this assumption, per the Supreme Court's guidance, the court must evaluate the broader context to determine if the Eighth Amendment was violated by the HAC aggravator’s usage.

An unconstitutionally vague jury instruction does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if a state court subsequently applies a constitutional narrowing construction. In Payne's case, the Tennessee Supreme Court is presumed to have applied such a construction, thus avoiding any Eighth Amendment issues. The case of Cone raised the question of when a state appellate court is considered to have applied a narrowing construction. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not reference the limiting construction established in State v. Dicks while affirming Cone's sentence but focused instead on the evidence of the murders. The jury determined that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel due to the brutal nature of the attacks, which involved multiple blows leading to the victims' deaths. The defense conceded that self-defense was not at issue, and the victims suffered significantly before dying. A federal appellate court concluded that the Tennessee Supreme Court's lack of citation to Dicks meant it could not presume that the court had applied its own limiting construction, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision. The federal court is required to defer to state court rulings and cannot assume a state court failed to apply its own law based solely on the absence of citation. Additionally, the state court's opinion did not deny its application of the established construction; it merely confirmed that the evidence supported the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance.

The State Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the aggravating circumstance of "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (HAC) narrowly, establishing a precedent that it applies in cases unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. This approach is constitutionally mandated, and the court has taken responsibility to ensure constitutional application in each case. In the Supreme Court case of Cone, it was determined that the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision affirming Cone's death sentence adheres to this narrowing construction. The evidence cited in Cone's case, which included the victims' resistance, the non-instantaneous nature of their deaths, and the brutality of the actions taken against them, closely mirrored evidence from prior cases where the HAC aggravator was similarly applied. 

In contrast, the argument presented by Payne highlighted that the Tennessee Supreme Court did not mention the narrowing construction in affirming his sentence. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Cone indicates that absent explicit evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the Tennessee Supreme Court followed its established precedent. The examination of factual evidence in Cone's case further reinforced the conclusion that the narrowing construction was applied, but the presumption of its application stands independently of that examination. Overall, the Supreme Court maintained that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s history of narrow construction of the HAC aggravator supports the presumption that it was followed in Cone's case as well.

In Payne's case, the lack of explicit examination by the Tennessee Supreme Court regarding the facts of a narrowing construction is not decisive. The critical factors are whether Tennessee has precedent for such a construction and if there is any affirmative indication that the court did not apply it. The Tennessee Supreme Court is presumed to have applied a narrowing construction to the HAC aggravator when upholding Payne's sentence. The precedent established in Cone confirms that Tennessee follows a narrowing construction for the HAC aggravator.

Additionally, there is no affirmative indication that the state failed to apply this construction; rather, the court's affirmance of Payne's sentence suggests it did. The Tennessee Supreme Court's review process, as mandated by TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-205, requires consideration of whether the evidence supports the jury's findings regarding statutory aggravating circumstances and whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate compared to similar cases. Although the court emphasized only the proportionality aspect, its reference to the entire review process indicates compliance with the statutory requirements, distinguishing it from situations noted in Cone where issues were left unaddressed.

Therefore, despite the differences in the depth of factual analysis compared to Cone, the invocation of TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-205 suggests that the Tennessee Supreme Court did apply a narrowing construction. The final question remains whether that construction was unconstitutionally vague, as noted in Cone.

The Supreme Court's analysis pertaining to aggravating circumstances in death penalty cases references State v. Dicks, which upheld a constitutional interpretation of an aggravating factor aligned with the precedent set in Proffitt v. Florida. In Dicks, the court defined the aggravating circumstance as targeting "conscienceless or pitiless crimes" that are torturous to victims. This interpretation was deemed sufficient to counter claims that the state court's application contradicted federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Tennessee Supreme Court later clarified that to satisfy the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder, evidence of torture or a depraved mind must be demonstrated. Notably, the court established that immediate death does not constitute torture, while defensive injuries indicating the victim's awareness and fear would meet the standard. Furthermore, the court concluded that actions reflecting a depraved mind, such as multiple blows to a victim, could meet the threshold for the aggravating circumstance, thereby ensuring a principled basis for differentiating cases eligible for the death penalty.

Payne challenges the constitutionality of the narrowing construction established in Tennessee's State v. Williams, which interprets the murder statute's requirement that the act must be "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." The Williams case stipulates that to meet this requirement, the state must demonstrate that the murder involved either torture of the victim or depravity of mind of the murderer. "Torture" is defined as inflicting severe pain on the victim while conscious. The court also states that depravity of mind can be shown without torture if acts after the victim's death suggest the murderer had a depraved state of mind at the time of killing, particularly if those acts occurred soon after death.

The Williams court emphasized that the timing of any post-mortem acts, such as mutilation, is crucial; if too much time passes, the necessary inference of depravity at the time of the homicide cannot be drawn. Payne argues that Williams lacks critical components present in the earlier Dicks case. However, the court clarifies that Williams does not deviate from previous rulings but rather builds upon them, confirming that the narrowing construction upheld in Williams aligns with the constitutional interpretations established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cone. The Tennessee Supreme Court found that the statute's terms are not unconstitutionally vague when interpreted consistently with past decisions, including Dicks and Pritchett.

The case at hand is similar to Cone, with the Tennessee Supreme Court presumed to have applied a narrowing construction of the HAC aggravator when affirming Payne's sentence. This narrowing construction aligns with constitutional standards established in previous Tennessee cases like Dicks, Pritchett, and Williams, thus confirming that the Tennessee Supreme Court's affirmation was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of established federal law. Consequently, Payne's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is denied.

Additionally, Payne's claims surrounding the prosecution's alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence, as per Brady v. Maryland, do not warrant habeas corpus relief. Specifically, he argues that the prosecution failed to disclose that the victim, Charisse Christopher, had a boyfriend who admitted to having intercourse with her the night before her murder. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Payne's post-conviction relief petition, and this affirmation is deemed a reasonable application of federal law, given the state court’s factual findings.

To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must prove three elements: (1) the evidence was exculpatory, (2) it was material to the case, and (3) it was known to the prosecution but not to the defense at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed testimony from various witnesses, including lead investigator Detective Sammy B. Wilson, who noted that the district attorney's office had access to all investigation materials, including notes of a conversation with Charisse's boyfriend, Darryl Shanks, which indicated he had seen her shortly before the murder.

On November 11, 1992, Darryl Shanks submitted an affidavit stating he last saw Charisse Christopher during the early morning of June 27, 1987, spending the night with her and leaving approximately eight hours before her murder. He informed prosecutor Henderson of this. However, at a subsequent hearing, Shanks clarified that he misunderstood the inquiry about his relationship with Charisse, asserting he did not have sexual relations with her that night due to her menstruation and a child sleeping in their bed. He noted their last intimate encounter was about two weeks prior.

Trial counsel Jim Garts, inexperienced in death penalty cases but with over nineteen years of legal practice, emphasized the importance of motive in the case. He acknowledged the State's inability to definitively link a specific individual to sexual relations with Charisse on the murder day, despite significant expert testimony regarding acid phosphatase found in her. Garts aimed to discredit this testimony, which could indicate sexual contact but was not conclusive. He stated that had he known Shanks spent the previous night with Charisse, he would have changed his strategy to include Shanks' testimony, potentially undermining the State's expert evidence. Garts also filed a Brady request, indicating that Shanks' information should have been disclosed to him.

The State's lead prosecutor, Tom Henderson, testified he did not recall interacting with Shanks but noted that his case notes included the name "Daryl Starks," identified as Charisse's boyfriend, indicating that an investigator was seeking him.

Henderson testified that he provided Garts with more information than necessary due to Garts' prior connection to the district attorney's office. He believed that if Garts had known about Shanks' sexual encounter with Charisse Christopher the night before the murders, it could have been used to explain the presence of acid phosphatase in her body. Henderson indicated he would have shared this information had Shanks disclosed it to him, but he did not consider it Brady material if Shanks only mentioned spending the night. Although the prosecution suggested an attempted rape, Henderson believed the jury rejected this theory, as they did not find the felony murder aggravating circumstance. He noted that the strongest evidence of rape included a removed tampon and the positioning of the victim's shorts.

The trial court recognized that the State was aware Shanks was Christopher's boyfriend, but found no evidence indicating that they had sexual relations the night before the murders. The assessment of the undisclosed information is based solely on what was available at the time of non-disclosure, specifically a police report indicating Shanks saw Christopher the Thursday before the murders. A motion filed by the defense for exculpatory evidence did not specifically request Shanks' name, leaving two remaining questions regarding the exculpatory nature and materiality of the evidence.

The trial court concluded that Shanks being Christopher's boyfriend was not information the prosecutor was constitutionally obligated to disclose and agreed that this information was not exculpatory. The court determined that the fact Shanks spent Thursday night with Christopher did not undermine the State's sexual motive theory. The evidence presented suggested the appellant entered Christopher's apartment after using drugs and alcohol, and post-attack, she was found with a used tampon and signs of sexual assault. Thus, the court concluded that the information about Shanks was not favorable or relevant to the appellant's guilt or innocence.

The appellant failed to demonstrate that the undisclosed information was exculpatory, rendering his claim meritless. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found that the prosecution lacked evidence at trial indicating that Shanks and Christopher had intercourse the night before the murders. The prosecution only had evidence of Shanks seeing the victim the Thursday before the murders. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1), this factual determination is presumed correct, and the appellant must rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence, which he did not accomplish. Although Payne cited Shanks' 1992 affidavit as evidence, it was not available to the prosecution at trial and thus does not contest the state court's determination. Payne also challenged the prosecutor's credibility regarding discussions with Shanks but failed to provide evidence that met the burden required to rebut the presumption. Furthermore, even if the state court's conclusion about the evidence was accepted, the determination that it was not exculpatory was not an unreasonable application of federal law, particularly since Payne was charged with first-degree murder without a sexual motive charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence did not undermine the prosecution's theory of sexual motivation. Consequently, Payne's arguments do not warrant habeas relief, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also denied.

Payne claims his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during sentencing by failing to conduct a thorough investigation and not calling key witnesses to present mitigating evidence. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed this claim when affirming the denial of Payne's post-conviction relief petition, concluding that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. Under Strickland v. Washington, the effectiveness of counsel is judged with great deference, and a defendant must demonstrate that the state court's application of Strickland was objectively unreasonable. The evidence presented during sentencing included testimonies from Payne's parents, girlfriend, and a psychologist, while additional witnesses who could have provided further mitigating evidence were not called. At the guilt phase, several character witnesses testified to Payne's good reputation, and at the post-conviction hearing, these witnesses reiterated their support, alongside testimonies from Payne's sisters about their close relationship with him. Several other potential witnesses were not interviewed by his trial counsel but could have offered favorable testimony regarding Payne's character and background.

Stephanie Robinson testified that the appellant drove herself and her family to church. Martha Fain, a guidance counselor, noted that while the appellant was not a discipline issue, she sometimes needed additional assistance in science. The appellant called two expert witnesses: Gloria Shettles, a mitigation specialist, who conducted about sixty hours of investigation for mitigating evidence not presented at sentencing, stating that the investigation was easy due to accessible witnesses, and criticizing the quality of Garts' investigation; and Dr. George Baroff, a clinical psychologist, who confirmed the appellant's IQ of 78, indicating borderline intelligence, and assessed her reasoning ability as akin to that of a ten-year-old.

The appellant argued that this evidence would demonstrate her good character prior to the offenses. The document cites that when counsel is aware of facts supporting a defense due to the defendant's disclosures, the necessity for further investigation may be reduced. Testimonies from non-testifying witnesses were deemed cumulative of existing character witness statements. Garts, the trial counsel, highlighted the appellant's exemplary life in closing arguments and explained his choice of five key character witnesses, asserting that more witnesses would yield similar testimonies. Concerns were noted about the potential for questioning regarding the appellant's past negative actions if additional character evidence were presented. The court emphasized that it would not second-guess trial counsel's strategic decisions unless they were shown to be uninformed by inadequate preparation.

The appellant's arguments did not convincingly demonstrate that counsel's choices represented an unreasonable application of Strickland, as simply indicating potential ineffectiveness is insufficient under the high standards established by AEDPA.

The Court upheld the decision of trial counsel not to recall medical experts during the sentencing phase, reasoning that the jurors likely remembered the testimony from the guilt phase. This situation parallels Payne's case, where witnesses discussing his reputation were not recalled. Payne failed to demonstrate that the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably applied the Strickland standard. The district court's ruling was affirmed. 

Additionally, Mary Zvolanek's testimony about her grandson's impact following the murders was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, which recognized the relevance of victim impact evidence in death penalty cases. The state conceded that Payne's claim was not procedurally defaulted and needed no further analysis on that issue.

Regarding jury instructions, the state initially argued the instructions for Payne's jury were constitutional compared to Cone's. The Supreme Court previously held that an aggravator is unconstitutional if it lacks inherent restraint against arbitrary death sentencing. The changes made to the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (HAC) instruction did not provide additional clarity; rather, they rendered it more vague. The revised definitions for "torture" and "depravity" offered some guidance, yet the instructions allowed the jury to impose the death penalty based on a finding of either torture or depravity, with "depravity" defined as moral corruption or wickedness.

The definition of "heinous" is so similar to another term that adding it does not effectively restrain arbitrary death penalty applications. Pervis T. Payne argues against the Supreme Court's ruling in Cone, claiming that only a harmless error analysis can rectify trial court errors, contrasting with Cone's sufficiency determination. The district court dismissed Payne's Brady claim regarding evidence from Darryl Shanks on simpler grounds, stating that even if Shanks's 1992 affidavit were true, the evidence was not material enough to warrant further examination of the state court's determination. Consequently, further analysis was deemed unnecessary. The Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Cone reversed a prior ruling by this court and led to a remand for additional proceedings, with subsequent opinions addressing the HAC aggravator being reversed as well. The majority of the discussion focuses on the implications of the 2005 Bell v. Cone ruling.