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American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

Citations: 301 U.S. App. D.C. 293; 994 F.2d 20Docket: No. 88-1375

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; June 8, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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The American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3882 (the Union), has filed a motion under the Back Pay Act (BPA) seeking attorneys’ fees for litigation regarding the calculation of a previous fee award. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) had previously found that the Bureau of Prisons committed an unfair labor practice by not reinstating an employee, Richard Frontera, as directed by an arbitration award. The Union represented Frontera and subsequently requested attorneys’ fees under the BPA after the FLRA limited the fee award to actual legal costs instead of the prevailing market rate. The Court ruled in favor of the Union, establishing that the prevailing market rate should apply.

After the Court's decision, the Union sought additional attorneys’ fees for the hours spent challenging the FLRA's fee calculation method, grounding its request in both the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and the BPA. While the EAJA claim was rejected, the matter of fees under the BPA was referred to the merits panel. The BPA allows for attorneys’ fees to be awarded to federal employees who prevail in cases of unjust personnel actions, provided that the fees are related to the personnel action and warranted in the interest of justice.

The FLRA acknowledges the Union as the prevailing party but argues that the requested fees do not relate to the personnel action since they arise from the litigation concerning fee calculation rather than the original unfair labor practice. However, existing case law suggests that fees incurred in pursuit of fee awards are generally considered related to the underlying action, as established in prior rulings, including the Supreme Court case Commissioner, INS v. Jean, which clarified that the losing party's justification in the underlying case is critical for determining fee eligibility.

The Court emphasized that fee requests are closely linked to the underlying case, advocating for a holistic view of civil actions rather than treating them as separate items. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and similar fee-shifting statutes support the notion that "fees for fees" are essential for fulfilling their intended purposes. These provisions aim to make litigants whole, encourage challenges to unfavorable conduct, and enable indigent clients to secure legal representation. The Supreme Court noted that the EAJA's goal is to eliminate financial disincentives for individuals contesting unreasonable government actions. If fees for litigation over fees were unavailable, the effectiveness of fee-shifting provisions would be diminished, deterring attorneys from representing clients and undermining congressional policies. The Third Circuit highlighted that if attorneys cannot recover fees for their time spent on fee claims, it effectively reduces their overall compensation, contrary to the objectives of statutory fee authorizations. The Bureau of Personnel Administration (BPA) protects federal employees from unjustified personnel actions by ensuring they receive back pay, attorney fees, and recognition for lost time. Legislative history indicates that the BPA aims to financially restore wronged employees. Denying "fees for fees" could discourage employees from pursuing claims and deter attorneys from taking on cases involving clients with limited means.

"Fees for fees" are recognized as a crucial mechanism for reinforcing laws that prevent improper personnel actions, specifically in this case concerning the Bureau of Prisons. The request for such fees is deemed relevant, occurring well before any potential disconnection from the underlying action. Under the Back Pay Act, attorneys’ fees must be awarded in line with standards from section 7701(g), which stipulates that fees are warranted in the interest of justice, particularly when a prohibited personnel practice is evident or when the agency's actions lack merit. 

The FLRA's position suggests that the evaluation of whether "fees for fees" are justified should be based on its methodology for calculating fees rather than the Bureau’s conduct in the personnel action. However, precedent from the Supreme Court in INS v. Jean indicates that the focus should remain on the agency's actions in the original dispute. The Bureau's failure to comply with an arbitrator's order to reinstate Mr. Frontera was deemed "clearly without merit," supporting the argument for awarding attorneys’ fees.

The FLRA contends that it should not be held responsible for these fees since it did not engage in the prohibited practice and acted to rectify the situation. While this argument is acknowledged, the determination of fee liability still centers on the Bureau's conduct. Consequently, the Bureau of Prisons is required to pay the Union's attorneys' fees, which should be calculated at the market rate for the hours spent pursuing these fees. The Union is entitled to compensation under the Back Pay Act, with the award linked to the previous fee calculation dispute and justified as being in the interest of justice.