Michael Wang v. Robert Masaitis, U.S. Marshal

Citations: 416 F.3d 992; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15361; 2005 WL 1761570Docket: 04-55772

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 27, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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The case, Michael Wang v. Robert Masaitis, involves a constitutional challenge regarding the validity of an extradition treaty between the United States and Hong Kong. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, led by Judge Hawkins, affirmed that the United States can legitimately enter into treaties with non-sovereign entities, such as Hong Kong, upholding the Extradition Agreement for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders. The court also ruled that a magistrate judge possesses the authority to issue a Report and Recommendation (R. R.) on a habeas petition without requiring the defendant's explicit consent.

In 2003, a warrant for Wang's arrest was issued by a Hong Kong magistrate on multiple counts of theft and related offenses. Following the extradition request from Hong Kong, U.S. Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman certified Wang's extraditability after confirming that all legal requirements were satisfied. Wang subsequently filed a habeas petition contesting the extradition order on two grounds: the Extradition Agreement was not a valid treaty under the Constitution, and there was insufficient probable cause for some charges. Although Wang did not explicitly consent to the magistrate's review, he did not object to her appointment. District Judge Christina A. Snyder reviewed and adopted the R. R., ultimately denying Wang's habeas corpus petition.

The background notes that Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred from the United Kingdom to China in 1997, establishing the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) with considerable autonomy. Extradition relations had previously been governed by a treaty with the United Kingdom until the new Extradition Agreement was ratified by the U.S. Senate, following approval from China.

The government claims that the constitutionality of the Extradition Agreement is a nonjusticiable political question, specifically questioning whether Hong Kong is a "sufficiently sovereign foreign power" to enter a treaty. However, the court does not need to adjudicate Hong Kong's sovereignty but must determine if the term "treaty" in the Treaty Clause includes agreements with non-sovereigns like Hong Kong, a justiciable issue under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Second Circuit's analysis indicates that federal courts are not equipped to evaluate the legitimacy of foreign governments and should focus on defining "foreign government" within the extradition statute. The court notes that while the HKSAR government is recognized as the authority of Hong Kong by the Executive, its status as a "foreign government" under the statute is contingent upon judicial interpretation. The court emphasizes that, although the Executive has determined China's sovereignty over Hong Kong, it retains the authority to assess whether the Treaty Clause applies to Hong Kong as a potential treaty party. 

Baker's six factors for identifying nonjusticiable political questions suggest that justiciability should be upheld in this case, as none of the factors—such as a constitutional commitment to a political department or a lack of judicial standards—are inherently present. Thus, the court may proceed without dismissing the case on political question grounds.

Justice Powell outlined the Baker test, which includes three key inquiries to determine if a question is a political one beyond judicial review: 1) whether the issue is committed to another branch of government by the Constitution, 2) whether resolving the issue requires moving beyond judicial expertise, and 3) whether prudential considerations advise against judicial intervention. It is clarified that not all foreign relations matters are outside judicial cognizance, nor are all political matters considered political questions.

The primary issue is whether the term "treaty" in the Treaty Clause pertains to agreements with non-sovereigns. The text does not explicitly assign this issue to any political branch, indicating a lack of textual commitment. The analysis of the Treaty Clause does not necessitate any policy determination and can be approached using standard constitutional interpretation methods, despite potential complexities.

Prudential considerations suggest that the dissent's concerns about foreign affairs and national unity are overstated. Even if the court rules that the Treaty Clause does not include non-sovereigns, the President could still create equivalent agreements through executive actions or legislation. The court acknowledges the relationship between treaty interpretation and foreign affairs but emphasizes its duty to interpret the Constitution, regardless of political implications. Thus, the court concludes that the issue is justiciable.

Finally, the court will assess whether a constitutionally valid extradition treaty exists, reviewing the matter de novo.

The Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly define "treaty," granting treaty-making power in broad terms without specifying the entities involved. Although Wang contends that treaties can only be made with sovereign nations, there is no credible authority supporting this limitation, especially considering that non-sovereign entities were not common at the time of the Constitution's drafting. The Second Circuit has affirmed the constitutionality of the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, noting that the term "treaty" historically encompassed more than just agreements between fully sovereign states. This is evidenced by the U.S.'s numerous treaties with Indian tribes, which have been regarded as equivalent to foreign treaties despite their classification as "domestic dependent nations." 

Wang also argues that the 1871 statute (25 U.S.C. § 71), which prohibits new treaties with Indian nations, implies that treaties are only inter-sovereign agreements. However, this interpretation is contested, as the judicial branch is responsible for constitutional interpretation, and there is no Supreme Court ruling that deems treaties between sovereigns and non-sovereigns unconstitutional. The judicial precedent suggests the Treaty Clause allows for treaties with non-sovereigns, as demonstrated by the treatment of historical treaties with Indian nations.

Pre-1871 judicial decisions characterized Indian nations as non-sovereign or partially sovereign entities, as seen in cases like Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Johnson v. M'Intosh. Although these rights were limited, Worcester v. Georgia acknowledged Indian nations as distinct, independent political communities with original natural rights. This historical context supports the constitutional validity of the U.S. entering treaties with non-sovereign entities, such as Hong Kong.

The appointment of Magistrate Judge Chapman for handling Wang's extradition certification and habeas challenge was proper. The scope of authority for magistrate judges is outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 636, allowing them to manage various pretrial matters, with specific exceptions. General Order 01-13 from the Central District of California assigns magistrates to certain cases, including habeas corpus petitions and extraditions, ensuring that subsequent related cases are also handled by the same magistrate.

Wang contended that Magistrate Judge Chapman lacked jurisdiction to submit a report and recommendation (R. R.) for his habeas petition without his explicit consent. Under United States v. Gomez-Lepe, consent is vital for magistrate authority in "critical stages" of proceedings. However, since the district judge reviewed the habeas petition de novo, the magistrate's R. R. did not constitute a "critical stage," thus not requiring consent and falling within the magistrate's authority under the catch-all provision of § 636(b)(3).

Magistrate Judge Chapman acted within her authority in issuing the Report and Recommendation (R. R.) regarding involuntary medication, as established in United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that involuntary medication involves significant constitutional issues, and while a magistrate judge cannot make final determinations on such matters due to Article III concerns, they can propose findings and recommendations subject to de novo review by a district court judge. The court confirmed that Judge Snyder's de novo review of the R. R. complied with the Federal Magistrates Act, as he thoroughly reviewed all relevant documents and objections. Consequently, the extradition of Wang was deemed constitutional, and the R. R. issued by Magistrate Judge Chapman was upheld. The ruling affirms the legitimacy of the extradition process under applicable treaties and statutes governing such actions.

25 U.S.C. § 71 establishes that Indian nations or tribes in the United States are not recognized as independent entities with whom the U.S. can contract by treaty. However, it maintains that treaties made with these tribes before March 3, 1871, remain valid. The 1871 statute was influenced by Congressional tensions regarding the control of Indian affairs. The Supreme Court has characterized Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations," indicating their reliance on the U.S. government for protection and management of their affairs, which reflects a guardian-ward relationship. The government asserts that § 636 does not explicitly permit a report and recommendation (R. R.) for habeas petitions challenging extradition orders, thus the magistrate judge's authority must be inferred from a general provision. The Rivera-Guerrero case considered the applicability of provisions under § 636(b)(1)(B) and § 636(b)(3) in this context. De novo review of a R. R. is only required when objections are raised. The dissenting opinion argues that not every constitutional question necessitates judicial review, asserting that treaty-related issues involving non-sovereigns should be resolved by politically accountable branches, criticizing the majority for its constitutional ruling and advocating for the dismissal of the appeal due to justiciability concerns.

The majority opinion asserts that the President's constitutional authority to enter into treaties with non-sovereigns, such as Hong Kong, is a justiciable question under Baker v. Carr. However, the opinion reframes the issue to whether the Treaty Clause encompasses agreements with non-sovereigns, which is deemed a question of foreign policy beyond judicial review. The judiciary recognizes its power to interpret the Constitution but should refrain from adjudicating constitutional questions unless necessary. The real issue is the role of the judiciary versus the political branches in defining treaty partners, which the Constitution assigns to the latter. The President, as the Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, is positioned as the primary authority in foreign affairs, including treaty-making, ambassadorial appointments, and political recognition of foreign powers. Therefore, objections related to foreign policy and recognition should be addressed to the political branches rather than the courts.

The President, utilizing constitutional authority, engaged in diplomatic relations with Hong Kong, recognizing it as a foreign power for cooperation, including an extradition agreement. This led to the establishment of the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement (HKEA), which was approved by the Senate and reflects the President's commitment to foreign relations with Hong Kong. Courts do not question the President's exercise of political power in treaty-making or foreign affairs, as these are primarily the purview of the political branches of government, as established in relevant case law. The Constitution assigns the power to make treaties and conduct foreign relations to the President, and the judiciary is generally excluded from intervening in these matters. The political question doctrine applies, particularly concerning treaties and international agreements, indicating that issues like treaty validity and termination are not subject to judicial review. The courts interpret the Constitution's text and structure to reinforce this separation, affirming that treaty-making and foreign relations are reserved for the political branches, excluding judicial involvement.

The Constitution grants the President broad authority in foreign affairs, particularly in making treaties with the Senate's advice and consent. This power includes the discretion to select treaty partners, whether sovereign or non-sovereign. The text and structure of the Constitution do not impose explicit limits on this authority. The political question doctrine emphasizes the need to defer to political branches on such matters, as courts lack manageable standards to evaluate what qualifies as a constitutionally acceptable treaty partner under the Treaty Clause. Previous cases, such as Goldwater and Made in the USA Foundation, illustrate that questions regarding treaty adoption and abrogation are governed by political standards rather than judicial ones. The Treaty Clause does not define the circumstances under which treaties must be ratified by the Senate or specify the foreign governments with which the President may enter treaties. Historical interpretations, such as those arising from Indian treaty cases, suggest that the term "treaty" encompasses agreements beyond those with fully sovereign entities. However, these interpretations are inconclusive regarding the sovereign status of Indian tribes, further complicating the understanding of the President's treaty-making power.

The Court highlighted the distinct relationship between Indian nations and the United States, noting that this relationship is unlike any between other nations. Indian nations are deemed subject to U.S. jurisdiction and certain legal restraints, yet they are recognized as distinct, independent political communities with original rights to their lands. The Supreme Court's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia emphasized that the U.S. Constitution acknowledges treaties made with Indian nations, implying their sovereignty at the time such treaties were entered. However, the enactment of 25 U.S.C. § 71 in 1871, which barred treaties with Indian tribes, raises questions about their sovereign status, suggesting either a removal of sovereignty or a historical lack of recognition as independent nations. The complexities surrounding whether Indian tribes were sovereign when treaties were made complicate comparisons to other treaties, such as those under the HKEA. The Court indicated that the determination of a President's authority to enter treaties with non-sovereigns should be left to the political branches, not the judiciary. Lastly, prudential considerations suggest that foreign affairs require a unified governmental voice, as underscored in Baker v. Carr, and the majority's critique of the President's foreign relations decisions reflects a lack of respect for executive authority in these matters.

The excerpt critiques the majority's decision regarding the President's authority to engage in foreign relations without judicial intervention. It argues that the court should refrain from adjudicating constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary, referencing Spector Motor Serv. to emphasize that intervention is typically unwarranted. The dissent emphasizes that the President's actions, supported by both the State Department and the Senate, should not be questioned, as judicial involvement risks undermining the Executive Branch's role in foreign relations. The dissent cites precedent cases (Alperin, Made in the USA Found., Goldwater) to illustrate that the judiciary should avoid interfering in matters where the political branches have not reached a constitutional impasse. It asserts that the issue of the President's authority to enter treaties with non-sovereigns, such as Hong Kong, is inherently political and nonjusticiable. The dissent warns that the majority's ruling unnecessarily threatens the political question doctrine and expresses dissent for these reasons.