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Friedman v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee
Citations: 77 Conn. App. 526; 824 A.2d 866; 2003 Conn. App. LEXIS 275Docket: AC 23051
Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; June 24, 2003; Connecticut; State Appellate Court
David A. Friedman appeals the trial court's judgment denying his petition for admission to the Connecticut bar. He contends that the court incorrectly denied his petition, improperly remanded the case twice to the Connecticut bar examining committee for further factual findings, and failed to assess his current fitness to practice law. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. Friedman graduated from Quinnipiac College School of Law and passed the Connecticut bar examination in 1998. However, allegations of cheating during law school led to an interview with the standing committee on recommendations for Fairfield County, which ultimately recommended his admission. Despite this, the bar examining committee decided to hold a formal hearing, which occurred in early 1999. On January 14, 2000, the committee recommended denying his admission, citing a lack of good moral character. Friedman subsequently petitioned the Superior Court, arguing the committee's decision was arbitrary and unjust. On April 24, 2002, the court ruled that the committee's findings were adequately supported by the record, leading to a denial of his petition for admission. In his appeal, Friedman asserts that the trial court improperly upheld the committee’s decision. However, the court found sufficient evidence to support the committee's conclusion regarding his moral character. The appellate review focused on whether the committee acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, confirming that the trial court's role was to assess the adequacy of the evidence presented to the committee. The Superior Court, in reviewing a petition for bar admission, does not act as a factfinder; that role belongs to the trier of fact, who determines witness credibility and the weight of their testimony. Good moral character is essential for bar admission, with the applicant bearing the burden of proof. While there is no definitive test for moral character, truthfulness and candor are paramount. An applicant must not only be honest but also perceived as such. The respondent's assessment of the petitioner’s character was based on two main incidents: (1) an alleged violation of the Quinnipiac student conduct code during a closed book examination and (2) perceived dishonesty in his testimony. The petitioner faced charges related to the May 1995 constitutional law examination, with hearings conducted by the student discipline committee. Testimony included accounts from fellow students Lynn Fiore and Matthew Goldzweig. Fiore testified she saw the petitioner with an outline on a piece of paper and noted that he had it on his desk during the exam, while Goldzweig corroborated that the petitioner was seen studying a condensed outline before placing it under his exam booklet. Both witnesses indicated they observed the petitioner with the outline, raising concerns about his compliance with examination rules. Yvonne Shoff, a law student present during the spring 1995 constitutional law examination, testified that she saw the petitioner reading his exam paper and asked him to turn it over, which he did. She observed him for only a brief moment and did not notice any further unusual behavior. The petitioner claimed he complied with the proctor's instructions by removing all materials except for a pen, a spare pen, and a blank sheet of paper. He prepared an outline during the examination, which he admitted to using while answering the exam questions, denying any cheating. He suggested that the accusations against him stemmed from animosity from certain students. The student discipline committee determined there was strong evidence that the petitioner had brought an outline into the examination room and concealed it to gain an unfair advantage, although they could not ascertain the document's content or its material value. Consequently, they found him in violation of the student conduct code and imposed sanctions. On January 24, 1997, Dean Neil H. Cogan reversed the committee's decision due to excessive delays in notifying and hearing the charges, which he believed may have prejudiced the petitioner’s defense. However, he stated he was required to include the materials in the petitioner’s records for bar admission review. The petitioner passed the Connecticut bar exam in July 1998. On January 4, 1999, the respondent issued a notice for a hearing regarding the petitioner’s application for admission to the bar, focusing on the previous examination incident and the petitioner’s honesty. The hearings took place on January 7 and June 25, 1999, where the petitioner, represented by counsel, reiterated that he created an outline to aid his exam responses. Another witness, Fiore, testified that she had overheard a student commenting on the petitioner’s nervousness and had seen him studying a piece of paper before the exam began, noting that part of the paper was visible under his exam book. On January 14, 2000, a panel concluded that the petitioner engaged in dishonesty by cheating on a law school exam at Quinnipiac College School of Law, thereby attempting to gain an unearned grade. The misconduct was significant as it pertained to the petitioner's law degree, necessary for bar admission, and was committed by an individual whose age and experience exceeded youthful indiscretion. The panel determined, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner lacked good moral character and did not recommend him for admission to the Connecticut bar. Following this, the petitioner sought admission to the bar through the Superior Court, which remanded the case for further findings on November 16, 2000, and August 20, 2001. The respondent issued revised decisions in May and December 2001, maintaining the initial determination against the petitioner. The court affirmed the respondent's findings, stating sufficient evidence supported their conclusion, and denied the petition. The petitioner contended that the respondent's findings were arbitrary and lacked a fair factual investigation, particularly criticizing the absence of independent inquiry into the "crib sheet" allegedly used during the exam. He also argued that the respondent failed to investigate the reversal of the student discipline committee's decision by Dean Cogan, which could have affected his defense. However, the court noted that the burden of proving good character lies with the applicant, and the respondent was not required to investigate the content of the "crib sheet" or potential delays in the proceedings. The respondent could rely on the student discipline committee's findings and the evidence presented, including witness testimony. The court emphasized that the respondent's credibility assessment of the witnesses, specifically favoring Fiore’s testimony over the petitioner’s, was within their discretion. Fiore testified that she observed the contested material during the exam, providing sufficient grounds for the respondent to conclude that the petitioner cheated. The petitioner claims to have established a prima facie case of good moral character, arguing that the respondent was required to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he lacked such character. Although the respondent appears to have applied this standard, the petitioner contends that the conclusions reached were not reasonable or logical based on the record. He references his response to a specific question on his bar application concerning any disciplinary actions, where he disclosed a charge related to unauthorized materials during an exam but noted he was not convicted or sanctioned. The petitioner argues that this disclosure indicates candor; however, the court disagrees, finding that he did not establish a prima facie case of good moral character, and that the respondent had prior knowledge of the disciplinary materials from the Quinnipiac proceedings. Furthermore, the court distinguishes between attorney grievance proceedings and bar admission processes, asserting that the burden of proving good moral character lies with the applicant, not the respondent. After a thorough review, the court concludes that the respondent acted reasonably and did not abuse its discretion in determining the petitioner lacked good moral character. The petitioner also challenges the court's decision to remand the case twice for further factual findings, arguing that it should have ordered his admission to the bar instead. The court finds this position to be incorrect, noting that the review process resembles that of an administrative agency, and the respondent is not classified as such. A trial court can determine that an administrative ruling is incomplete and not ready for final judicial review, thereby requiring further factual findings before any resolution. In the current case, the court found that the respondent's conclusions lacked necessary factual findings, justifying a remand for those findings. The petitioner argued that the court failed to consider his current moral character and fitness to practice law, requesting a remand for additional hearings. However, since the petitioner did not raise this request before the trial court, the appellate court declined to review it, emphasizing that issues not presented at the trial level typically cannot be considered on appeal. Even if the claim were reviewed, the court did not interpret the precedent set in Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee as granting an automatic right to remand for a determination of current fitness to practice law. In Scott, the petitioner's significant past drug-related legal issues were scrutinized, and the court ultimately reversed a lower court's ruling that had ordered his admission to the bar based on findings that questioned his credibility and moral character. The court in Scott determined that the trial court improperly rejected findings regarding an applicant's fitness to practice law, emphasizing that fitness is not static and should be reassessed over time. Although the respondent had deemed the petitioner unfit in 1989, the court stated a new hearing was warranted to evaluate any new evidence related to the petitioner's current fitness. In Scott, the bar committee was concerned about the petitioner's prior criminal record, and the respondent's counsel concurred that a remand for a rehabilitation review was appropriate. In contrast, the current case involved a determination by the respondent that the petitioner lacked good moral character based on a specific incident and his hearing testimony. Unlike Scott, there was no consensus for a remand to consider rehabilitation, leading the court to uphold that a new hearing on the petitioner's present fitness was unnecessary, affirming the judgment. The document also references prior opinions and remands issued by the court, detailing a student conduct code that prohibits various acts, including cheating and actions reflecting adversely on fitness to practice law. Testimony recorded during proceedings highlighted an incident where the petitioner was observed with unauthorized materials during an examination, further contributing to the assessment of his moral character. Fiore provided testimony regarding a conversation with Matt Goldzweig about exam preparation, specifically questioning what materials would be left on the desk during the exam. Goldzweig indicated he would clear everything, prompting Fiore to do the same. Fiore expressed doubt that the petitioner could have produced the amount of writing seen during the exam, stating her own experience resulted in much less output even while writing constantly. Goldzweig recounted the exam process, noting he was distracted by the petitioner referring to a piece of paper on his desk, which he perceived as cheating. The petitioner denied cheating and attributed accusations against him to personal animosity from Goldzweig. The Student Discipline Committee sanctioned the petitioner by reducing his constitutional law grade by one full point, issuing a reprimand for misconduct, and documenting the decision in his law school record. The petitioner was found to have violated the Student Conduct Code regarding cheating on the exam, although this decision was later reversed by Dean Cogan. During his testimony, the petitioner explained that he began the exam by writing an outline of key points on a blank sheet of paper and subsequently used these points to structure his answers, asserting that he did not cheat. The student, as reported by Fiore, questioned another's nervousness about cheating, suggesting a commonality of behavior among students. The May 9, 2001 decision noted findings of fact regarding the petitioner’s conduct during a constitutional law exam, concluding that the petitioner cheated by bringing unauthorized materials—specifically, a written piece of paper—into a closed book exam. The petitioner denied any wrongdoing both when testifying under oath before the panel and the Quinnipiac College School of Law discipline committee, but was found to be untruthful in these statements. Further findings from the December 26, 2001 decision highlighted that the petitioner was deceptive in his initial account of events, failing to acknowledge the written material he had during the exam. He misrepresented the timing of when other witnesses observed writing on his desk and allowed his attorney to make false denials regarding the presence of unauthorized materials. The petitioner argued that the student discipline committee did not conclude he had cheated, pointing to the dean's reversal of the committee’s decision, which he claimed supported his innocence due to the retention of his course grade. However, the dean's reversal was based on procedural delays that may have hindered the petitioner’s defense, without addressing the merits of the case. Ultimately, the court found the respondent's credibility assessment of Fiore over that of the petitioner to be justified, referencing Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee. Sufficient evidence exists to support the respondent's finding regarding the petitioner's moral character, contrary to the petitioner's claims of innocence regarding unauthorized exam material. The petitioner’s assertion that he was not convicted or sanctioned is questioned; it may have been more accurate to state that the student discipline committee's decision was reversed due to procedural delays. An applicant demonstrating prima facie good moral character must be evaluated against any contradictory evidence, either from the committee's own investigation or through the applicant's testimony. The committee's determination must be rationally supported by the evidence presented. The petitioner challenges the reliance on Goldzweig's testimony, arguing lack of opportunity for cross-examination, yet he had previously cross-examined Goldzweig at the student discipline committee hearings without objection to the testimony being considered. More critically, decisions by both the respondent and the court highlighted Fiore's testimony as more persuasive. This aligns with precedent from Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, which affirmed that sufficient evidence supported findings on moral character, leading to a remand for a new hearing without the requirement of reassessing the petitioner’s current fitness to practice law.