State v. Thomas

Citations: 62 Conn. App. 356; 772 A.2d 611; 2001 Conn. App. LEXIS 121Docket: AC 20235

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; March 20, 2001; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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Damian Thomas appeals his conviction from a jury trial on four counts of felony murder and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit. He argues (1) insufficient evidence supports the felony murder conviction; (2) the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance was plain error; and (3) the conviction of four counts of felony murder violates his double jeopardy rights given only two homicide victims. The court affirms the trial court's judgment in part and reverses it in part. 

Key facts established by the jury include an incident on December 25, 1997, when Thomas, accompanied by three others, left a nightclub and approached a residence in New Haven. Armed with a gun, he demanded money from individuals on the porch. Witnesses testified that Thomas shot one victim, Jevon Langley, who was lying on the floor, and another shot was heard shortly afterward, indicating a second victim. Anthony Mitchell identified Thomas as the shooter, while Ronnie Washington, who also witnessed the incident, could not identify him. After the shootings, Thomas fled in a car, where his accomplice observed him with a handgun. Later, police arrested Thomas, who confessed but later claimed the confession was coerced. Both victims died from .41 caliber bullet wounds fired from the same gun.

The jury convicted the defendant of four counts of felony murder and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit, based on an incident from March 8, 1999. On May 28, 1999, the court sentenced the defendant to a total of 120 years: sixty years for each of the felony murder counts concerning the deaths of Foskey and Langley during robbery and burglary, with some sentences running concurrently and others consecutively, and five years for carrying a pistol without a permit, running concurrently with the felony murder sentences. The defendant appealed, claiming insufficient evidence to support his felony murder convictions, arguing that while he intended to kill, he did not intend to commit robbery or burglary. This insufficiency claim was not preserved at trial, prompting the defendant to seek review under the plain error doctrine. However, the court found this claim reviewable under State v. Golding since it pertains to a fundamental constitutional right, specifically the right not to be convicted on insufficient evidence. The court outlined a two-part review standard for sufficiency of evidence: first, viewing evidence favorably for sustaining the verdict, and second, determining if the jury could have reasonably concluded that the evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court clarified that felony murder involves a death occurring during the commission of another crime. It concluded that the jury could have reasonably found the defendant guilty of attempting robbery, as he acted with the necessary mental state and took substantial steps toward committing that crime.

Robbery occurs when a person, during the act of committing larceny, uses or threatens immediate physical force to compel another to surrender property. Larceny involves wrongfully taking or withholding property with the intent to deprive the owner. In this case, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant, armed with a .41 caliber handgun, threatened the victims with phrases like "Stick up" and "nobody move," thus demonstrating intent to commit robbery. The jury could also infer that the defendant's instructions to the victims to "lay down" and "give [him] everything" further indicated his intent to rob. 

The defendant's argument for insufficient evidence of robbery was rejected, as the evidence suggested he intended to rob the victims upon entering their residence, meeting the definition of burglary. Burglary is defined as unlawfully entering a building with intent to commit a crime inside. The jury could reasonably find that the defendant entered with the intent to rob, thereby supporting a burglary conviction.

To establish probable cause for felony murder, there must be evidence that the defendant was committing or attempting to commit a designated felony when the victims were killed. The jury could conclude that the defendant caused the deaths during an attempted robbery and burglary, making the claim of insufficient evidence regarding the felony murder conviction unfounded.

Additionally, the defendant claimed that the court erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of extreme emotional distress without a request from him. This claim was dismissed based on precedent, which indicates that a trial court does not have an obligation to sua sponte examine evidence for mitigating circumstances unless requested. Thus, the absence of such an instruction did not violate the defendant's rights or constitute plain error.

The Supreme Court's decision in Veal is binding, and the court is not permitted to disregard it. The defendant's argument regarding the court's failure to instruct the jury on extreme emotional distress lacks merit. The defendant also claims a violation of his double jeopardy rights due to convictions for four counts of felony murder with only two homicide victims. While the state disagrees with the conviction's validity, it acknowledges the improper sentencing on four counts. The double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense within a single trial. The court emphasized that the felony murder statute refers to the death of "a person" in the singular, meaning that for multiple victims, there are as many offenses as there are victims. The Supreme Court has ruled that felony murder and manslaughter for a single homicide should be treated as one crime for double jeopardy purposes. Consequently, the court found that sentencing on four counts of felony murder for two victims violated the defendant's rights. The appropriate remedy for this violation has been previously discussed in State v. Chicano, where the court indicated that the state’s request to vacate the sentence without overturning the conviction does not align with established procedures for double jeopardy claims.

A majority of circuits vacate both the conviction and sentence for lesser offenses, while at least three circuits, excluding the Second Circuit, support vacating only the sentence. The Supreme Court in Chicano affirmed that the Second Circuit's method effectively addresses concerns related to reversing remaining convictions and avoiding collateral consequences from multiple convictions. Consequently, the court determined that when multiple punishments arise from the same offense, it is proper to vacate only the additional sentence. The judgment is partially reversed, directing the trial court to vacate sentences on counts four and five, merge count four with count two and count five with count three, and conduct resentencing on counts two and three, while affirming the judgment in other respects. 

Regarding the legal definitions, General Statutes § 53a-54c outlines the conditions under which a person is guilty of murder during the commission of certain crimes, providing an affirmative defense for defendants not involved in the homicidal act or not armed. General Statutes § 29-35(a) prohibits carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, except within one's dwelling or business. Testimony from the trial indicated that a statement instructing someone to "run everything" constituted a robbery. The jury acquitted the defendant on counts of capital felony and murder. 

Additionally, Practice Book § 60-5 states that a court is not obligated to consider claims not distinctly raised at trial but may notice plain errors in the interest of justice. In State v. Roy, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court should have reviewed the sufficiency of evidence despite the defendant's unpreserved claim of constitutional error. The interpretation of "in the circumstances of this case" refers to unpreserved sufficiency claims rather than specific factual situations. At oral argument, both the defendant and the state agreed to remand the case for merging counts.