Caswell Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Milford Partners, Inc.
Docket: AC 19072
Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; June 13, 2000; Connecticut; State Appellate Court
Milford Partners, Inc., a land development company and successor declarant of the Caswell Cove Condominium, appeals a trial court judgment that quieted title of disputed real property to the Caswell Cove Condominium Association, Inc. The defendant contests the court's rulings that (1) voided the fourth amendment to the condominium declaration, (2) invalidated the fourteenth amendment, and (3) denied a motion to strike for nonjoinder of necessary parties. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
The case involves Milford Partners' withdrawal of approximately five acres from the southern portion of the 43-acre Caswell Cove Condominium and an attempt to establish an easement over the common areas. The condominium was initially established through a declaration recorded on September 19, 1988, by Milford River Associates, which was succeeded by the defendant between July 1990 and September 1992.
The original declaration included a survey showing thirteen potential building sites, with five required to be developed. Over time, fourteen amendments were recorded. The fourth amendment made significant changes, including altering the maximum unit count, withdrawing section IV from the condominium, and updating the survey to reflect only three sections. This amendment reserved the withdrawn area for the defendant and indicated that not all buildings and amenities needed to be constructed immediately.
Subsequently, the fifth amendment reintroduced some of the previously withdrawn land back into the condominium and adjusted unit counts and ownership interests. The fourteenth amendment, recorded on September 19, 1995, established a permanent easement across common areas for the lands withdrawn by the fourth amendment and declared the remaining developmental rights for those lands withdrawn from the condominium.
On February 26, 1996, the plaintiff initiated legal action challenging the defendant's claim to developmental rights and the validity of the fourteenth amendment, seeking to quiet title to the withdrawn property and nullify the easement. The plaintiff also alleged violations of the Common Interest Ownership Act and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, while the defendant's motion to strike the complaint was denied as insufficient.
On October 16, 1998, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, confirming their title to the property, declaring an easement void, and permitting an award of attorney’s fees. The defendant's subsequent motions for reargument and reconsideration were denied, leading to an appeal. The defendant contested the court's decision to void the fourth amendment, which expanded their developmental rights. The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings, stating these are binding unless clearly erroneous. The evidence from the defendant did not comply with General Statutes § 47-228(a), which requires surveys to be clear and legible; in this instance, the survey attached to the amendment was deemed illegible. Additionally, the survey failed to provide a legally sufficient description of properties subject to developmental rights, as required by § 47-228(b). The court ruled the fourth amendment void regarding any interpretation that would remove property from the condominium, noting the only reserved property was a two-acre parcel known as the "Point." The defendant also challenged the validity of the fourteenth amendment, which reserved a permanent easement for the lands removed under the fourth amendment. The court found this amendment invalid, as it did not adequately describe the properties subject to withdrawal, reaffirming that all real property remained subject to General Statutes § 47-229(d).
If all real property is subject to withdrawal without separate descriptions in the declaration, no property can be withdrawn after a unit is sold. The court ruled the fourth amendment void, rendering the fourteenth amendment invalid as it depended on the fourth. The defendant's claim that the court wrongly denied a motion to strike for not including unit owners and mortgagees as necessary parties was rejected. Necessary parties are those with an interest in the controversy essential for a fair trial. However, if their interests can be separated from those of existing parties, they are not indispensable. The court found no evidence that unit owners or mortgagees were necessary for this action. Under General Statutes § 47-244(a), a condominium association can act on behalf of itself or unit owners in matters affecting the community without limitations, thus affirming the plaintiff's authority to initiate this action. The court also determined that mortgagees were not necessary parties since their interests derived from the unit owners. The judgment was upheld, noting that section numbers in the survey did not dictate the construction order and the declaration allowed for phased development without guarantees. The court considered the legal implications of the fourth amendment in the quiet title action, but the plaintiff's argument regarding the fourteenth amendment's compliance with General Statutes § 47-228(f) was not addressed, as the case was decided based on its trial theory.
