Richard Laird v. Martin Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections the District Attorney of Bucks County the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania Martin Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Gregory White, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh Joseph Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview

Citation: 414 F.3d 419Docket: 01-9012

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; July 19, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the Commonwealth's appeal of a district court order that overturned Richard Laird's death sentence and granted a new trial for his first-degree murder conviction. The district court found that the state trial court improperly instructed the jury on accomplice liability during the guilt phase of the trial. Laird and his co-defendant, Frank Chester, were accused of murdering Anthony Milano, whose severely beaten body was discovered shortly after they left a bar with him. Both defendants admitted to being present during the murder but denied any intention to kill, each blaming the other for the fatal injuries. They were convicted of multiple charges, including first-degree murder, and sentenced to death, a decision affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Following the denial of his post-conviction relief petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, Laird filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which ultimately resulted in the current appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously addressed Laird’s and Chester’s allegations separately, noting issues related to the jury instructions on accomplice liability, including a failure to require a finding of specific intent as a prerequisite for such liability. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing with its reasoning.

The Court upheld a jury instruction on accomplice liability, which states that a person is guilty if they knowingly assist in the commission of a crime, but mere presence or knowledge of the crime is insufficient for accomplice status. A defendant can be considered an accomplice if they actively promote or facilitate the crime, but they are not an accomplice if they withdraw their efforts before the crime is committed. The Court confirmed that the instruction aligned with Pennsylvania's statutory definition and dismissed Chester's challenge to it, noting that Laird's related challenge was not directly adjudicated on its merits. The district court found that Laird's due process claim regarding the jury instruction was not procedurally defaulted, citing a "relaxed waiver rule" applicable at the time of his appeal. The court ruled that the AEDPA's deferential standard did not apply due to lack of state court review on the merits and analyzed the jury instruction under a pre-AEDPA standard, concluding it could mislead the jury regarding the prosecution's burden of proof. The court granted conditional relief, determining the error was not harmless. Federal habeas relief is restricted if a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court's decision was unreasonable or contrary to established federal law.

The Commonwealth contends that the district court incorrectly determined that Laird's challenge to the trial court's accomplice liability instruction was not subject to the deferential standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) because it was not adjudicated on the merits by the state supreme court. The Commonwealth argues that the state court's ruling on Chester's ineffective counsel claim regarding the instruction should be considered a decision on Laird's due process challenge, warranting AEDPA deference. However, the Commonwealth fails to provide supporting authority for this assertion, and no such authority is found. The situation is complicated by the fact that Laird and Chester attempted to shift blame for the murder during their joint trial. 

Additionally, the state supreme court's analysis of Chester's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) claim revealed that while the accomplice liability instruction had been litigated, it possessed arguable merit due to its inconsistency with precedent in Commonwealth v. Huffman. The court noted the necessity for the jury to understand that both the actual killer and the accomplice must share the specific intent to kill in first-degree murder cases. Although the court concluded that Chester was not prejudiced by the erroneous charge, as he was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder—which requires a finding of intent—the district court disagreed with this harmless error analysis, citing that convictions for second and third-degree murder do not require such specific intent. Ultimately, the state supreme court did not address the merits of Laird's due process claim, contradicting the Commonwealth's assertion that the district court's finding was unsupported by the record.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Laird I highlighted a flaw in the Commonwealth's argument regarding Laird's claim of inconsistent verdicts, noting that the issue had only been raised by co-defendant Chester and had not been conclusively litigated for Laird. The court clarified that resolutions concerning one defendant do not automatically apply to unlitigated claims of a co-defendant. The Commonwealth further contended that Laird's failure to raise an accomplice liability instruction on direct appeal barred its review during habeas proceedings due to procedural default, asserting that Laird could have raised this issue similarly to Chester. However, the district court disagreed, finding that Laird's claim was not procedurally defaulted and affirming this conclusion. 

The court also ruled that the trial court's accomplice liability instruction violated Laird's right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing In re Winship, the court emphasized the necessity of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Laird argued that the jury instructions improperly relieved the Commonwealth of its burden to demonstrate his specific intent to kill. Under Pennsylvania law, first-degree murder requires proof of intent, which applies to accomplices as well. The jury had been instructed on accomplice liability and first-degree murder, with specific elements outlined. The court's analysis focused on whether the jury could have misapplied these instructions in a manner that contravened constitutional standards.

Chester and Laird each accused the other of killing Milano while admitting to their involvement in the kidnapping. Both defendants denied any intent to murder Milano or to assist each other in committing the act. Laird, convicted of conspiracy, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and murder, contends that jury instructions allowed for his conviction as an accomplice in first-degree murder without establishing a shared intent to kill. The Commonwealth argues that references to "accomplice" were specific to the murder charge, implying that jurors understood the need for specific intent to convict for first-degree murder. However, this interpretation overextends the language of the jury instruction, which has previously been deemed inadequate in similar cases, such as Smith, where an erroneous accomplice liability charge led to unfair trial claims. The Commonwealth's attempt to differentiate Smith based on the nature of the crimes overlooks other convictions against Chester and Laird, including kidnapping, which could mislead the jury into convicting Laird of first-degree murder without proof of intent to kill. Although the trial court did instruct jurors on the necessity of forming specific intent to kill, this instruction was contextualized within a diminished capacity defense and did not sufficiently clarify the flawed earlier instruction. As a result, it remains unclear which of the conflicting instructions jurors considered in their verdict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the instructional issue but did not resolve it, leading the district court to rule that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's deferential review standards were inapplicable, affirming the erroneous nature of the instruction. The inquiry continues into whether the error was harmless, as suggested by the Commonwealth and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Chester II.

In assessing whether the error was harmless, the court must determine if it had a substantial impact on the verdict. The Commonwealth presents two arguments against Laird's entitlement to habeas relief. First, it asserts that the error was harmless because Laird was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, implying that the jury found he had the requisite mens rea for murder. The court rejects this argument, noting that Laird was only convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, not first-degree murder, and that the jury could have believed he intended to kidnap or assault Milano, while only Chester intended to kill him. This distinction means a conviction for first-degree murder based on shared specific intent is unsupported. 

Second, the Commonwealth claims that overwhelming evidence establishes Laird's intent to kill. However, the court emphasizes that determining what evidence the jury believed is not its role. The only testimony directly linking Laird to the killing came from Chester, who also provided conflicting statements. The court reiterates that while the evidence supports the notion that a killing occurred with intent, it does not confirm that Laird, as a coconspirator, shared the specific intent to kill Milano. The trial court's jury instructions allowed for a conviction of first-degree murder without confirming that each conspirator intended to kill, raising significant doubts about the verdict's integrity. Consequently, the court affirms that the error was not harmless, aligning with the district court's findings.

In C. Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005), the court addressed a case where the defendant, Bronshtein, was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy. The court determined that the jury instructions on accomplice liability were misleading, suggesting Bronshtein could be found guilty without having the specific intent to kill. However, the court found the error harmless because Bronshtein was also convicted of conspiracy, implying the jury must have believed he either committed the murder or shared the intent to do so.

In the current appeal involving Laird, the Commonwealth argued that the reasoning in Bronshtein applied, asserting any error was likewise harmless. The court disagreed, noting significant differences: unlike Bronshtein, Laird was convicted of multiple degrees of murder, and the jury was not instructed that a co-conspirator needed to share the specific intent to kill for a first-degree murder conviction. This lack of clarity left uncertainty about the jury's understanding.

Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's conditional grant of habeas relief and remanded the case for further proceedings, specifically addressing the defective accomplice liability charge. The district court's additional findings regarding penalties and defense counsel's effectiveness were not considered necessary to resolve given the decision based on the accomplice liability issue.

The excerpt outlines the legal framework and procedural history related to Laird's appeal concerning a murder conviction. Under Pennsylvania law, first-degree murder necessitates a specific intent to kill, while second-degree murder occurs during the commission of a felony, and all other murders fall under third-degree murder as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2502. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2254, and appellate jurisdiction was granted under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 2253. The review of the district court's legal conclusions is plenary, referencing Duncan v. Morton.

Laird's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) appeal noted the precedent set in Smith v. Horn, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address, despite its relevance to Laird's habeas claim. The district court found that Laird's claim was not procedurally defaulted and that no state procedural rule barred federal review of the accomplice liability charge. The district court relied on Doctor v. Walters and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Albrecht regarding the "relaxed waiver rule."

The excerpt further explains the court's treatment of homicide and conspiracy, emphasizing the intent required for accomplice liability and distinguishing between degrees of murder. It asserts that if the jury finds intent to kill, they could return a verdict for first-degree murder, even if a felony occurred. Given Laird's conviction for second-degree murder, which carries a life sentence, the Commonwealth may retry him for first-degree murder or resentence him for the other charges. The text also indicates that Laird's life sentence for second-degree murder was never formally imposed, following a prior death sentence for first-degree murder.