George D. Philip v. Ford Motor Company, a Delaware Corporation

Citations: 413 F.3d 766; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13447; 86 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,112; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1858; 2005 WL 1568285Docket: 04-1735

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 7, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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George D. Philip appeals the summary judgment granted to Ford Motor Company on his race discrimination claims related to his removal from a '25 mile driver-inspector' position in 1998. Philip, an African-American who worked for Ford from 1988 until being placed on 'no work available' status in 1998, initially filed a lawsuit in 1999 alleging disability discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation. The district court dismissed his racial discrimination claims concerning events before 1997 without appeal. In March 2003, the court dismissed the remaining claims, but the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Philip's post-1997 race discrimination claims, which alleged that Ford's hiring practices favored white employees over him.

In October 2003, Ford sought summary judgment, claiming Philip failed to provide sufficient evidence of disparate treatment compared to similarly situated non-minority employees. The district court granted Ford's motion in February 2004, leading Philip to appeal again. The Eighth Circuit reviews summary judgment de novo, requiring Philip to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination by showing membership in a protected class, meeting work expectations, experiencing adverse employment action, and evidence of differential treatment of similarly situated employees. Philip met the first three criteria but struggled with the fourth, needing to provide specific evidence of such disparity to advance his claims. If he succeeded, the burden would then shift to Ford to justify its actions with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

Philip contends that the district court utilized an incorrect standard for determining whether he and other employees were 'similarly situated.' The court required that he identify individuals who shared the same supervisor, standards, and conduct, as outlined in *Clark v. Runyon*. Philip argues that this standard is excessively stringent and should instead follow the less rigorous standard from *Wheeler*, which focuses on whether employees engaged in similar conduct but received different disciplinary actions. However, even under the Wheeler standard, Philip failed to provide sufficient evidence of disparate treatment.

The court determined that Philip did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination as he could not demonstrate that similarly situated employees were treated differently. Although he cited affidavits from Dr. Zubieda Kahn and Nancy Schillinger as evidence of disparate treatment, the court found these insufficient. Kahn's testimony highlighted potential racial discrimination incidents but did not connect them to Philip’s circumstances or establish that those involved were similarly situated. Similarly, Schillinger’s affidavit suggested differential treatment of two Caucasian employees but lacked evidence regarding the comparability of their positions or qualifications to Philip’s situation.

Ultimately, while the affidavits may indicate some instances of disparate treatment, they do not provide the specific, tangible evidence required to prove that employees similarly situated to Philip received different treatment from Ford. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Ford. A dissenting opinion from Judge Heaney indicated a belief that Philip had presented adequate evidence of preferential treatment towards similarly situated white employees.

A plaintiff must demonstrate that they are similarly situated to comparably treated employees in all relevant aspects to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Courts assess the necessary similarities on a case-by-case basis, with relevant factors varying by circumstance. In the context of Philip's claim, he asserts that Ford's decision to reclassify his position was discriminatory, as other employees were allowed to remain in their roles post-reclassification. He supports his argument with an affidavit indicating that two white male employees were "grandfathered" into their positions, meaning they were allowed to retain their jobs without bidding. Philip's claim does not involve disciplinary action or inadequate performance; instead, he argues that the application of a collective bargaining agreement unfairly removed him from his position while not affecting white employees similarly situated. The judgment against Philip may impose an undue burden on plaintiffs in non-disciplinary cases by requiring irrelevant comparisons. His position, alongside those of the white employees, was reclassified and should have been subject to a bidding process based on seniority. Therefore, the recommendation is to reverse the district court's judgment and remand the case for additional proceedings.