Town of South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, Local 1480

Citations: 41 Conn. App. 649; 677 A.2d 464; 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3143; 1996 Conn. App. LEXIS 281Docket: 14347

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; June 11, 1996; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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The South Windsor Police Union, Local 1480, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, appeals a trial court decision vacating an arbitration award that reinstated a member (grievant) of the police department. The court ruled the award was (1) untimely, (2) contrary to public policy, and (3) in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, which prohibits reinstatement when a grievant is only partially exonerated. The grievant, a nine-year police veteran, faced multiple charges related to misconduct, primarily involving the improper dissemination of police information while interacting with a known informant and a woman believed to be a drug buyer. The grievant's actions, including revealing an informant's status to an undercover officer, led to his termination. The union sought arbitration, resulting in a decision that found the grievant guilty of several violations but ordered reinstatement after a 150-day suspension. The town contested the award's validity, citing untimeliness and policy violations. The trial court determined the award was issued nearly fifteen months after final briefs were received, violating General Statutes § 52-416(a), thus rendering it ineffective. The appeal followed the trial court's judgment.

Section 31-98 mandates that a majority of the board members must sign a written decision within fifteen days after proceedings conclude, unless the parties consent to an oral decision. The Supreme Court clarified that when interpreting statutes, it is presumed that the legislature considered existing relevant laws. Thus, the General Assembly, by establishing a specific fifteen-day limit in 31-98, indicated that the thirty-day limit in 52-416 (a) does not apply to board decisions. The Court in AFSCME v. New Britain determined that the time limit in the predecessor statute was directory, not mandatory, allowing arbitrators to issue awards within a reasonable time if no specific limits exist in collective bargaining agreements. The town argued that a thirteen-month delay in rendering a decision was unreasonable; however, the plaintiff waived this timeliness issue by not raising it before the award was issued, rendering the trial court's ruling on untimeliness incorrect. 

Furthermore, the town contended that the arbitration award reinstating a police officer who disclosed a confidential informant's identity would breach public policy, which mandates the protection of such identities. The courts support arbitration but can vacate awards that contradict explicit public policy derived from statutes and case law. Specifically, the Freedom of Information Act reinforces the policy of safeguarding confidential informants' identities, indicating that disclosure could be detrimental to public interest.

In Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the Freedom of Information Act restricts the disclosure of arrest information to basic details found in the arrest report, including the arrestee's name, address, arrest date, time, location, and offense. The court emphasized the importance of protecting the identity of informants, citing legislative comments that highlighted the risks to law enforcement and informants if such identities were disclosed. Representative Francis X. O’Neill, Jr. warned that revealing informant identities could jeopardize undercover operations and endanger lives. 

In the context of a union’s appeal, five arguments were presented to assert that an award did not violate public policy. These included the claim that the grievant had not disclosed information as defined by specific statutes, that R. was not recognized as an informant, that the South Windsor police department had a practice of endangering drug suspects, that the grievant’s knowledge of R.'s informant status was no more substantial than that of others in the drug culture, and that the grievant's actions were lawful. 

While the trial court only referenced certain statutes, it was noted that public policy regarding the confidentiality of informants is broader than those statutes. The Supreme Court's decision in Gifford reinforces the state's policy against disclosing informant identities. Although the board did not label R. as an informant for the task force, it acknowledged that he had been used as an informant by the South Windsor police prior to his arrest.

The board determined that the grievant's assertion that R. was an informant, despite being a police officer, violated public policy by potentially discouraging informants from cooperating with law enforcement due to fears of disclosure and physical harm. The board emphasized the state's strong interest in protecting the identities of confidential informants, which is reflected in the police manual's prohibition against disseminating such information. The grievant's justification that police practices might allow for "burning" informants did not absolve him of responsibility, as public policy is defined by statutes and legal precedents, not police conduct. The union's arguments regarding the grievant's knowledge of R.'s informant status and the lack of explicit legal prohibition against his actions were dismissed, as the board found that the grievant's status as a known officer lent authenticity to the disclosure, increasing the risk to R. The grievant's actions were deemed a violation of the statutory requirement for police officers to maintain good behavior, justifying the trial court's vacatur of the award. The board also found no violations concerning misuse of position or neglect of duty against the grievant. The implications of "burning" someone in the drug culture context, while debated, highlighted the significant risk posed to individuals labeled as informants. The judgment was affirmed with concurrence from other judges. General Statutes, 52-416 (a) outlines the timeline for rendering arbitration awards.

The trial court found that the award was not rendered within a reasonable time, but this statement was deemed unnecessary since the court ruled under General Statutes § 52-416 (a). The collective bargaining agreement's Section 16.5 stipulates that grievances can be submitted to the State of Connecticut Board of Mediation and Arbitration within fifteen working days, with the arbitration decision being final and binding. According to General Statutes § 31-98, the arbitration panel may issue an immediate oral decision with the parties' consent, or a written decision must be signed by the majority within fifteen days, detailing the decision's nature and the issues resolved. A copy of the written decision must be filed with the town clerk and provided to each party involved. The resolution of timeliness and public policy concerns eliminates the necessity to address whether the award contravenes the agreement's remedy provisions.