Bower v. D'Onfro

Citations: 38 Conn. App. 685; 663 A.2d 1061; 1995 Conn. App. LEXIS 363Docket: 12161

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; August 8, 1995; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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Defendants Bradley D. Ausmus and Lin Ausmus appeal a judgment awarding damages in an automobile negligence case, contending that the trial court erred in several respects: (1) not allowing evidence of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt per General Statutes 14-100a (c. 4), (2) improperly applying the collateral sources statute, (3) awarding prejudgment interest under General Statutes 52-192a, (4) excluding judicial and evidentiary admissions, (5) admitting evidence of racing, and (6) determining there was sufficient evidence of negligence to establish causation. The appellate court partially affirms and partially reverses the judgment.

The jury found that plaintiff Amy Bower was a passenger in a car driven by David V. D'Onfro, which crashed after losing control at high speed. Bower was ejected from the vehicle and subsequently struck by Ausmus, who was driving closely behind. The trial court excluded evidence of Bower's lack of a seat belt based on the statute, which states that such failure does not constitute contributory negligence and is not admissible in civil cases.

The defendants argue that this exclusion violated their constitutional rights, claiming the plaintiff's seat belt non-use was relevant to the accident's causation and negligence assessments. The court addresses the constitutionality of the statute, emphasizing that challengers bear the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and that courts exercise caution before declaring statutes unconstitutional. Ultimately, the court upholds the constitutionality of General Statutes 14-100a (c. 4), rejecting the defendants' due process claim. The defendants asserted that they should not be liable for the plaintiff's injuries as they allege her non-use of a seat belt was the actual cause of her injuries, rather than Ausmus's actions. However, the court maintains that the legislature can assign liability through statute, regardless of direct causation.

In Starr v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, the court ruled against the plaintiff's assertion that the public treasury should cover cleanup costs for contaminated property instead of the landowner. The legislature's determination that protecting public resources outweighed an owner's lack of culpability was deemed legitimate. The defendants' argument that the statute unfairly punishes those not directly responsible for an injury was rejected, as the court found their definition of causation unworkable. The plaintiffs provided evidence of joint negligence by D'Onfro and Ausmus, establishing their liability for Bower's injuries, irrespective of whether she was thrown from the vehicle.

The court referred to Tetro v. Stratford, affirming that proximate cause is typically a factual question based on foreseeable risks linked to the defendant's negligence. Despite the jury's potential findings of reckless driving by Ausmus, the court maintained that the abolition of the seat belt defense was rational and addressed in legislative debates. The legislature specified that failure to wear a seat belt does not equate to causation of an accident. Representative Farr emphasized that this amendment disallowed the seat belt defense in such circumstances, aiming to ensure that injured plaintiffs could seek redress without being hindered by the actions of the driver or the use of a seat belt.

The court concluded that the statute was not irrational, and the defendants received a fair trial regarding their liability, thus not violating due process. Due process is only compromised when legislative changes undermine constitutional rights, which was not the case here. The defendants also claimed that the statute deprived them of court access by eliminating the seat belt defense as a contributory negligence argument, which was countered by the court’s findings.

Defendants argue their access to the courts was violated, citing Gentile v. Altermatt, which asserts that article first, section 10 of the Connecticut Constitution protects existing rights from legislative abolition but allows for reasonable legislative alternatives. Their claims are undermined by three main points: 

1. No common law duty to wear seat belts existed in Connecticut prior to the enactment of 14-100a (c. 4), meaning the defendants cannot claim deprivation of a common law right.
2. Section 10 preserves only rights existing in 1818; thus, the defendants must demonstrate that contributory negligence was an established defense at that time. While an English case existed in 1809, no relevant Connecticut case arose until 1844.
3. Gentile does not apply to defenses; the no-fault law in Gentile barred plaintiffs from bringing a cause of action, unlike the current case where the statute restricts the defense but not the cause of action. The defendants still have reasonable alternative defenses available.

Subsequently, defendants claim that 14-100a (c. 4) violates their equal protection rights by discriminating between plaintiffs and defendants without a compelling state interest. However, strict scrutiny is deemed inappropriate for three reasons: section 10 does not confer a fundamental right, defendants have not been denied access to the courts, and no suspect class has been identified. The statute treats all defendants uniformly regarding the seat belt defense. Consequently, the equal protection claim is subject to rational basis review, which requires only that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, such as promoting public health and safety. The court will not evaluate the wisdom of the legislation unless it is unreasonable or not rationally adapted to its intended goals.

The burden of proof rests with the party challenging the statute's enactment, which the defendants have failed to meet. Prior discussions confirm that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and does not violate the equal protection clause of either the federal or state constitution. The defendants claim that the statute, 14-100a (c. 4), infringes on their right to a jury trial as it eliminates the seat belt defense. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that the right to a jury trial applies only to recognized legal defenses, and since the seat belt defense is not legally recognized, the defendants' argument is unsubstantiated. Additionally, the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding Bower's failure to wear a seat belt was not a procedural misstep but rather a compliance with the statute.

Regarding collateral source payments and tort reform, the defendants argue that a $400,000 settlement from D'Onfro should reduce the jury's $1,000,000 award, which found D'Onfro and Ausmus equally negligent. However, the court ruled that the $400,000 settlement does not qualify as a collateral source for deduction, while $43,345.10 for medical bills should be deducted from the total award. The trial court's decision was based on the legislative amendment to General Statutes 52-225b, which clarified that settlement amounts are not included in the definition of collateral sources.

The trial court determined that a public act, intended to clarify an existing statute, should be applied retroactively, aligning with the precedent set in Turner v. Turner, which states that amendments clarifying prior statutes represent the legislature's interpretation of the original act. Consequently, the court ruled against deducting a $400,000 payment as a collateral source. It upheld the principle that settlements do not qualify as collateral source payments.

The court deducted $43,346.10 in medical payments from the $1,000,000 jury verdict, resulting in a balance of $956,653.90, and rendered judgment against the Ausmus defendants for $478,326.95, reflecting their 50 percent share of negligence. This decision is supported by Fleming v. Garnett, which established that the net collateral source reduction applies to the total jury award rather than a defendant’s proportionate share.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the intent of the legislature must be determined through the statute’s language, legislative history, and its relationship to existing laws. In Fleming, it was clarified that the term "award" refers to the total damages awarded, not limited to the defendant's share, validating the trial court's approach to applying the collateral source reduction. Tort Reform II, effective October 1, 1987, aimed to clarify how collateral source reductions are calculated, specifically stating that economic damages, defined to include various pecuniary losses, should be reduced accordingly. Thus, economic damages were adjusted from $100,000 to $65,019.40, reflecting the actual costs proven by both parties.

Plaintiffs received $43,346.10 from Blue Cross and Blue Shield, which is the sole amount paid for their benefit. According to statute 52-225b, there is no provision for further reduction beyond this amount, and the trial court correctly deducted it from the $1,000,000 jury award, resulting in a net figure of $478,326.95. The court's application of statute 52-225a to reduce damages by collateral source payments was appropriate. However, it should have adjusted the economic damages to the proven amount of $65,019.40, leading to a total jury award reduction to $965,019.40. After the medical payments were deducted and divided by two, the judgment against defendants Lin and Bradley Ausmus should have been $460,836.65.

Regarding an offer of judgment under statute 52-192a, the plaintiffs proposed a judgment of $700,000, with specific payments from defendants D'Onfro, Ausmus, and conditions for acceptance. The defendants moved to strike this offer, but the motion was never addressed, leaving the amended offer as the only one before the court. D'Onfro later filed a separate offer of $400,000, which was accepted, resulting in a judgment of $300,000 against him. The case remains open against Ausmus defendants. Plaintiffs requested interest on the verdict, which the Ausmus defendants contested, arguing that the amended offer was indivisible and that a new offer was not filed after settling with D'Onfro.

Defendants contended that plaintiffs did not recover an amount equal to or greater than the $700,000 offer of judgment, as the judgment against the Ausmuses was less than this figure. The trial court disagreed, awarding the plaintiffs 12 percent interest, reasoning that the amended offer represented the total liability of all defendants and that it was equitable to divide the offer equally between the two defendant groups, resulting in a $350,000 offer against the Ausmuses. Since the jury awarded $500,000 against the Ausmuses, which exceeded $350,000, the court deemed plaintiffs entitled to interest on this amount.

However, the appellate court found no authority to divide the $700,000 offer, asserting that plaintiffs are bound by this total. Citing Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., the court emphasized that the relevant figure is the judgment, not the verdict. For plaintiffs to satisfy statute 52-192a (b), their judgment against the Ausmuses must exceed $700,000. The jury's verdict of $1,000,000, after deducting medical payments and dividing liability, resulted in a judgment of $478,326.95 against the Ausmuses, which does not exceed $700,000. Consequently, the appellate court ruled that the 12 percent interest statute does not apply, reversing the trial court's decision regarding interest.

Additionally, the defendants argued that they should have been allowed to inquire about the settlement with David D'Onfro and that certain judicial admissions were admissible as evidence. The trial court precluded such inquiries based on § 52-216a, which prohibits introducing evidence of settlements to avoid influencing jury verdicts. The appellate court upheld this exclusion, affirming the trial court's decision to prevent evidence of the settlement from being introduced. The court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling regarding the inadmissibility of judicial admissions in the original complaint.

David V. D'Onfro operated his vehicle in a manner that caused it to leave the roadway, skid sideways, and overturn, which resulted in the plaintiff, Amy Bower, being ejected and subsequently run over by a vehicle driven by Bradley Ausmus. The Ausmuses argue that D'Onfro's actions were the proximate cause of Bower's ejection and subsequent injury, and they seek to highlight Bower's lack of knowledge regarding the incident to the jury. The amended substitute complaint includes similar allegations, which the Ausmuses assert function as judicial admissions concerning causation and fault, implying non-negligence on their part. The trial court's exclusion of these judicial admissions from evidence was deemed an error, although it was considered harmless as the information was cumulative.

The defendants also contested the use of the term "racing" by two of the plaintiffs' witnesses. They argued that no racing allegation was made in the complaint as per General Statutes 14-224. However, the plaintiffs clarified that they did not claim racing but alleged that Ausmus drove recklessly at high speeds. Witness testimony described fast driving and weaving, which was deemed relevant to the issues of speed and recklessness. The court found this testimony admissible, as it was pertinent to the allegations of the complaint.

Lastly, the defendants argued that the evidence presented was insufficient. However, the jury could reasonably ascertain that the speed limit on the road where the accident occurred was twenty-five miles per hour.

Bradley Ausmus was driving at high speeds, following the D'Onfro vehicle, which carried the plaintiff, when an accident occurred after he crested a hill with a blind spot. Ausmus admitted to traveling at forty-five miles per hour at the top of the hill and increased his speed to between fifty-two and sixty miles per hour before impact. Had he adhered to the posted twenty-five miles per hour speed limit, he could have stopped in time to avoid hitting the plaintiff, who was lying in the road. Instead, he braked abruptly, lost control, and struck the plaintiff, dragging her for sixty-eight feet. The jury could reasonably determine that Ausmus and Lin Ausmus were liable for the plaintiff's injuries, resulting in a judgment of $460,836.85, with no prejudgment interest, after the case was partially reversed and remanded. The plaintiff's father sought compensation for medical expenses. The named defendant settled before trial. Relevant constitutional provisions from the Connecticut Constitution ensure access to courts, equal protection under the law, and the right to a jury trial. Collateral sources, as defined by Connecticut statutes, refer to payments made to a claimant for personal injury, excluding settlement amounts. Additionally, Connecticut law stipulates that if a plaintiff makes an 'offer of judgment' and recovers an amount equal to or exceeding that offer, interest may be added to the recovery amount. General Statutes also address responsibilities related to motor vehicle operation and racing.

Individuals operating a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in serious physical injury or death must immediately stop, assist the injured, and provide their name, address, operator’s license number, and registration number to the injured party, witnesses, or law enforcement. If unable to provide this information, they must report the incident to law enforcement, detailing the accident's location and circumstances along with their identifying information.

For accidents causing physical injury or property damage, the same obligations apply, including stopping, assisting, and providing necessary information or reporting to law enforcement if unable to do so.

Additionally, operating a motor vehicle for racing, wagering, or speed records on public highways is prohibited. In cases of property damage only on limited access highways, drivers must move their vehicles to a non-traveled area if possible without further risk.

Complying with the movement requirement for property damage does not constitute a violation of other reporting obligations. Violations of the serious injury or death reporting requirements may result in fines up to $5,000 or imprisonment for 1 to 5 years, while violations of other provisions may incur fines between $75 to $600, with increased penalties for subsequent offenses.