Town of Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council

Citations: 37 Conn. App. 653; 656 A.2d 1067; 1995 Conn. App. LEXIS 204Docket: 13094

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; April 25, 1995; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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The plaintiffs appealed the Connecticut Siting Council's denial of their requests to reverse or modify the council's certification for an electric transmission line, citing General Statutes 4-181a (b). The council's denial was based on a finding of no changed conditions. The trial court dismissed the case, leading to the plaintiffs' appeal, arguing that the trial court incorrectly deemed the council's decision as non-final under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) and classified their requests as petitions for reconsideration. The appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs and reversed the trial court's judgment.

The background details include that in January 1991, Connecticut Light and Power Company and United Illuminating Company applied for a certificate for a 15.3-mile electric transmission line, which was granted by the council on September 18, 1991, after a contested hearing. No appeal was made post-certification, and the utilities commenced construction. However, between September 1991 and May 1993, multiple motions were filed to reopen the case, which the council denied without a hearing, citing a lack of new information. Following this, new motions claiming changed conditions and advancements were submitted, prompting the council to schedule public hearings for July 13, 1993, soliciting input from various state departments before the hearing, which focused on public and party statements.

The council allowed evidence and briefs to be submitted by July 20, 1993, and issued a written opinion on July 30, 1993, regarding motions to reopen a previously decided case from September 18, 1991. The council referenced General Statutes 4-181a (b), asserting that without evidence of changed conditions, there was no basis to revisit the decision. They concluded that no new information, unforeseen events, or scientific advancements warranted reopening the case. Commissioner Paulann H. Sheets dissented, advocating for a rehearing based on perceived changed conditions.

Subsequently, the town of Fairfield and several individuals and organizations appealed to the Superior Court, claiming the council acted illegally and arbitrarily in denying their motions for reconsideration and revocation. They raised several issues, including: the council's decision being erroneous based on substantial evidence, inadequate public notice of the hearing, improper procedures for contested cases, failure to consider the effects of changed conditions without a full hearing, erroneous reliance on public health comments, neglecting to assess the project’s impacts on historic resources and the environment, and improperly denying party status to certain plaintiffs.

In response, the council and utilities filed motions to dismiss based on the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted these motions, ruling that there is no automatic right to appeal in hearings under General Statutes 4-181a (b), and since a hearing was not required, the denial of the motions did not create a right to appeal, referencing the case Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection.

Motions for reconsideration, reversal, or modification of final decisions are subject to the requirements for contested cases as outlined in General Statutes 4-181a (b). The trial court determined that the agency's handling of such motions did not qualify as a 'contested case' under 4-166 (2), which means no hearing was necessary, and thus it was not an 'agency determination in a contested case' or a 'final decision' as defined in 4-166 (3). Although 'final decision' includes decisions made after reconsideration, the agency’s ruling on reconsideration petitions is explicitly excluded from this definition. The court refrained from assessing the merits of the plaintiffs' appeal, focusing solely on their right to have it heard.

The case is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), specifically 4-181a (b), which permits an agency to modify or reverse a final decision in a contested case if there is a showing of changed conditions. This section has not been previously reviewed by an appellate court. While the UAPA lacked prior statutory authority for such modifications, case law has acknowledged changed conditions as a valid reason for administrative decision alteration, as seen in Shea v. State Employees Retirement Commission.

General Statutes 4-181a (b) allows an agency to reverse or modify a final decision upon showing changed conditions, with procedures for contested cases applicable. The original parties and intervenors must be notified and allowed to participate, and any modifications must consider the rights of those who relied on the original decision. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court incorrectly ruled that the council’s decision was not a final decision under the UAPA. Judicial review of administrative decisions is statutory, with Section 4-183 (a) enabling appeals from aggrieved parties based on final decisions. A final decision under General Statutes 4-166 (3) includes agency determinations in contested cases, declaratory rulings, and decisions made after reconsideration, but excludes rulings on reconsideration petitions. The trial court concluded, based on Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, that the council's decision was not a final decision under the UAPA.

In the case of Summit Hydropower, the plaintiff applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for a license to build a hydroelectric facility, submitting the application to Connecticut's water management bureau for state certification of compliance with water quality standards, a prerequisite for FERC's licensing. The environmental protection commissioner denied the certification, leading the plaintiff to appeal to the Superior Court, which initially upheld the appeal. However, the defendants appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, determining that the agency proceedings were not a contested case and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court referenced the criteria for a contested case, which include the existence of a legal right or duty, statutory determination by the agency, and an opportunity for a hearing. The court reviewed the relevant statutes and concluded that the environmental commissioner was not required to hold a hearing to determine the plaintiff's rights.

In contrast, a different case indicated that the granting of a certificate on September 18, 1991, was a final decision in a contested case appealable under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). While the council may modify or reverse previous decisions due to changed conditions, this authority derives from the UAPA rather than chapter 277a. The UAPA mandates a public hearing for certificate amendments, initiated only by the certificate holder or the council, and allows for judicial review of such orders. The UAPA grants broad discretion to agencies to reverse or modify final decisions at any time based on changed conditions, either on the agency's own motion or upon request from any person.

Analysis of the plaintiffs’ claim follows established statutory construction principles aimed at determining the legislature's intent. Key factors include the statute's wording, legislative history, intended policy, and its relation to existing laws and common law. The term 'person' is defined in General Statutes 4-166 (9) to include individuals and organizations, excluding the agency involved in the proceedings, which encompasses the plaintiffs. Following the council's denial of the plaintiffs’ requests on May 6, 1993, the plaintiffs submitted new motions citing changed conditions and advancements since September 18, 1991. The council scheduled a public hearing regarding the motions, aligning with the proceedings outlined in 4-181a (b). The term 'proceeding,' lacking a statutory definition, is interpreted through common usage, as stated in relevant case law. It broadly encompasses various forms of actions and business affairs. The July 13 hearing qualified as a proceeding, with public notifications and solicitations for comments sent to relevant agencies and parties involved in previous hearings. The defendants' claims regarding the council's lack of consideration for reversal or modification were dismissed. The council explicitly stated on July 30, 1993, that it reviewed motions to reopen and modify the construction of a transmission line facility but concluded no new information warranted a reopening. The council chairman confirmed the process during the hearing, ensuring all interested parties were notified and allowed to participate.

Vested rights of utilities necessitate that the issue of 'changed conditions' be addressed through a contested hearing. Section 4-181a (b) allows an agency to reverse or modify decisions at any time, diverging from prior case law that permitted such actions only when no vested rights had developed. A 'showing of changed condition,' which is defined as an act of presenting evidence, is required for this reversal. The contested case provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) apply, mandating that the agency notify all relevant parties of the hearing and consider the interests of those who relied on the original decision. The plaintiffs contended that their hearing did not adhere to UAPA procedures, claiming violations including denial of party status, inadequate notice, and lack of a full evidentiary hearing. The statute permits modification of a final decision upon a showing of changed conditions, ensuring due process for those with vested rights during the proceedings. The right of appeal protects both those seeking modification and those with vested rights. Additionally, petitions for reconsideration must be filed within fifteen days of the final decision, as governed by UAPA Section 4-181a (a).

Petitions for reconsideration under General Statutes 4-181 differ from requests under 4-181 (b) as they cannot be made "at any time" or by "any person." None of the plaintiffs were involved in the original contested case from 1991, and filing a petition does not suspend the appeal period established by General Statutes 4-183 (c). Legal precedent, including Cassella v. Dept. of Liquor Control, emphasizes that failure to timely appeal an administrative decision invalidates the appeal and deprives courts of jurisdiction. Recent changes to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) have altered appeal procedures, specifically by removing the tolling effect of reconsideration petitions on the appeal period. The legislative history clarifies that a petition for reconsideration is not required for judicial review and does not stay the appeal timeline. Current UAPA provisions outline that reconsideration can occur within fifteen days of a decision, with a two-step agency process for reassessing the decision. If reconsideration is granted, the agency has a new decision that triggers a new appeal period. Additionally, modifications to decisions can occur later if conditions change, but must respect the rights of those who relied on the original decision.

Subsection (c) allows an agency to make clerical corrections in final decisions. The judgment in this case has been reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss and proceed further as per this opinion, with the concurrence of the other judges. The appeal was filed by the plaintiffs: Alliance to Limit Electromagnetic Radiation Today, Anne Graney, Jennifer Lindine, Santo Piro, Christine S. Piro, Stephen Stout, and David S. Parker; the town of Fairfield did not file an appeal. The term "plaintiffs" refers solely to the appealing parties.

General Statutes 16-50 (d) states that an amendment proceeding can be initiated by either the certificate holder or a council resolution. An amendment application must follow the format and information prescribed by the council, and any resolution must specify the design, location, or route of the facility subject to modification based on unforeseen conditions. No resolution for amendment can be adopted after site preparation or construction begins, or after the council approves relevant parts of a construction plan.

Notice of each amendment application must be provided by the certificate holder as specified in subsection (b), while the council is responsible for notifying about resolutions issued. Neither the certificate holder nor the council is required to notify municipalities or agencies outside the modified facility's location.

General Statutes 16-50m outlines that upon receiving a compliant application for a certificate, the council will set a public hearing date not less than thirty nor more than one hundred fifty days later, ensuring at least one session is held in the relevant county after 6:30 p.m. If the facility spans multiple counties, at least one hearing must occur in the most appropriate county, with additional sessions at the council's discretion. For certificate amendment applications, a hearing must occur within thirty to sixty days if the proposed changes materially increase environmental impacts or substantially alter the facility's location, with the council having the discretion to return applications without prejudice.

A council is required to hold a hearing on a resolution to amend a certificate within thirty to sixty days after the resolution's adoption. A hearing must occur if a request is made by the certificate holder or an entitled party within twenty days of notice publication. The hearing will then take place within the same thirty to sixty-day timeframe after the request. The relevant county for the hearing is where the facility portion proposed for modification is located. Notices of the hearing's date and location must be mailed within one week to the applicant and those entitled to the application or resolution copy, with public notices in boldface type. Hearings may be conducted by a majority of council members and may consider facts from general hearings. 

According to General Statutes 4-166 (3), a "final decision" encompasses agency determinations in contested cases and declaratory rulings, excluding preliminary rulings or reconsideration petitions. Under General Statutes 4-181a (a), a party may file a petition for reconsideration within fifteen days of receiving the final decision, citing errors of fact or law, newly discovered evidence, or other valid reasons. The agency must decide on the petition within twenty-five days; failure to do so is a denial. Additionally, the agency may reconsider the final decision within forty days, regardless of a petition's status, and must conduct further proceedings reasonably to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision.