Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; September 13, 1994; Connecticut; State Appellate Court
In the wrongful termination case involving James Barry and Posi-Seal International, Inc., the trial court ruled in favor of Barry after a jury trial. Posi-Seal appealed the verdict, citing four main arguments: (1) insufficient evidence of an employment contract; (2) improper finding of breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing due to the alleged non-existence of a contract; (3) front pay being an improper measure of damages or insufficiently supported; and (4) inadequate evidence for punitive damages. Barry cross-appealed, claiming the court incorrectly set aside awards for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent misrepresentation and reduced the punitive damage award.
The jury found that Barry had been employed by Posi-Seal for over a decade. His termination followed a disparaging remark about a valve during a customer inspection, and he was not given prior notice or disciplinary measures as outlined in the company’s personnel manual. The jury concluded there was an implied employment contract based on statements from Eugene Bisbee, a vice president, regarding job security, and the policies described in the personnel manual concerning disciplinary actions.
The jury awarded Barry damages totaling $52,275 in back pay, $271,775 for future wage loss, $42,315 for emotional distress and misrepresentation, and $50,000 in punitive damages. The trial court later set aside the verdict regarding emotional distress and misrepresentation claims while upholding the other counts.
The defendant appeals, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of an implied agreement that the plaintiff's employment could only be terminated for cause after following disciplinary procedures. The defendant argues that statements made by Bisbee and the personnel manual do not establish such an agreement, and thus the matter should not have been presented to the jury. The court, however, maintains that a contract implied in fact relies on actual agreement, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate through evidence that the defendant committed to a contractual obligation preventing termination without just cause.
In reviewing motions to set aside the jury's verdict, the court must assess if the evidence, when viewed favorably for the plaintiff, reasonably supports the jury's decision. The trial court's denial of such motions holds significant weight, as judges can discern factors influencing the jury that are not apparent in the written record. The court's role is to evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
The determination of the parties' intentions is a factual inference, which is not reversible unless the fact-finder's conclusion is unreasonable. This inference-making process is a jury function. The defendant further claims that Bisbee's comments were merely expressions of optimism and morale-boosting, not indicative of a contractual commitment. The evaluation of evidence and credibility of witnesses is left to the jury, and the court refrains from intervening in that role.
In Gallo v. Gallo, the court determined that the jury could reasonably infer an implied employment contract based on the defendant's financial situation and the encouragement given by Bisbee, along with the personnel manual's provisions. The defendant claimed that the personnel manual could not create an implied agreement since the plaintiff did not rely on it, but the court referenced Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., asserting that reliance is not necessary to support a promise of employment security. The only required consideration is the employee's acceptance of employment under those terms, rendering the defendant's argument meritless. The jury had sufficient evidence to find an implied agreement that the plaintiff could not be terminated without cause, thus the trial court acted within its discretion in rejecting the defendant’s motion to overturn the verdict.
Additionally, the defendant contested the finding of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but this was dependent on the existence of an employment contract, which was affirmed. The defendant also argued that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on future lost earnings (front pay) and sought to overturn this award. However, the plaintiff contended that the defendant failed to preserve this claim under Practice Book § 315. The court found that the defendant did preserve the issue by framing it in a request to charge, which, if granted, would have addressed the alleged defect in the jury instruction. The defendant's exception to the charge post-instruction was deemed compliant with procedural requirements, allowing for the review of the front pay instruction.
Front pay, which compensates for loss of future earnings, has not been definitively addressed as a recovery measure in wrongful termination cases based on breach of contract. Courts typically recognize front pay as an award for a reasonable period necessary for an employee to regain their position in the job market. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 626(b)) provides courts with broad authority to grant appropriate legal or equitable relief, which includes the potential for future earnings loss awards. Denying front pay could undermine the Act's purpose of making victims of discrimination whole and act as a deterrent against employer misconduct.
The remedy of front pay is established under federal statutory authority but is inconsistently granted across federal courts. Some courts do not allow recovery of front pay in any circumstances, while others distinguish between cases that permit front pay under statutory contexts and those that confuse it with "benefit of the bargain" in breach of contract claims. The former is evidenced by its application under the Act and extensions to other federal statutes. Various case law supports these distinctions, indicating ongoing judicial interpretation of front pay's applicability and scope.
Some courts have applied similar reasoning to cases of alleged discriminatory treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The remedy of front pay, first recognized in 1973, is reserved for egregious cases and is not punitive nor intended to provide a windfall for employees. It aims to make discrimination victims whole when they lack reasonable prospects for comparable employment. The Second Circuit acknowledged front pay as an appropriate remedy under limited circumstances. Various cases reflect this approach, although some instances involve different statutes. Notably, the case of Stark v. Circle K Corp. awarded front pay until the employee's anticipated retirement, amounting to a significant duration of lost income. The case of Brown v. Ford, Bacon, Davis, Utah, Inc. highlighted a situation where a plaintiff was terminated under conflicting reasons; however, its citations are limited. It also suggests that if compliance with dismissal procedures is impractical, front pay may be awarded for the duration it would take to comply.
Reinstatement may not be feasible due to a lack of available positions or significant animosity between parties, as established in several cases including Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp. and Cancellier v. Federated Department Stores. The obligation to mitigate damages by seeking alternative employment restricts the potential for front pay. Recent trends indicate a preference for remanding cases for new trials concerning both liability and damages, although separating these issues is typically seen as unjust.
In a specific case involving claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found insufficient evidence of intent or awareness of the likelihood of causing emotional distress, noting that the plaintiff's feelings of embarrassment did not meet the threshold for severe emotional distress. Consequently, the motion to set aside the verdict on this claim was granted. Similarly, regarding the claim of negligent misrepresentation, the court determined there was no evidence that the defendant's statements were false or should have been known to be false at the time they were made. Thus, the motion to set aside the verdict for negligent misrepresentation was also granted.
