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Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission
Citations: 35 Conn. App. 646; 646 A.2d 277; 1994 Conn. App. LEXIS 327Docket: 12324
Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; August 30, 1994; Connecticut; State Appellate Court
Plaintiffs are appealing a trial court judgment that upheld a decision by the defendant plan and zoning commission regarding a subdivision application submitted by Fairfield University. The plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in several respects: 1. Determining that trees and wildlife are not considered natural resources under General Statutes 22a-19. 2. Deciding that the proposed subdivision does not qualify as a cul-de-sac according to Fairfield subdivision regulations. 3. Concluding that the commission acted appropriately in approving the subdivision despite alleged violations of drainage and open space requirements, unsafe intersection concerns, and failure to show principal wooded areas. 4. Finding that the commission applied the correct standard of review for the subdivision plan. Fairfield University proposed resubdividing 13.4 acres of land into forty lots and sought permission for excavation and filling. The plaintiffs, whose property is within 100 feet of the site, intervened, arguing the subdivision would negatively impact the environment. After a public hearing, the commission approved the plans with conditions, and the trial court upheld this decision. The plaintiffs assert that the commission ignored their claims regarding the environmental impact involving the cutting of trees and loss of wildlife. However, the trial court did not resolve whether the land contains trees and wildlife. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The trial court, referencing the case Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan, Zoning Commission, concluded that while trees and wildlife are generally considered natural resources, they do not qualify as such under General Statutes 22a-19 (a). Consequently, the commission was not required to adhere to the obligations of 22a-19 (b). The trial court’s decision is upheld unless clearly erroneous, and legal conclusions are evaluated based on their logical correctness and factual support. To ascertain whether trees and wildlife fall under 'natural resources' as intended by the legislature, the court examined the statute's language and legislative history, finding no explicit mention of trees and wildlife in 22a-19 (a). Although the legislative history does not clarify intent, the Connecticut State Agencies' regulations and other statutes indicate that some trees and wildlife are considered natural resources. Specifically, the Department of Environmental Protection views wildlife as a natural resource, and wildlife and plant life are included in protections under the Environmental Policy Act. The definition of 'natural resource' encompasses materials with economic value, yet the interpretation of what types of trees and wildlife are included under 22a-19 should be limited to avoid requiring consideration of alternatives for every subdivision, which would be an unreasonable expectation of the legislature. Thus, the interpretation balances environmental concerns with the rights to develop residential and commercial areas. Natural resources, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, include timberland and other economically valuable products of nature. The legal classification of trees and wildlife as natural resources hinges on their economic value. Although the trial court incorrectly ruled that trees and wildlife are not natural resources, a remand for factual determination is unnecessary. When the commission fails to justify its decisions, the trial court must examine the complete record to substantiate the commission's findings. Upon independent review of the commission's record, it was determined that there was no evidence demonstrating the subdivision area had economic value, as it contained no endangered or rare species to support tourism or research value. Regarding the proposed subdivision, the trial court found that it did not constitute a cul-de-sac under section 2.1.6 of the Fairfield subdivision regulations, which restricts cul-de-sacs to access no more than ten building lots. The subdivision plan featured a horseshoe-shaped street, Mailands Road, which was assessed to have three separate intersecting streets rather than a closed end. This configuration allowed emergency access to all lots and complied with the ten-lot requirement. The commission has discretion in interpreting regulations, and the trial court's review assesses whether the commission acted fairly and with valid reasons. The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate improper action by the commission. The appellate function focuses on the trial court's conclusions and the legitimacy of its reasoning, rather than alternative conclusions that could have been reached. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the commission acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or illegally. The commission determined that Mailands Road is not a cul-de-sac, and the trial court found sufficient evidence supporting this classification, indicating that Mailands Road consists of three intersecting streets, each open at one end. The mere naming of the streets does not render the commission's approval unreasonable. Subdivision regulations advocate for intersections at right angles, and the plan shows that Mailands Road's intersections approach ninety degrees, indicating compliance. The plaintiffs challenged the trial court's conclusion that the proposed subdivision adhered to town regulations, citing issues with drainage, the representation of wooded areas, intersection safety, open space provisions, and other alleged deficiencies. However, the commission, acting in its administrative capacity, is mandated to approve subdivisions that conform to regulations. The court must affirm the trial court's finding of compliance to uphold the commission's approval. Regarding drainage, the regulations require stormwater pipes to be at least twelve inches in diameter, as determined by the Town Engineer. The engineer noted that the proposed pipe sizes may be inadequate for a ten-year storm frequency, but Fairfield University contended that the plan was sufficient during the public hearing. The commission approved the subdivision plan based on the engineer’s statement regarding drainage, without a detailed finding. The trial court ruled that this approval was not illegal, as the commission did not conclude that the drainage was inadequate, but rather that it was sufficient for normal stormwater conditions. The plan included a condition for upgrading drainage to accommodate a ten-year storm, and the town engineer's report did not indicate inadequate drainage. Consequently, the court found that Fairfield University complied with regulations, and the commission acted appropriately. Regarding wooded areas, the Fairfield subdivision regulations require a preliminary map to show principal wooded areas, but not in the final map. Although the preliminary map did not depict these areas, evidence presented at the public hearing indicated that the land was 80% wooded. The court determined that the commission was aware of this fact and that the depiction of wooded areas was not a critical factor for final approval, supporting the trial court's finding that the commission's decision was not unreasonable or illegal. Lastly, concerning health and safety, Section 1.1.8 of the regulations mandates evidence demonstrating that the land is suitable for building without health risks and that proposed streets align safely with thoroughfares. Plaintiffs argued that no evidence was provided regarding the compatibility of Mailands Road with North Benson Road at their intersection. The trial court determined that Fairfield University’s attorney adequately addressed traffic concerns at a public hearing regarding the intersection of Mailands Road and North Benson Road. The commission is permitted to accept statements made by counsel as credible evidence. Therefore, the commission had sufficient evidence concerning intersection safety, supporting the trial court's conclusion that Fairfield University complied with relevant regulations and that the commission acted reasonably. Regarding open spaces, Section 2.3 of the Fairfield subdivision regulations allows the commission to decide the necessary amount of open space, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion that the lack of open spaces rendered the application invalid. The trial court and this opinion concur that the plaintiffs did not substantiate their claims of improper commission actions based on environmental concerns due to a lack of specific evidence. On the issue of off-site traffic safety, the plaintiffs argued that the commission incorrectly deemed it irrelevant, referencing past cases that require consideration of traffic safety if regulations mandate it. However, the commission’s decision did not specify the standard applied for traffic safety assessment, and the burden of proof rested on the plaintiffs to demonstrate improper application, which they failed to do. Consequently, the court will not speculate on the commission's reasoning. The judgment affirming the commission's decision stands, with Spear, J. concurring. The plaintiffs are Anthony J. Paige and Candace D. Paige; the defendants include the town plan and zoning commission of Fairfield, the town of Fairfield, and Fairfield University. General Statutes 22a-19(a) allows individuals to intervene in administrative or judicial proceedings if they assert that the action could unreasonably harm the public trust in the state's natural resources. Under 22a-19(b), agencies must consider potential unreasonable pollution or impairment and cannot authorize actions likely to have such effects if feasible alternatives exist that meet public health and safety requirements. General Statutes 22a-6a(a) establishes liability for individuals who knowingly or negligently violate specific environmental statutes, holding them responsible for costs related to detecting, investigating, and mitigating such violations, as well as restoring the affected natural resources. The excerpt also addresses a dissenting opinion advocating for a definition from the Minnesota Environmental Rights Law, arguing that it contradicts the principles established in Red Hill II. The dissent suggests that its definition would not impede compliance with Red Hill II, as alternative plans are only considered when a project's impact on natural resources is likely. However, the majority maintains that this interpretation misrepresents the Supreme Court’s intent, asserting that the dissent's definition could lead to an unnecessary requirement for all subdivision applicants to submit alternative plans. The majority concludes that the dissent's concerns regarding review of the commission's record are unfounded. Section 2.1.6 defines a cul-de-sac as a street that is closed at one end by building lots, with no plans for future extension. Section 1.1.8 mandates the submission of evidence for proper drainage provision. Section 3.4.4 requires that stormwater discharge must be directed into suitable streams, rivers, or town drains that can handle the additional load. Section 1.1.3 stipulates that a preliminary map showing principal wooded areas must be submitted at least three days before the relevant meeting. Additionally, Section 1.1.8 requires evidence that the land intended for subdivision is suitable for use without posing health or safety risks. Section 2.3 mandates the provision of open spaces for parks or recreational areas, prohibiting the removal of natural growth or the placement of foreign materials unless directed by the Commission. Section 1.4.2 states that subdivision plans are approved only when all regulatory conditions are satisfied. Since the application in question complied with these regulations, the plaintiffs’ claim regarding improper approval under Section 1.4.2 is unnecessary to address. The courts have consistently ruled that errors based on aggregating claims of nonreversible error do not warrant the reversal of judgments, as established in State v. Reddick, 33 Conn. App. 311.