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Gore v. People's Savings Bank

Citations: 35 Conn. App. 126; 644 A.2d 945; 1994 Conn. App. LEXIS 269Docket: 12203

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; July 12, 1994; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, plaintiffs appealed a trial court judgment that favored defendants following a jury verdict on negligence claims related to lead paint exposure. The plaintiffs alleged negligence per se and strict liability after their child ingested lead paint at the defendants' property, violating General Statutes 47a-7, 47a-8, and 47a-54f. The trial court granted directed verdicts for defendants on strict liability counts, a decision contested by the plaintiffs. The appellate court found that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on negligence per se and improperly directed verdicts on strict liability. It highlighted the legislative intent to protect children from lead hazards without requiring notice to landlords for strict liability. The court clarified that the statutes impose strict liability upon proof of violation and proximate causation, remanding the case for a new trial. The decision affirms that lead paint violations are inherently unsafe, supporting strict liability without the need for landlords to have prior notice of the defects. The appellate court's ruling emphasizes a landlord's duty to maintain habitable premises and the automatic nature of liability for statutory violations.

Legal Issues Addressed

Landlord's Duty under General Statutes 47a-7

Application: Landlords are required to maintain habitable premises, and a violation of 47a-8 supports a per se violation of 47a-7. This aligns with strict liability principles.

Reasoning: The court's focus would be on the interaction between General Statutes 47a-8 and 47a-7, establishing that proof of a violation of 47a-8 constitutes a per se violation of 47a-7, aligning with strict liability principles rather than negligence per se.

Negligence Per Se and Strict Liability under Lead Paint Statutes

Application: The trial court improperly directed a verdict on strict liability counts, necessitating a remand for a new trial. The court emphasized the defendants' violations of statutes concerning lead paint hazards, which supports both negligence per se and strict liability claims.

Reasoning: The court determined that the trial court improperly directed a verdict on the strict liability counts, leading to a remand for a new trial.

Negligence Per Se Elements

Application: For negligence per se to apply, the plaintiff must be within the protected class, and the injury must be of the type the statute aims to prevent. The defendants could not provide an excuse under Section 288A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Reasoning: Two conditions must coexist for statutory negligence to be actionable: (1) the plaintiff must belong to the class of individuals the statute protects, and (2) the injury must be of the type the statute is designed to prevent.

Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent

Application: The court examined the plain language of statutes 47a-8 and 47a-54f and, if ambiguous, looked to legislative history. This aids in determining the applicability of negligence per se or strict liability.

Reasoning: If the language is ambiguous, extrinsic aids such as legislative history will be consulted.

Strict Liability Without Notice

Application: The court ruled that notice to landlords is not required for strict liability under statutes 47a-8 and 47a-54f. Violations of these statutes result in liability without the need for notice.

Reasoning: The court determined that notice to landlords is not required for imposing civil damages under the theory of strict liability.