Curry v. Burns

Citations: 33 Conn. App. 65; 633 A.2d 315; 1993 Conn. App. LEXIS 434Docket: 9488

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; November 16, 1993; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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The case involves a plaintiff who sued the Connecticut commissioner of transportation under General Statutes § 13a-144 for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident attributed to a defective highway. The defendant denied any breach of duty and claimed the plaintiff did not provide proper notice as mandated by the statute. After a jury trial that favored the defendant, the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict was denied, leading to this appeal.

The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by quashing two subpoenas, redacting her notice, and failing to give specific jury instructions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting that on the accident date, the plaintiff's truck hit a pothole on Interstate 95, causing a collision with another vehicle.

The trial court quashed the subpoenas aimed at gathering evidence for subsequent repairs to the highway defect, deeming such evidence inadmissible and asserting that the jury must evaluate the sufficiency of the notice based solely on its content. The court's rulings on evidentiary matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with a presumption favoring the trial court's decisions. The appellate court confirmed that the notice must be strictly construed, aligning with established precedents, and indicated that the trial court found the notice adequate for the jury's consideration. The adequacy of the notice is judged by its effectiveness in providing the commissioner with sufficient information for an investigation and protecting state interests.

Evidence of subsequent repairs is generally inadmissible regarding issues of negligence, causation, or defects, as established in Hall v. Burns. Furthermore, such evidence cannot assist jurors in assessing the adequacy of notice, as noted in Murray v. Commissioner of Transportation. The plaintiff's assertion that remedial repairs indicate adequate notice is rejected; repairs may occur as routine business operations, unrelated to any notice provided. The trial court's decision to quash the subpoena was upheld, particularly because the "District 3 Director of Maintenance" does not exist, violating General Statutes § 52-143. 

The second subpoena targeted Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, with the plaintiff claiming the materials sought would demonstrate adequate notice. The court found that the evidence aimed at establishing notice was collateral and could distract the jury from the primary issue—whether the notice provided a sufficient guide for the commissioner’s inquiries. Relevant evidence can be excluded if it risks prejudice or confusion, as supported by case law. The Aetna subpoena's materials were deemed to have minimal probative value compared to their potential prejudicial impact. Ultimately, the jury needed to determine if the notice sufficiently described the pothole's location for the defendant to investigate effectively. The court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoena.

The plaintiff argued that the court improperly redacted her written notice before it was presented to the jury. After realizing the notice was not in evidence, the court offered to let her reopen her case to present this evidence, which she declined. The defendant acknowledged receipt of the notice but contested its sufficiency as a statutory notice. Attempts to reach an agreement on redaction failed, leading the court to determine what portions would be excluded, ultimately submitting a redacted version to the jury. The court maintained that only the statutory-required portions were relevant, and although the plaintiff's counsel had some agreement, he lodged an exception to the redacted notice.

The sole issue raised by the defendant was whether the description of the defect's location was adequate. The final version of the redacted notice included all necessary statutory elements: written notice of the injury, a general description, the cause, time, and place. The court's discretion in allowing the notice to be presented was affirmed, with the understanding that not all content required admission into evidence. The court redacted immaterial and prejudicial information, complying with precedents that support such discretion.

The plaintiff also claimed the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the sufficiency of the notice should be evaluated against its purpose and the nature of the obstruction. While the court's instructions did not include the exact phrasing requested by the plaintiff, they were deemed adequate, as the overall guidance provided to the jury was sufficient for understanding the issues. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate any harmful impact from the redaction or instruction issues as required to establish an abuse of discretion.

The trial court adequately instructed the jury on the legal issues presented in the plaintiff's request, fulfilling its duty to provide a clear understanding of the matters at hand. The plaintiff's claim regarding the refusal of a "missing witness" charge was deemed unnecessary to address due to the resolution of the first claim. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with the concurrence of the other judges. 

General Statutes § 13a-144 allows individuals injured due to the state's neglect in maintaining highways or bridges to bring a civil action against the commissioner of transportation, provided that such actions are initiated within two years of the injury and that written notice is given within ninety days. The trial court must first evaluate whether the notice meets statutory requirements before presenting the issue to the jury, as it is inappropriate for the jury to determine notice sufficiency if it is legally inadequate. 

The defendant argues, as an alternative basis for affirming the judgment, that the notice was legally defective. According to General Statutes § 52-143 (a), subpoenas must be served at least eighteen hours in advance unless otherwise ordered by the court. The notice sent included details of the plaintiff, Vicki S. Curry, who sustained injuries from a pothole on the Connecticut Turnpike on March 14, 1984. The incident caused significant damage to her vehicle and resulted in permanent injuries that impeded her ability to work as a truck driver and engage in various life activities without pain.

Mr. Frassetto's collision with Mrs. Curry’s truck resulted in an injury to his left shoulder, exacerbating a pre-existing bursitis condition, and his vehicle was classified as destroyed. The incident was attributed to the state's negligence, particularly due to a pothole that arose from inadequate maintenance and was not repaired despite being known to the state and its employees. They also failed to warn the public about the pothole’s dangers. 

The notice served to the state was intended to inform the commissioner about the claim, allowing for a timely investigation, as established in previous case law. The notice requirement was not meant to hinder injured parties but to facilitate proper inquiries. Furthermore, the sufficiency of the notice relies on the nature of the obstruction; a general description may suffice if the obstruction is well-known or long-standing. 

The jury was instructed that this case is not a typical negligence claim but one that enforces statutory liability against the Connecticut commissioner of transportation, which exists solely due to specific legislation permitting such lawsuits. Without this statute, the commissioner would not be liable, as direct lawsuits against the state are generally prohibited. The jury was informed about the relevant statutory provisions applicable to the case.

Any individual injured in person or property due to the negligence of the State or its employees concerning defective highways, bridges, or sidewalks within the state highway system may file a civil lawsuit for damages against the commissioner of transportation in the Superior Court of Connecticut. The ability of the plaintiff to pursue this action is grounded in statutory provisions that require written notice of the injury, including a general description, cause, time, and place of the incident, to be submitted to the commissioner within ninety days post-incident. It is undisputed that the plaintiff complied with this notification timeframe. The notice must include five critical elements: 1) written notice of injury, 2) general description of the injury, 3) cause, 4) time, and 5) place. If any of these elements are found lacking, the notice is deemed insufficient, leading to a verdict for the defendant. The notice serves to inform the commissioner, allowing for appropriate inquiries to protect the state's interests. The requirement for specificity ensures the commissioner can effectively investigate the circumstances surrounding the injury. In the case at hand, the notice specified that on March 14, 1984, at approximately 5:30 a.m., a pothole was located in the eastbound center lane of the Connecticut Turnpike, I-95, east of exit 4. The determination of whether this description sufficiently guides the commissioner in conducting inquiries is a key aspect for consideration.

If the jury determines that the notice served to the state of Connecticut by Vicki Curry does not meet the statutory requirements regarding the description of the injury, cause, time, and place, then the plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict, and the jury must rule in favor of the defendant. Compliance with the statutory notice is a prerequisite for the action. Should the jury find that the notice is compliant, they must then consider whether the plaintiff has established a cause of action under the highway statute, specifically § 13a-144. Additionally, the plaintiff requested a jury instruction on the missing witness doctrine, indicating that the commissioner should have investigated the accident and that his failure to provide testimony from those who conducted the investigation allows the jury to infer that such testimony would be detrimental to the commissioner’s case. A witness who should naturally be produced is one with knowledge pertinent to the case, and their absence can suggest unfavorable evidence for the party that did not produce them, as established in Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co.