Jeffries v. Johnson

Citations: 27 Conn. App. 471; 607 A.2d 443; 1992 Conn. App. LEXIS 182Docket: 10199

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; May 5, 1992; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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The named defendant appeals the trial court's decision to set aside the jury verdict and order a new trial. The defendant asserts that the court improperly set aside the verdict, and alternatively argues that an additur, as permitted under General Statutes 52-228b, should have been ordered instead of a new trial. The defendant contends this matter should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard rather than an abuse of discretion standard. The court agrees with the defendant's position that an additur should have been ordered, thus vacating the trial court's judgment and remanding the case to determine a reasonable additur.

The facts established during the trial indicate that on October 26, 1986, while making a left turn into his driveway, the defendant's vehicle collided with the plaintiff's vehicle, resulting in the plaintiff suffering various physical injuries. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was receiving workers’ compensation benefits for a prior work-related injury. Following the accident, she sought chiropractic treatment and later consulted an orthopedic surgeon who diagnosed a torn medial meniscus requiring surgery. Notably, the plaintiff sustained another injury to the same knee in a subsequent unrelated accident before the surgery was performed.

The jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff, itemizing her economic damages at $10,653.79 and awarding zero for noneconomic damages, while also determining the plaintiff to be 30 percent contributorily negligent, leading to a total damage award of $7,457.65. The plaintiff later moved to set aside the verdict regarding damages, claiming it was inadequate and contrary to the evidence, and requested the option for an additur. However, the trial court granted the motion to set aside the verdict, declined to order an additur, and instead mandated a new trial on all issues, despite both parties' requests for an additur if the verdict was to be set aside.

The trial court found the jury's verdict contradictory and unjust, stating that while the economic damages indicated the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, the absence of noneconomic damages suggested the opposite. The standard of review for the trial court’s decision to set aside the verdict is typically "abuse of discretion," as established in Creem v. Cicero. However, the defendant argued for a stricter "clearly erroneous" standard due to the implications for the right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court in State v. Hammond reaffirmed the "abuse of discretion" standard for reviewing motions to set aside verdicts.

The trial court's duty is to set aside a verdict if it finds manifest injustice or if the verdict is against the evidence. If the awarded amount shocks the sense of justice, it implies the jury was misguided. The court emphasized that it is better positioned than an appellate court to assess jury influence, and its decisions warrant a presumption of correctness. The trial court concluded that the jury's failure to award damages for pain and suffering alongside economic damages was manifestly inadequate, aligning with Connecticut law that requires damages for pain and suffering when special damages are awarded.

Consequently, the appellate court concurred with the trial court’s finding of inadequacy in the verdict, ruling that it did not abuse its discretion in setting it aside. However, the court noted that the trial court incorrectly applied General Statutes 52-228b, which mandates that no verdict may be set aside solely for inadequate damages without first offering the parties an opportunity to accept a reasonable additur.

The trial court found the jury's verdict of zero noneconomic damages to be 'contradictory and unjust,' interpreting it as a sign that the jury believed the defendant caused none of the plaintiff’s injuries. Consequently, the court concluded it could not order an additur without first ordering a new trial since the inadequacy of damages was not the sole reason for setting aside the verdict. The court noted that the jury's intent in issuing a verdict for the plaintiff with zero damages was unclear, and to favor one interpretation over others would lead to speculation, which is discouraged by precedent. The court described the verdict as 'manifestly inadequate' and 'unjust,' suggesting no significant distinction between these terms. Importantly, the trial court assumed the jury found no causation by the defendant, which contradicts established legal principles. The appellate court ruled that the trial court should not have set aside the verdict without offering the parties a chance to accept an additur first. The case is remanded for the determination of a reasonable additur, allowing the parties to accept it, and only if they reject it should the verdict be set aside and a new trial ordered. Additionally, the action against the vehicle's owner, Ferba Johnson, was withdrawn. General Statutes 52-228b stipulates that a verdict cannot be set aside for inadequate damages without giving parties the opportunity to accept an additur first.

The total amount of medical bills presented by the plaintiff is specified. Under General Statutes 52-572h (a), 'economic damages' are defined as compensation for pecuniary losses, including reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitative services, custodial care, and loss of earnings or earning capacity, while excluding noneconomic damages. Noneconomic damages are defined as compensation for nonpecuniary losses, including physical pain and suffering as well as mental and emotional suffering. According to Practice Book 4061, the supreme court can reverse or modify a trial court’s decision if it finds factual findings to be clearly erroneous based on the entire record or if there are legal errors in the decision. Special damages are synonymous with economic damages. The defendant suggests that the jury may have disbelieved the plaintiff's claims of pain and suffering or concluded that any pain and suffering was attributable to other traumas.