McCurdy v. State

Citations: 26 Conn. App. 466; 601 A.2d 560; 1992 Conn. App. LEXIS 38Docket: 9902

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; January 28, 1992; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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The claimant estate is appealing a decision from the workers' compensation commission that denied an award for specific benefits under General Statutes § 31-308(b). The central issue is whether the estate is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits despite the deceased, John Mollico, receiving temporary total disability benefits until his death. Mollico sustained a back injury on November 21, 1983, while employed by the state of Connecticut and was paid temporary total disability benefits until his death on December 24, 1987. A physician had rated his injury as a 70 percent permanent partial disability shortly before he died from unrelated cancer. After his death, Jean McCurdy sought permanent partial disability benefits, and the estate also claimed entitlement in case she was not recognized as a dependent widow. The commissioner determined that McCurdy was neither a presumptive widow nor a dependent, and consequently, the estate was not entitled to the unmatured permanent partial disability benefits. The compensation review division upheld the commissioner's findings, emphasizing that the commissioner is the trier of fact and that his conclusions are valid unless legally erroneous. The distinction between temporary total disability payments and permanent partial disability awards is crucial; the former compensates for loss of earning capacity, while the latter compensates for permanent bodily impairment.

In Levanti v. Dow Chemical Co., the respondent contended that the claimant's demand for benefits contravened the prohibition against double compensation, which disallows concurrent payments for permanent partial impairment under Connecticut General Statutes § 31-308 (b) and total incapacity benefits under § 31-307 stemming from the same incident. The claims emerged from a lower back injury sustained by the deceased while employed by the state. The court noted that a person cannot simultaneously be partially and totally incapacitated. Although the deceased might have received specific indemnity for permanent partial disability had he not succumbed to cancer, no such award was granted before his death, thus no benefits could pass to his estate.

The claimant erroneously believed that reaching maximum improvement automatically entitled him to permanent benefits, a notion dismissed by the court. The claimant's reliance on Forkas, Admrx. v. International Silver Co. was deemed inappropriate since that case involved a prior award of permanent disability benefits at the time of death. The court affirmed the compensation review division's decision, declining to address the claimant's equal protection argument, as it was not raised in the lower court's review. Additionally, the commissioner found that Jean McCurdy was not a presumptive or factual dependent of the deceased, resulting in no unmatured award entitlement. Only the estate of the deceased appealed, as McCurdy's status was unchallenged. The applicable statute, § 31-308 (b), outlines compensation for specific injuries, including a structured benefit for the loss of back use.

The claimant raises three specific legal issues: 1) Whether the commissioner and the compensation review division incorrectly determined that the decedent's estate is ineligible for benefits under Connecticut General Statute 31-308 (b. 13), despite the decedent achieving maximum medical improvement before death. 2) Whether the refusal to grant two paragraphs of the claimant's motion to correct the finding constitutes an error by the workers’ compensation commissioner and the compensation review division. 3) Whether the commissioner's conclusion that specific benefits do not benefit the decedent's estate infringes on the equal protection clause of both the U.S. Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution. Additionally, Connecticut General Statute 31-307 stipulates that in cases of total incapacity resulting from injury, the injured employee is entitled to weekly compensation of two-thirds of their average weekly earnings, subject to a maximum rate defined in section 31-309 for the year of injury. The legal precedent Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co. modifies a prior ruling, clarifying that the unmatured portion of such awards does not belong to the estate of a deceased employee.