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Matto v. Dan Beard, Inc.
Citations: 15 Conn. App. 458; 546 A.2d 854; 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 293Docket: 5350
Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; August 16, 1988; Connecticut; State Appellate Court
The plaintiff has appealed the trial court's denial of his requests for injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and damages, as well as the ruling on the counterclaim that a portion of his riparian rights in the Housatonic River was adversely possessed by the defendant. The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the defendants proved adverse possession, in ruling that his claims were barred by General Statutes 52-575, in leaving certain title issues unresolved, and in concluding that the state was a necessary party. The defendants counter that the claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations under General Statutes 52-577 and that the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof for damages or injunctive relief. The case originated when Betty J. Matto filed suit against Dan Beard, Inc. in 1983 to stop dredging operations affecting her property, seek a declaratory judgment on land ownership, and request damages. After her death, her husband, Ralph J. Matto, became the plaintiff. The court allowed Daniel Nichols Beard to join as a defendant, asserting his claim of adverse possession over property adjacent to the plaintiff’s land. The amended complaint detailed that Betty J. Matto acquired land adjacent to the Housatonic River, which was eroded and rendered unusable due to the defendant’s dredging operations, negatively impacting the plaintiff's riparian rights. The second count of the complaint emphasized that land previously underwater was now at or above sea level and should belong to the plaintiff along with associated riparian rights. In the third count, the plaintiff claims that the corporate defendant removed boundary stakes established after a property survey. The defendant denies these allegations and presents three special defenses: (1) the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the claims are barred by laches; and (3) the defendant asserts that due to adverse possession for over fifteen years, both it and its predecessor have acquired sole title to the premises and corresponding riparian rights. The defendant also files a counterclaim asserting similar grounds for claiming title based on adverse possession. Following a two-day trial, the court issued a detailed memorandum of decision, establishing key findings: the plaintiff's corporation acquired two contiguous parcels of land in 1979, with a warranty deed transferred to the plaintiff's decedent in 1980. A July 1980 survey revealed that the defendant’s operations encroached on the plaintiff’s property, and boundary stakes were destroyed by the defendant's trucks. The plaintiff attempted to resolve the issue through letters and conversations with the defendant, but these efforts yielded no results, leading to the lawsuit filed on July 25, 1983. The court found that the plaintiff's easterly boundary previously fronted the Housatonic River, except for a 40-foot roadway created by the defendant that encroached on the plaintiff's property. This roadway, not used as a standard road but for the defendant's dredging equipment, extended into the river and was below the high-water mark. Further findings indicated that by 1975, the roadway and a causeway leading to Two Mile Island diminished the plaintiff's property’s direct access to the river. The Housatonic River is identified as a tidal river, affecting the delineation of high and low-water marks. In 1980, the legal situation surrounding the plaintiff's property mirrored that of previous years, with Beard constructing a roadway along the plaintiff’s easterly boundary and affecting the adjacent river through dredging operations. The causeway connecting the plaintiff's property to Two Mile Island was initiated in 1974 and completed in 1975. Beard's equipment was situated on the roadway in 1975 and 1980, but not in 1970. Beard also owned land south of the plaintiff's property and operated on the Matto property, including stockpiling gravel since 1946. The court determined that the defendant's dredging had eroded part of the plaintiff's property, though the specific area affected was not clearly defined. The defendant removed gravel and fill from this area, but the timeline for such removal was unclear, preventing a determination of adverse possession. The court found the defendant's operations had filled land below the high-water mark, obstructing the plaintiff's access to the Housatonic River and negatively impacting his riparian rights. The roadway east of the plaintiff’s property existed for forty feet in 1965, with access to the river until 1970, when the roadway was completed and further filled for various purposes, including creating sumps and placing machinery. The defendant's trucks have traversed the plaintiff's property since 1973 for material transport. In 1980, the plaintiff informed Beard of the encroachment on his property after having the boundary line staked. Correspondence was exchanged regarding this issue. The trial court concluded that establishing adverse possession requires clear proof, noting that the disputed land below the high-water mark is state-owned, citing relevant legal precedents. Neither party could claim title to this river parcel, but riparian rights may be acquired through adverse possession, as established in previous cases. The court ruled that the defendant acquired the plaintiff's riparian rights to a portion of the roadway below the high-water mark, extending forty feet from the plaintiff's southern boundary, due to continuous and adverse use since before 1965 for a period of fifteen years. The defendant's filling of the land sufficed to meet the adverse possession criteria. Additionally, the use of the river for dredging was continuous, open, and under a claim of right from 1965 to July 1980. However, the filling of another area below the high-water mark on the plaintiff’s easterly boundary did not meet the fifteen-year requirement as it began in 1970. The court found insufficient evidence of continuous use by the defendant for the southeasterly portion of the plaintiff's premises. Regarding the statute of limitations under General Statutes 52-575, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, noting that the plaintiff failed to re-enter the property within the required timeframe after being disseized. The plaintiff made four entries, including boundary surveying and correspondence, but did not initiate a lawsuit within one year of these entries. The lawsuit was filed on July 25, 1983, well after the deadline. The court denied the plaintiff's claims to title and requests for an injunction or damages due to the failure to exercise rights under the statute. It clarified that the corporate defendant’s rights existed through continuous dredging operations since the 1930s, despite the company's incorporation in 1973. The court's rulings included: 1) judgment for the defendant on all counts; 2) acknowledgment of limited adverse possession of the plaintiff's riparian rights; 3) denial of claims to other riparian rights due to the lack of continuous possession; and 4) denial of the plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim for failing to include all necessary parties, particularly the State of Connecticut. The trial court rejected the defense of the three-year statute of limitations under General Statutes 52-577, asserting that once the fifteen-year period expired, the plaintiff lost all enforceable rights, rendering the three-year defense ineffective. The court also determined that the doctrine of laches did not apply, as the plaintiff acted promptly upon becoming aware of his rights, and the defendant did not base its actions on any delay by the plaintiff. Further factual details relevant to the plaintiff's appeal include that Daniel Nichols Beard, not Dan Beard, Inc., owns Two Mile Island, having acquired it via a warranty deed on February 20, 1941. At the time of purchase, the island was a true island, accessible at low tide by foot. On July 16, 1946, Beard received a permit from the War Department to construct bulkheads in the Housatonic River, which contained a disclaimer stating it did not confer property rights, nor did it authorize any private property infringement or bypass the need for state approval. In a separate legal context, on September 20, 1973, Douglas M. Costle, the commissioner of environmental protection, filed a lawsuit against The Dan Beard Construction Co., Inc., seeking injunctions against illegal dredging activities and the disposal of illegally removed materials from the Housatonic River. A second suit was filed on November 5, 1973, against the same defendant for the removal of unauthorized causeways connecting Two Mile Island to the mainland. These cases were subsequently consolidated for trial. Daniel Nichols Beard, owner of Two Mile Island, and Dan Beard, Inc., the successor operator of dredging activities, were added as defendants in a legal action on April 23, 1974, following a joint stipulation for settlement. With court approval, Beard agreed to seek a permit from the commissioner of environmental protection for the existing causeways connecting Two Mile Island to the Shelton mainland, with litigation stayed pending this approval. After the stipulation, a mistrial was declared in each case. On July 11, 1974, Beard applied for a permit to maintain two causeways to the west bank of the Housatonic River, naming Ralph Hopkins and Riverview Cemetery as adjoining property owners but omitting the plaintiff's predecessor. On October 17, 1974, the environmental protection department approved a permit for the causeways, which emphasized that it did not confer property rights or exclusive privileges and remained subject to public and private rights and regulations. The plaintiff's primary claim is that the trial court incorrectly ruled on the defendant's counterclaim regarding the adverse possession of the plaintiff's riparian rights. The defendants claimed adverse possession of the disputed premises, asserting that their use had been open, notorious, continuous, and under a claim of right for over fifteen years. They contended this usage granted them sole title to the premises and associated riparian rights. Defendant Daniel Nichols Beard claimed ownership of land referenced in the plaintiff's complaint, asserting riparian rights through adverse possession lasting over fifteen years. This possession was characterized as open, visible, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and under a claim of right. The trial court's conclusion regarding the extent of the adverse possession, specifically that it only covered a portion of the plaintiff’s riparian rights, was not supported by the record. Adverse possession requires strict adherence to legal standards, with the burden of proof resting on the claimant, who must provide clear and convincing evidence of possession. Essential elements for establishing adverse possession include continuous and exclusive possession, without the owner's consent, for a statutory period of fifteen years. The legal title remains with the original owner, and shared use with others negates exclusivity. Additionally, land held by the state or its subdivisions for public use cannot be acquired via adverse possession. The Housatonic River is classified as a navigable and tidal river, establishing high and low-water marks. The plaintiff’s property is defined as being bounded 130 feet easterly by the Housatonic River, indicating a boundary at the high-water mark, as the area between these marks (the foreshore) is state-owned. The term "high-water mark" refers specifically to the mean or ordinary high-water mark. The plaintiff’s property does not touch the river but instead fronts a roadway constructed by the defendants below the high-water mark, which was built by dredging and filling the river. The trial court determined that the roadway was not for general use but solely for Beard’s equipment related to dredging activities. In 1965, the upper ninety feet of the plaintiff's eastern boundary still faced the river, while the lower forty feet bordered the newly created roadway. The court ruled in favor of the defendant Dan Beard, Inc. on its counterclaim to a limited extent, finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of the plaintiff's riparian rights only for the forty feet easterly of the plaintiff's boundary, contradicting the broader claim of sole title to the filled foreshore. The court found that no claim for adverse possession of the riparian rights was made in the counterclaim. Furthermore, Daniel Nichols Beard acquired Two Mile Island in 1941 and later received authorization from the War Department in 1946 to construct bulkheads filled with gravel near the plaintiff’s property. However, the trial court did not find evidence supporting Beard's claim that the barges infringed on private property rights, despite the War Department's warning against such invasions. Beard’s testimony indicated that B. N. Beard Company and Dan Beard, Inc. filled in the northern causeway and adjacent areas by Matto's property. On September 20, 1973, the commissioner of environmental protection filed a lawsuit to stop The Dan Beard Construction Co. Inc. from dredging operations in the river, followed by another injunction on November 5, 1973, demanding the removal of two unauthorized causeways connecting Two Mile Island to the mainland. Dan Beard, Inc. was incorporated at an unspecified time in 1973, and its connection to The Dan Beard Construction Co. Inc. was not documented in the record. On April 22, 1974, the commissioner amended his complaint to include Daniel Nichols Beard and Dan Beard, Inc., alleging that Dan Beard, Inc. was continuing dredging activities in a manner previously complained about. The trial court concluded that despite Dan Beard, Inc. existing only since 1973, the continuity of dredging operations since the 1930s allowed for "tacking" under adverse possession law. This conclusion was challenged as erroneous because the continuity required for tacking necessitates clear and positive proof, not mere inference. The court cited Smith v. Chapin and Marquis v. Drost, emphasizing that privity of possession—not privity of estate—is essential for establishing adverse possession. It was noted that the activities of B. N. Beard Company, The Dan Beard Construction Co. Inc., and Dan Beard, Inc. did not demonstrate necessary privity of possession, as they reflected independent actions rather than a connected succession of possession. The trial court failed to clarify the plaintiff’s riparian rights, concluding incorrectly that Dan Beard, Inc. adversely possessed land extending beyond the plaintiff's boundary. As the owner of upland property adjacent to navigable waters, the plaintiff could not extend property into the foreshore by depositing fill beyond the high-water mark. The plaintiff lacked riparian rights associated with their upland property, preventing the defendant, Dan Beard, Inc., from acquiring the right to deposit fill on the river's foreshore through adverse possession. State law establishes that the public, represented by the State, owns the land between high and low-water marks on navigable waters. Upland owners possess specific qualified rights, including the exclusive privilege to build wharves and piers, utilize the submerged land without obstructing navigation, and the rights of accretion and access by water to their upland. These rights are a form of property that can be separated and sold independently from the upland. The fundamental riparian right is access, which is distinct from public access rights. The exclusive rights of reclamation and wharfing are considered extensions of the right of access. A riparian owner cannot remove and sell sand from the public beach between high and low-water marks, as this constitutes ownership rather than access. The foreshore is subject to three classes of rights: the jus publicum (public navigation and access rights), the jus privatum (government ownership rights held in trust for public benefit), and the riparian rights of upland owners, which ensure reasonable and safe access to the water. The riparian rights cannot be compromised by illegal filling of the foreshore beyond the upland property. If the state holds inalienable title to the foreshore, no adverse possession can be claimed over it, nor can riparian rights be acquired through such illegal actions. The trial court erred in determining that the defendant acquired the plaintiff's riparian rights to a section of the roadway below the high-water mark, specifically a forty-foot area from the plaintiff’s southern boundary. The court found that the defendant's actions, including filling the land before 1965 and using it continuously, openly, notoriously, and adversely for fifteen years, met the requirements for adverse possession. However, the filling of the land was deemed sufficient on its own to establish usage. The defendant's dredging operations were also characterized as open, notorious, exclusive, and uninterrupted for the same duration. Notably, the use of the foreshore for dredging after October 17, 1974, was authorized by a permit from the department of environmental protection, which was issued to Daniel Nichols Beard, not Dan Beard, Inc. This distinction meant that no rights of adverse possession could accrue to the corporate defendant. The state permit explicitly stated that it did not convey property rights or exclusive privileges and was subject to public and private rights. Further, the permit's conditions prohibited interference with public use of navigable waters, undermining the claim of adverse possession by Dan Beard, Inc. The trial court affirmed that filling adjacent to the plaintiff's southern boundary occurred prior to 1965, while filling of the remaining area started in 1970 and extended further into the river afterward. Prior to the permit's issuance, the filling activities were in violation of General Statutes 25-7d and constituted a public nuisance under General Statutes 25-7e. Public Acts 1963, No. 569, which includes General Statutes 25-7d and 25-7e (Revised to 1972), became effective on June 27, 1963, establishing regulations for the removal of sand and gravel from tidal lands without a state permit. The Commissioner of Environmental Protection initiated two injunction actions against The Dan Beard Construction Co., Inc. for alleged violations: one to halt the illegal dredging and sale of sand and gravel, and another to dismantle two unlawfully constructed causeways to Two Mile Island. These actions were resolved when Daniel Nichols Beard applied for and received the necessary permits on October 17, 1974, albeit under specific conditions. The trial court found that Beard violated the permit by maintaining the causeways, which were defined as raised roads across water. Although the permit stated the causeways were primarily for access to the island, the court determined they were primarily used for Beard's dredging operations. Beard's application for a permit on July 11, 1974, contained a statement asserting that the causeways provided access to and from both Two Mile Island and the Shelton mainland, supported by a plan detailing their dimensions and the creation of a non-tidal lagoon between them. However, the roadway constructed below the high-water mark adjacent to the plaintiff's property was not explicitly or implicitly approved by the Department of Environmental Protection and was not part of Beard's application. The trial court highlighted that this roadway, being bounded by water on only one side, did not qualify as a causeway. The court referenced a 1970 aerial map indicating the roadway's extent along the Matto easterly boundary. The roadway in question extends from the plaintiff's eastern boundary into the Housatonic River, existing below the high-water mark of this tidal river. A 1970 aerial map indicates land extending from the roadway to Two Mile Island, owned by the defendants. By 1975, both the roadway and a causeway to Two Mile Island were still present, alongside two landlocked sump ponds, the second created by the defendants in 1972. As a result of these constructions, the plaintiff's land no longer directly fronts the river. Defendant Daniel Nichols Beard testified that the north causeway was built in 1970, while the south causeway was already in place. His testimony indicates that since 1970, the river area between the causeways and the adjacent west bank below the high-water mark has been appropriated by the defendants for exclusive private use. The sump ponds, created in 1972, were part of operations to manage water and silt from sand and gravel dredging. Water is pumped from a washland into the smaller sump pond, where silt collects before being transferred to a larger pond, which is then recycled back into the washland, ensuring no contaminated water returns to the river. The operations, including dredging machinery located on the causeways and roadway, were conducted before a state environmental permit was issued in 1974, which permitted maintaining the causeways for access purposes. However, the defendants' activities exceeded the permit's scope and illegally filled the foreshore, violating the plaintiff's riparian rights. The trial court incorrectly ruled that Dan Beard, Inc. had adversely possessed the plaintiff's riparian rights. The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction to halt the dredging operations that trespass on their property. An injunction is sought for the defendant to cease removal of the plaintiff's boundary markers and for a declaratory judgment regarding land ownership adjacent to the plaintiff’s property. The trial court denied the plaintiff's monetary damages for trespass and property invasion due to a lack of evidence on the amount of fill removed, despite acknowledging that fill was taken. The court's conclusion is contested, as some damage results from any wrongful invasion of property rights, which, while potentially nominal, should not prevent the award of damages. The court also denied the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages and injunctive relief, citing the plaintiff's failure to exercise rights under a specific statute, thus barring entitlement to an injunction or damages related to removal costs. The plaintiff had previously established that the defendant's dredging operations caused erosion on their property, necessitating consideration of further allegations regarding ongoing irreparable harm. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant’s actions led to the disappearance of boundary markers, which are protected by law. Finally, the court ruled that the state is a necessary party in determining ownership of land adjacent to the plaintiff's property, referencing the defendant's successful counterclaim of adverse possession over the plaintiff's riparian rights. The plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment is denied due to the failure to include all necessary parties, specifically the State of Connecticut, the landowner concerning the claimed riparian rights. The court identifies an error in this denial, noting that while including the state might have been beneficial, it was not essential for adjudicating the title to the filled foreshore. The court previously acknowledged that the land filled by the defendant below the high-water mark belongs to the State of Connecticut, meaning neither party can claim title to the land east of the plaintiff's boundary. The judgment is set aside, and the case is remanded with instructions to render a judgment for the plaintiff regarding the defendant Dan Beard, Inc.'s counterclaim, while ordering a new trial solely on the issue of the plaintiff's entitlement to injunctive relief. Both the plaintiff, as a representative and individual devisee of the decedent's estate, and the court have used ambiguous singular and plural references to defendants, which has been clarified in this summary. Relevant statutes are cited, including General Statutes 52-575, which outlines entry and action timelines for land claims, General Statutes 52-577 concerning tort actions, and federal and state regulations regarding land use, specifically the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act and the commissioner of environmental protection's regulations on materials removal from tidal waters, ensuring the rights of riparian property owners are respected. No entity is permitted to remove sand, gravel, or other materials from below the mean high water mark of tidal and coastal waters without first obtaining a permit from the commissioner. This permit comes with conditions, including the obligation to pay the state for any materials removed for commercial purposes, with specified payment amounts and timelines. Additionally, no construction, obstruction, or dredging activities can occur in tidal, coastal, or navigable waters without a permit. Engaging in such activities without proper authorization renders them a public nuisance, which the attorney general may seek to enjoin or abate at the commissioner's request. The commission has the authority to develop regulations to enforce these provisions. Furthermore, any individual who knowingly damages or removes markers placed by a surveyor on land boundaries may face a fine of up to fifty dollars.