Judy Greene, of the Estate of Donald Greene, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant, Wausau Insurance Company, Intervening (03-5017) Intervening (03-5018) v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc. D/B/A B.F. Goodrich Aerospace, Avionics and Lighting Division, N/k/a Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc., Defendant/third-Party Appellant/cross-Appellee. United Technologies Corporation D/B/A Sikorsky Aircraft, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., Third-Party
Docket: 03-5017
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; May 20, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Judy Greene, Executrix of the Estate of Donald Greene, Deceased, against B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, addressed a products liability claim stemming from a helicopter crash on June 14, 1999, that resulted in the deaths of the pilot Donald Greene and three others. B.F. Goodrich, the defendant, appealed the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment regarding Greene's claim of manufacturing defects in the helicopter's vertical gyroscope. The jury had previously ruled in favor of Greene, prompting Goodrich's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied.
Greene asserted that Goodrich had defectively designed and manufactured the gyroscope and had been negligent in failing to warn about its defects. However, the court found that Greene did not present sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute regarding the existence of a manufacturing defect. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings aligned with this decision. The opinion noted that Greene also cross-appealed a pre-trial order that granted partial summary judgment to Goodrich and an evidentiary ruling made by the district court.
Greene's design defect claim was dismissed by the district court due to lack of evidence of a design flaw. However, her manufacturing defect claim was allowed to proceed under strict liability, as there were genuine issues regarding causation. The court ruled against Greene's state-law failure to warn claim, citing federal aviation standards that preempt state law duties. At trial, the jury favored Greene, awarding her significant damages and also compensating Wausau Insurance Co. for workers' compensation related to her husband's death. Goodrich appealed the district court's denial of its motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law regarding the manufacturing defect claim. Greene cross-appealed the summary judgment granted on her failure to warn claim and the exclusion of evidence related to prior gyroscope failures. The case involved vertical gyroscopes (model VG-204 A/B) manufactured by Goodrich, which provided data to the helicopter's Attitude Display Indicators (ADIs). Each ADI displayed critical flight information and received inputs from its own gyroscope, while the helicopter's other instruments relied on gyroscopes not made by Goodrich. The analysis will focus on Goodrich's motions for judgment as a matter of law following the jury's verdict in favor of Greene.
The District Court's denial of Goodrich's motions for judgment as a matter of law is subject to de novo review, applying Kentucky state law standards. Under Kentucky law, such a judgment is warranted only when there is a complete absence of evidence on a material issue or no disputed issue of fact exists. Goodrich contends that the court erred in denying its motion at both the close of Greene's case and at the trial's conclusion. The court found that it erred by not granting Goodrich's motion at the close of Greene's case.
Kentucky law defines a manufacturing defect as a product that leaves the manufacturer in a defective condition, not adhering to its specifications. A jury must determine if the defect arose from an error in manufacturing or assembly. In strict liability claims, Kentucky follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, which holds a defendant strictly liable if the plaintiff proves the product was unreasonably dangerous in a defective condition. The plaintiff does not need to prove fault but must establish causation using the "substantial factor" test, allowing for circumstantial evidence to support their case.
The term "unreasonably dangerous" refers to products that exceed the ordinary consumer's safety expectations based on common knowledge. Evidence presented at trial included the destruction of the vertical gyroscopes in the crash, eliminating direct evidence of failure. Greene relied on circumstantial evidence, notably her husband's statement before the crash that he believed his gyro had failed.
Greene provided evidence indicating that, in the six months before the crash, there were significant mechanical issues with the Sikorsky 76-A helicopters operated by PHI, including forty vertical gyroscope replacements and eleven ADI replacements on several helicopters. The specific helicopter involved in the crash had three vertical gyroscopes and two ADIs replaced in that timeframe. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) retrieved a faceplate from one of the helicopter's ADIs, which indicated that at impact, the ADI suggested the helicopter was in a position between level flight and a 2-degree right roll. However, evidence from the crash site, including damage patterns and the last words of pilot Jones, indicated the helicopter was actually in a left-hand turn and descending at the time of impact. Greene's helicopter expert, Douglas Herlihy, testified that a vertical gyroscope failure was likely the cause of the crash, suggesting that the confusion in the cockpit stemmed from a loss of vertical gyro input.
Goodrich challenged the admissibility of Greene's statement recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) regarding the gyroscope, arguing it was inadmissible hearsay and that Greene could not have seen the vertical gyroscopes located in the helicopter's nose. Goodrich contended that there were multiple gyroscopes, and it was speculative to determine which one Greene referenced. The district court admitted Greene's statement under the hearsay exceptions of present sense impression and excited utterance. The court's determination was subject to review for abuse of discretion, with hearsay defined as a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and the exceptions outlined under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1) and 803(2) pertaining to statements made during or immediately after a startling event.
Greene's out-of-court statement's admissibility at trial was questioned, particularly whether it constituted hearsay. The district court correctly admitted it as a present sense impression or an excited utterance. Although Greene could not directly observe the vertical gyroscopes, he could see the ADIs in the cockpit displaying data from the gyroscopes. His statement, "I think my gyro just quit," indicated he was referencing his ADI, supported by expert testimony that an experienced pilot like Greene would understand the source of the ADI's information. The court found it unreasonable to require a pilot to see the gyroscope to identify a malfunction. Furthermore, Greene’s statement was deemed an excited utterance, made under stress just before his death, with the Advisory Committee Notes indicating that a statement need only relate to the startling event.
Regarding the claim of a manufacturing defect in the vertical gyroscope, Goodrich argued that Greene did not meet her burden of proof to show a defect existed. The court agreed, noting that Greene's reliance on data about the replacement of vertical gyroscopes and ADIs in PHI helicopters did not substantiate a manufacturing defect. The NTSB report cited 40 vertical gyro replacements across 15 helicopters and 11 attitude indicator replacements across 7 helicopters in the six months leading up to the accident, with Greene's helicopter having two attitude indicators and three vertical gyros replaced during that period. The data interpretation was contested, but ultimately, it failed to demonstrate a manufacturing defect.
Exhibit No. 21, presented by Greene at trial, outlines the removal, replacement, and repair of vertical gyroscopes and Attitude Director Indicators (ADIs) from PHI's helicopter fleet between December 15, 1998, and June 14, 1999. The data indicates that 32 vertical gyroscopes and 12 ADIs were removed during this period, but this figure does not align with the NTSB report. Greene's assertion that a 'large number' of vertical gyroscope failures occurred is contested, as the evidence does not imply a manufacturing defect. Removals and repairs were distributed among various facilities, not solely Goodrich, and the inclusion of ADIs does not substantiate Greene's claims about vertical gyroscopes. No evidence was provided by Greene to demonstrate that the removal rates were unusual or that PHI's replacement rates differed from those of other manufacturers. Both parties acknowledged the absence of data on the expected useful life of vertical gyroscopes, which is critical for assessing whether the removal data is statistically significant. Consequently, Greene's statistics lack probative value regarding a manufacturing defect. Additionally, Exhibit No. 6 comprises 211 pages of work orders and inspection reports from Goodrich's repair station, detailing work conducted on VG-204 A/B vertical gyroscopes from November 1994 to April 1999.
Two work orders and inspection reports related to the vertical gyroscopes from helicopter N2743E, piloted by Greene, were submitted to Goodrich within six months of an accident. The first work order (FK956) was received on January 25, 1999, citing '2 pitch kicks in flight' as the reason for removal. Goodrich's inspection on January 29 identified 'carbon build-up on slip rings and brushes' as the cause of failure and confirmed the gyroscope was repaired to meet specifications before returning it to PHI. The second work order (FT858) on April 13, 1999, also noted '2 pitch kicks in flight.' Goodrich's inspection on April 16 reported that the issue could not be verified, as the unit performed normally after routine maintenance and cleaning.
The evidence presented does not support claims of a manufacturing defect in the VG-204 A/B gyroscopes, as no defects were identified. Testimony from expert Herlihy suggested the accident resulted from instrument confusion and other factors, including weather, rather than a gyroscope defect. Furthermore, pilot Methvin indicated that alternative instruments could mitigate issues from a failed ADI. The evidence suggested various possible causes for the accident, but Greene failed to establish that a manufacturing defect was the probable cause as required for a jury verdict. The court concluded that the evidence amounted to speculation and did not meet the burden of proof necessary to show a manufacturing defect.
The district court erred by not granting Goodrich's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end of Greene's case, making Goodrich's subsequent motions moot. Greene's cross-appeal claimed the court wrongly granted summary judgment to Goodrich on her failure to warn claims, asserting that Goodrich breached its duty to inform aircraft users about defects in the vertical gyroscope. Greene's argument relied on expert testimony indicating Goodrich lacked a centralized database for tracking malfunctions and employee concerns. However, she did not cite any federal law violations or relevant authority requiring Goodrich to maintain such a database. The district court determined that federal law preempts state duties regarding aviation safety, noting that FAA guidelines do not advocate for a database as suggested. Citing Abdullah v. American Airlines, the court emphasized that Congress intended aviation safety regulation to be exclusively federal. The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act supports this, indicating the need for a single agency to oversee safety regulations. The court concurred with the Third Circuit's conclusion that federal law governs standards of care in aviation safety, affirming that Greene's state-law failure to warn claim was preempted.
Greene contends that the district court incorrectly excluded evidence of gyroscope repairs and replacements on PHI's helicopters that occurred more than six months prior to the crash. The appellate review of such evidentiary exclusions is stringent; reversal is only warranted if necessary for substantial justice. Greene fails to demonstrate how the excluded evidence would aid her case, as it appears to be cumulative to existing evidence regarding vertical gyroscope replacements. The district court's decision to limit the evidence to six months prior was deemed appropriate to avoid presenting unnecessary data to the jury.
The appellate court emphasizes that overturning a jury verdict is not taken lightly, yet acknowledges that not all questions are appropriate for jury deliberation. Upon review, the court determined it must reverse the district court's decision, instructing that judgment be entered in favor of Goodrich and dismissing Greene's case.
Additionally, the court addressed the admissibility of expert testimony by Herlihy, affirming that the district court correctly deemed him competent to testify as an accident investigator regarding the vertical gyroscope's role in the crash. There was ambiguity regarding whether all removed vertical gyroscopes were manufactured by Goodrich, which the parties did not clarify post-argument. The court noted the importance of oral argument in facilitating direct dialogue and addressing concerns that may not have been fully explored in written briefs.
William H. Rehnquist's article emphasizes that a product failure does not necessarily constitute a manufacturing defect, which is central to the dissenting opinion on Greene's claims. For a successful manufacturing defect claim under strict liability, a plaintiff must prove that a manufacturing error caused an unreasonably dangerous condition leading to injury. Although Greene presented evidence suggesting that a vertical gyroscope failure likely caused a crash, including eyewitness statements and expert testimony, she failed to demonstrate that the failure resulted from a manufacturing defect due to the destruction of the gyroscope in the accident. The legal principle of res ipsa loquitur, which allows for the inference of a defect in cases where the item is unavailable for examination, requires proof that such failure is atypical for a properly manufactured product. In this case, evidence indicated that gyroscopes are replaced based on performance conditions, not on a fixed schedule, and failures are expected occurrences. Thus, Greene's assertion that the gyroscope's failure implied a manufacturing defect was unsubstantiated, leading to the conclusion that the jury's decision must be overturned.
The statement expresses skepticism regarding the majority's view that a gyroscope failure was not a contributing factor to the crash, suggesting that while gyroscope failures are often manageable, they could be inherently unsafe in specific circumstances. The author agrees with the majority's conclusion on Goodrich's motion for judgment but emphasizes that Greene's claim lacks evidence of a defect in her gyroscope compared to others produced by Goodrich. Regarding Greene's cross-appeal based on a failure to warn claim, the majority affirms that this claim is preempted by federal law. The analysis notes that federal legislation, particularly the Federal Aviation Act (FAA), can preempt state laws either expressly or implicitly. The author argues that no explicit preemption exists in the FAA concerning Greene's claim and discusses implied preemption, which occurs when federal regulation is so comprehensive that it leaves no room for state laws. The district court's ruling, which cited Abdullah v. American Airlines, supports the idea that federal oversight of aviation safety is extensive, indicating that state-level safety regulations may be precluded.
Federal regulations set the standard of care owed to passengers by pilots and flight crews, leading the court to conclude that the FAA preempts any state-imposed standards of care on flight operators. While the case of Abdullah demonstrates that state standards for aviation personnel can be preempted by the FAA, the current case is distinguishable due to the absence of federal regulations detailing the exact standard of care. The court has historically applied FAA preemption narrowly, as seen in Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, where local laws regarding ground space for aircraft landing were upheld despite FAA preemption of certain airspace regulations. Thus, the court expresses skepticism about assuming FAA preemption over state or common law duties in this instance. Although the FAA oversees quality control of aviation equipment, there is no justification for believing that a state's stricter duty of care in failure-to-warn cases would undermine FAA regulations. Consequently, the dissenting opinion argues against the majority's dismissal of Greene's failure-to-warn claim. The excerpt also notes the challenge of proving a manufacturing defect when the product is destroyed, emphasizing the potential relevance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and highlighting that the expected failure rate of gyroscopes might support Greene's claim regarding Goodrich's obligation to inform consumers about the product's reliability.
