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Rodia v. Tesco Corp.
Citations: 11 Conn. App. 391; 527 A.2d 721; 1987 Conn. App. LEXIS 990Docket: 4804
Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; June 30, 1987; Connecticut; State Appellate Court
A product liability action has been initiated by a plaintiff and his wife for injuries sustained while operating a forklift. The defendants in the case are Clark Equipment Company, the forklift’s manufacturer, and Tesco Corporation, the lessor of the forklift to the plaintiff's employer, C.N. Flagg Company, Inc. Flagg sought to intervene as a co-plaintiff to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff under the Workers’ Compensation Act, but its motion was denied by the trial court, prompting this appeal. The court first needed to determine if Flagg’s denial of intervention constituted an appealable final judgment. It referenced prior rulings indicating that an unsuccessful intervention applicant can appeal only if they present a colorable claim to intervene by right, specifically in personal injury cases where workers’ compensation has been paid. The court found that Flagg’s claim met the criteria for a colorable claim under General Statutes § 31-293. The plaintiffs and defendants argued that General Statutes § 52-572r (c) barred Flagg from intervening, as it states employers or their insurers cannot claim a lien on judgments in product liability actions. Flagg acknowledged that if the plaintiffs' complaint solely pertained to product liability, they would be precluded from intervening. However, Flagg contended that allegations in the third count against Tesco, concerning negligent repair and maintenance, do not fall under the product liability definition in General Statutes § 52-572m (b). Flagg claimed that since "repair" and "maintenance" are not explicitly listed in the statute, the complaint does not exclusively assert a product liability claim, allowing for Flagg’s intervention. Plaintiffs have narrowed count three of their complaint to address only the failure to repair or maintain a forklift before its delivery to the plaintiff's employer. This limitation is viewed as a judicial admission, binding the plaintiffs and preventing them from asserting claims related to post-delivery maintenance issues. The central question is whether pre-delivery negligent maintenance falls under product liability claims. It is established that a lessor qualifies as a 'product seller' under General Statutes § 52-572m (a), and thus, an allegation of negligent maintenance prior to leasing constitutes a valid product liability claim. The statute's purpose is to protect against harm from defective products, requiring a broad interpretation of conduct affecting product safety before it enters commerce. Terms like 'preparation,' 'installation,' and 'testing' encompass pre-leasing maintenance failures. Previous cases cited by Flagg do not apply, as they address the liability of repairers, not lessors, and Flagg's references to Regal Steel are misplaced; that case did not involve a recognized product seller under the statute, unlike Tesco in this instance. A footnote in Regal Steel, suggesting maintenance post-delivery is outside the product liability statute, is interpreted to pertain solely to maintenance performed after delivery. The court finds no error in this reasoning, and the opinion is concurred by other judges. General Statutes § 31-293 allows an injured employee to pursue legal action against a third party responsible for their injury, while also permitting the employer to seek recovery of compensation paid to the injured employee from that third party. In this case, the trial court addressed motions from both plaintiffs and defendants to strike an intervening complaint, mistakenly believing Flagg's motion had been granted. Finding no record of such an order, the court treated the motions as objections to the intervention and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiffs' complaint outlines that TESCO CORPORATION, a Connecticut corporation involved in leasing forklifts, rented a forklift manufactured by CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY to the plaintiffs' employer for use at a construction site. The complaint alleges that the forklift was used as intended but that the incident leading to the injury resulted from TESCO CORPORATION's negligence, including: 1. Failure to properly maintain and repair the forklift. 2. Failure to adequately inspect the forklift and its components for defects prior to leasing. 3. Lack of warnings regarding the defective condition of the forklift and its lift chain. 4. Failure to report prior damage to the forklift and to take necessary inspection and repair actions.