Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 10, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
James F. Horton, II, a California state prisoner, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's findings on all claims except for Horton’s assertion of a Brady v. Maryland violation, which prompted a reversal and remand from Judge Paez. The case revolves around the murder of Herschel 'Lobo' Bowser, who was found unconscious with severe head injuries consistent with a hammer attack. The scene showed signs of a struggle, with Bowser's girlfriend, Carolyn Ebel, noting missing cash and cocaine from the apartment. Horton, identified as a customer of Bowser, had previously borrowed a hammer from a resident of his lodge, which was similar to the one found at the crime scene. Testimony indicated that the hammer belonged to the lodge manager and had been missing around the time of the murder. The investigation revealed no substantial forensic evidence linking Horton to the crime, except for the hammer, which raises questions about the evidence's implications.
On October 10, Horton informed Dorn of plans that might lead to his moving out the next day. The following morning, Dorn observed Horton leaving with James 'Doonie' Cunnigan and Anthony Wilson. Horton later called Dorn multiple times inquiring if the police were seeking him and instructed Dorn to tell Graham to deny giving Horton anything. The key prosecution witness, Donald 'Foo' McLaurin, testified about his long-term acquaintance with Horton, their shared drug use, and their activities on October 10. McLaurin stated that Horton purchased cocaine from an individual linked to Bowser, known as 'Lobo,' and later went to Ray's Motel with McLaurin, Horton, Wilson, and Horton's brother to consume cocaine.
McLaurin recounted discussions about a robbery plan targeting Horton's dealer, which he ultimately did not participate in. On October 11, Horton contacted McLaurin to meet at Ray's Motel, boasting about having executed the robbery plan. McLaurin observed multiple bags of cocaine and a significant amount of cash at the motel. Horton shared details of how he had attacked the dealer with a hammer and stolen cocaine before their vehicle broke down. After retrieving items from the abandoned car, they returned to Ray's for further drug use, and McLaurin drove them to a Greyhound bus depot.
Later, in November 1984, McLaurin was incarcerated for a probation violation and met with Horton's attorney, admitting he had lied due to fear of retribution from other inmates. He clarified that neither law enforcement nor the district attorney assisted him with his probation violation sentencing and acknowledged his substance use during the relevant time, stating he was not charged with any crime despite his involvement in driving Horton.
On April 1, 1985, Horton was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery, with a jury affirming the special circumstance that the murder occurred during a robbery, as well as a prior murder conviction. The jury imposed a death sentence on April 16, 1985. However, on December 11, 1995, the California Supreme Court reversed the prior murder special circumstance and death sentence but upheld the overall judgment, resulting in a life sentence without parole. Horton filed multiple petitions for writ of habeas corpus, all of which were denied, including two in the California Supreme Court (in 1989 and 1995) and a federal petition initiated on October 2, 1997, which included a Second Amended Petition in 2001. The district court denied all claims, granting a Certificate of Appealability on four issues. The review of the habeas petition is conducted de novo under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is subject to the standards set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, Horton can only obtain relief if the California Supreme Court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable factual determination. The decision must be objectively unreasonable, as established by Supreme Court precedent. Horton claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to impeach a witness with prior felony convictions, but the California Supreme Court found no prejudice in light of the witness's own damaging testimony. The district court agreed, affirming that the state court's rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of the law as defined in Strickland v. Washington. A defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resultant prejudice to the defense.
McLaurin's credibility was significantly compromised due to his history of drug use, criminal record, and admissions of dishonesty, rendering any additional evidence of his conviction for possession with intent to sell PCP unlikely to influence the jury's decision. Horton contended that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify under the false belief that his prior murder conviction could be used against him, despite the trial judge ruling it inadmissible. However, the court found that the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel was not met, as there was no evidence of when counsel conveyed this information to Horton or of Horton's desire to testify. Additionally, Horton's claim that his right to a fair trial was violated due to a court commissioner presiding over the case without jurisdiction was rejected. Although there was no formal stipulation for the commissioner's authority, both Horton and his counsel were aware of the commissioner's role and proceeded without objection, thereby creating a "tantamount stipulation" under California law. The California Supreme Court ruled that the trial conducted by the commissioner did not infringe upon Horton's federal constitutional rights, as the commissioner acted with the same authority as a superior court judge. The district court's conclusions were upheld, and Horton's motion to expand the Certificate of Appealability was denied, as reasonable jurists would not dispute the district court's evaluation of his claims.
Horton claims a violation of his rights under Brady v. Maryland due to the prosecution's failure to disclose a deal with key witness McLaurin, who allegedly agreed to testify in exchange for immunity related to actions during the murder weekend. The district court denied Horton's claim without determining the existence of the deal, concluding that even if it existed, the evidence was not material under Brady. However, the reviewing court disagrees, stating that the prosecution's non-disclosure of the deal constituted a Brady violation. It emphasizes the prosecution's obligation to disclose material evidence that could aid the defense, including evidence that could impeach witness credibility. The court outlines that materiality is established if the undisclosed evidence could have reasonably affected the trial's outcome, underscoring that it is sufficient to show a "reasonable probability" rather than a likelihood of a different verdict.
The court identifies two key reasons for its conclusion: first, McLaurin's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case, and second, the undisclosed deal would have provided significant impeachment evidence indicating McLaurin's potential bias. The court references several Supreme Court cases to support its position. Ultimately, it states that the California Supreme Court's dismissal of Horton's Brady claim was an unreasonable application of established federal law, as McLaurin's testimony was central to establishing Horton's guilt, including a confession linked to McLaurin's account.
McLaurin's testimony was the sole direct evidence linking Horton to the crime, rendering the prosecution's case circumstantial without it, as there was no forensic evidence or eyewitness accounts implicating Horton. The prosecutor highlighted the significance of McLaurin’s testimony during closing arguments, indicating its centrality to the case and urging the jury to review it if they had any doubts. The jury requested a read-back of McLaurin's testimony, demonstrating its importance in their deliberation. The prosecutor argued that without McLaurin's involvement, the case would remain unsolved, despite acknowledging McLaurin's drug use, which he claimed did not diminish his credibility. The emphasis placed on McLaurin’s testimony suggests that undisclosed evidence regarding any deal he made could have severely undermined the prosecution's argument. The document references several court cases that support the notion that suppressed evidence could materially impact a trial outcome, particularly when a witness's credibility is crucial and their testimony is largely uncorroborated. Evidence that could impeach McLaurin's credibility might have led the jury to distrust his account, particularly regarding Horton's alleged confession, which was not corroborated by other witnesses.
McLaurin's testimony was significantly undermined by his admissions of drug use, dishonesty to police, and involvement in driving the victim to the bus depot post-killing. Despite this, the undisclosed evidence of a deal offering him immunity for his testimony remained crucial, as it could lead the jury to question his credibility further. The precedent established in Hayes indicates that such disclosure is not merely cumulative impeachment; it reveals the prosecution's substantial motivation to secure favorable testimony from its key witness. The court emphasized that when a witness is central to the prosecution's case, suppressed impeachment evidence gains greater significance. In Benn v. Lambert, it was determined that if the jury relied on a witness's testimony to reach a verdict, the withheld impeachment evidence could be prejudicial. Given that McLaurin’s testimony was vital for the prosecution, it is reasonably probable that disclosing the leniency agreement would have altered the trial outcome. The prosecution's failure to reveal this deal constituted a violation of Brady, which mandates the disclosure of material evidence favorable to the defense. The state court's finding that the suppressed evidence was immaterial was deemed an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court law, specifically in relation to the due process rights of the accused. The prosecution did not disclose McLaurin’s leniency deal, which was pivotal as he provided the only evidence of motive and opportunity for the crime, including a confession by Horton. The failure to disclose this deal not only undermined the trial's fairness but also violated the due process standards set forth in relevant case law, rendering the state court's judgment objectively unreasonable.
The district court's denial of Horton's Brady claim is vacated and remanded for a determination on whether the state disputes the existence of a deal between McLaurin and the police. If the state challenges this, an evidentiary hearing will be conducted. If the state concedes the deal's existence or it is established through evidence, the court will issue a writ of habeas corpus for Horton's release unless the state retries him within a reasonable timeframe set by the court. The court assumes the deal exists for the purposes of the Brady claim but requires resolution of the factual dispute. The dissent identifies evidence supporting McLaurin's testimony, emphasizing that without it, the case against Horton would falter, highlighting the deal's impact on the verdict's integrity. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) restricts evidentiary hearings, it does not apply here due to Horton’s diligence in state proceedings. Because the California Supreme Court denied the state habeas petition without ordering formal pleadings, Horton did not lack diligence, thus avoiding AEDPA’s limitations. Under pre-AEDPA standards, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he presents facts that could lead to relief and was not fully heard in state court, which applies to his Brady claim if the existence of the deal is contested by the state.
Donald McLaurin's alleged deal regarding charges or probation revocation related to the weekend of October 10th is deemed irrelevant, as any evidence of such a deal would not have influenced the outcome of Horton's trial. The California Supreme Court denied this claim without elaboration, prompting an independent review of the record to assess the objectivity of its decision. The district court, assuming an undisclosed deal existed, dismissed Horton's Brady claim on the grounds that the suppressed evidence was not material. Materiality requires a reasonable probability that disclosing the evidence would have altered the trial's outcome, not merely that it could have led to a different verdict. The court concluded that McLaurin's purported deal did not cast doubt on the trial's integrity for three reasons: McLaurin’s testimony was significantly undermined; key aspects of his account were corroborated by independent witnesses; and Horton's guilt was strongly indicated by other evidence. Witnesses confirmed that Horton sought and received a hammer from Graham, which was later linked to the murder of Bowser. Additionally, Horton's suspicious behavior, including his attempts to evade police inquiry after the crime, reinforced the case against him.
McLaurin served as a significant witness for the prosecution primarily by providing testimony that aligned with independent witnesses' accounts regarding Horton's actions and statements. He testified that he drove Horton to a building on Artesia Boulevard, where Horton obtained drugs. This was supported by Ebel, Bowser's girlfriend, who stated that Bowser sold drugs from that location and identified Horton as a customer. McLaurin noted that Horton referred to his dealer using a name containing 'Lo,' corroborated by Ebel identifying Bowser as 'Lobo.'
Additionally, McLaurin recounted a conversation about planning to rob Horton's dealer, where Horton opted against using a gun due to noise, instead suggesting a pipe; although a pipe was not used, a hammer was found consistent with this context. He mentioned Horton’s knowledge of where Bowser stored cocaine, which Ebel confirmed, detailing that Bowser kept his supply in a kitchen cupboard.
McLaurin testified about a call from Horton around 1:00 p.m. and their subsequent meeting at Ray's Motel, where Horton, Doonie, and Anthony were present with bags of cocaine, one marked with black "X's," which matched Ebel’s testimony about Bowser’s drug supply. He also stated that Horton admitted to attacking Bowser with a hammer, with forensic evidence supporting this claim.
Despite this, the district court found that McLaurin had significant credibility issues, including admitting to substantial drug use, lying to law enforcement, and never facing charges related to the events in question. His participation in the crime planning and the lack of prosecution suggested potential bias, although the jury was aware of these factors. The court concluded that evidence of any plea deal would not have significantly impacted the overall credibility or weight of the corroborated testimony regarding Horton's statements and actions.
Horton's connection to the murder weapon and his behavior indicating guilt remain unaffected by McLaurin's testimony. Horton argues that the circumstantial evidence against him is weaker than in other cases involving undisclosed witness deals, specifically citing Singh v. Prunty and Carriger v. Stewart. However, these cases are not Supreme Court precedents, and thus do not serve as benchmarks for assessing the California court's decision. In Singh, the undisclosed witness was the only evidence linking the defendant to a murder-for-hire plot, while in Horton’s case, McLaurin’s testimony was corroborated by independent evidence. In Carriger, the undisclosed witness had a history of deceit, whereas the jury was aware of McLaurin's reputation as a liar.
Horton speculates that McLaurin could have committed the murder, but lacks supporting evidence; McLaurin's timeline does not allow for him to have committed the crime undetected. Furthermore, there is no evidence linking McLaurin to the murder weapon or showing any consciousness of guilt beyond driving Horton to the bus depot. Horton also suggests that McLaurin might have learned details about the crime from others or by reading the police report, but this is purely speculative. The district court concluded that the California Supreme Court's dismissal of Horton's Brady claim was reasonable and aligned with Supreme Court standards.
Horton additionally claims that the trial court's jury instruction regarding the prosecution of other potential suspects compounded any Brady error. However, this instruction was not a certified issue on appeal and did not prevent jurors from considering evidence related to credibility. Lastly, Horton’s reliance on juror declarations to demonstrate prejudice was rejected, as they are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
