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Denby v. Voloshin Cadillac, Inc.
Citations: 3 Conn. App. 181; 485 A.2d 1360; 1985 Conn. App. LEXIS 831Docket: 2099
Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; January 22, 1985; Connecticut; State Appellate Court
Paul Denby appeals a directed verdict favoring Voloshin Cadillac, Inc. regarding damage to his automobile, which was stolen while in the dealership's custody for repair. On September 7, 1979, two wheels and tires were stolen from Denby's car, and he was informed that no further work would occur until he replaced them. Denby did not replace the items, and the car was subsequently vandalized while stored at the dealership. Denby’s lawsuit claimed the dealership was liable for the car's diminished value under negligence, bailment, Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), and respondeat superior theories. The court directed a verdict for the defendant on the CUTPA and respondeat superior claims. The jury found in favor of the defendant regarding negligence and bailment. Denby contended the court erred in directing a verdict on the CUTPA count, but the court found this claim meritless due to a lack of a timely motion to set aside the verdict, which was not filed until 25 days after judgment. Consequently, the appeal was restricted to a 'plain error' standard, revealing no such error in the record. Gwendolyn Denby, Paul’s mother, also held an interest in the vehicle but the appeal primarily focuses on Paul. The appeal was initially filed in the Appellate Session of the Superior Court. Denby also attempted to appeal the denial of his motion for summary judgment, which is not permissible as it is not a final judgment. Furthermore, Denby did not appeal the directed verdict on the respondeat superior count, and his argument that the directed verdict was a dismissal for lack of a prima facie case was rejected as it was made after the defendant's case in a jury trial, contrary to Practice Book 302 procedures. The trial court issued an amendment to the judgment on May 11, 1984, affirming the directed verdict for the defendant on the third count. The court clarified its prior action of removing the third count from the complaint before the jury's deliberation. According to Practice Book 3000, a party wishing to appeal a verdict directed by the court must file a motion to set it aside within the timeframe specified in Sec. 320. If the motion is denied, the party can appeal the final judgment and assert that the refusal to set aside the verdict is erroneous. Practice Book 320 outlines that motions related to arresting judgment, setting aside a verdict, or requesting new trials must be filed with the clerk within five days of the verdict acceptance or judgment, excluding days when the clerk's office is closed for at least two hours. The court may extend this deadline for good cause, and the clerk is required to inform the trial judge of the filing. These motions must clearly state the specific grounds for the request.