Garry D. Lloyd v. United States

Citations: 407 F.3d 608; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8699; 2005 WL 1155220Docket: 04-3549

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; May 17, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case of Garry D. Lloyd v. United States, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker concerning sentencing guidelines. Lloyd, convicted of bank fraud and sentenced to fifty months imprisonment, argued that his sentence violated the principles established in Blakely v. Washington, which held that judges could not impose sentences based on facts not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, claiming Blakely created a new right that should allow his late filing. 

The District Court dismissed Lloyd's motion, reasoning that Blakely did not declare the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional and that no determination had been made regarding its retroactive applicability to collateral review cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision, joining other appellate courts in concluding that the Booker rule does not apply retroactively to prisoners in the initial § 2255 motion stage as of Booker’s issuance. The appellate court confirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253(a).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 establishes a one-year limitation period for filing a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This limitation runs from the latest of: the date the judgment of conviction becomes final, or the date a newly recognized right by the Supreme Court becomes retroactively applicable. Lloyd filed his motion more than a year after his conviction became final, so it could only be timely if the Supreme Court had announced a new retroactive right.

Lloyd initially claimed his sentence violated Blakely, but this claim is impacted by the Supreme Court's January 12, 2005 decision in Booker, which found that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional as they allowed judges to increase sentences based on facts not determined by a jury. Booker consisted of two opinions: one declaring the Guidelines unconstitutional and the other providing a remedy to make them advisory rather than mandatory.

For Lloyd to benefit from Booker, it must be determined whether the decision applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane, which requires a three-step inquiry: first, confirming whether Lloyd's conviction became final before Booker; second, assessing if the Booker rule is "new"; and third, evaluating if it qualifies under Teague's exceptions for retroactivity, specifically if it is a "watershed rule" affecting fundamental fairness. Lloyd's conviction became final on May 6, 2003, as no certiorari was sought, which is consistent with the rules governing finality post-conviction.

The decisions in Blakely and Booker must be applied retroactively to Lloyd's case, as they were issued more than a year after the relevant date. Both parties agree that the Booker rule is a new rule of criminal procedure under Teague. To assess if the Booker rule was "new," the legal context at the time of Lloyd's final conviction must be examined to determine if the rule was dictated by existing precedent. Prior to Blakely and Booker, Apprendi allowed sentence enhancements based on facts not admitted by the defendant or found by the jury, provided the enhancements did not exceed the statutory maximum. Blakely clarified that the statutory maximum is defined solely by the jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions. Subsequently, Booker applied Blakely's principles to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

Every appellate court that considered the matter determined that the Blakely and Booker rules are new. For instance, the Tenth Circuit noted that while Blakely interpreted Apprendi, it did not compel a conclusion that the Blakely rule was constitutionally required before its announcement. The Sixth Circuit also recognized the Booker rule as new, highlighting the lack of consensus among reasonable jurists regarding its applicability before the ruling. The Second Circuit similarly concluded that the Booker outcome was not dictated by Apprendi or Blakely, reinforcing that it was not apparent to all reasonable jurists at the time. Thus, the consensus among the courts is that both rules represented a significant shift in understanding and were, therefore, new legal standards.

Booker's new rule of criminal procedure is evaluated for retroactive application under the second exception to Teague's non-retroactivity bar, which applies to "watershed rules" that affect fundamental fairness and accuracy in criminal proceedings. This exception is extremely narrow, with the Supreme Court indicating it has not found a new rule that qualifies under Teague. Every federal appellate court that has considered whether Booker's rule constitutes a "watershed rule" has determined it does not, thus ruling that Booker does not apply retroactively in collateral review cases. The government’s argument that the exception only pertains to rules affecting the accuracy of guilt or innocence is rejected; it is established that rules impacting sentencing can also qualify. The Supreme Court's decision in Schriro v. Summerlin further clarifies that procedural rules affecting sentencing may be considered under the "watershed rule" exception. The Summerlin Court emphasized that the accuracy of judicial factfinding compared to jury findings was insufficiently evidenced to warrant retroactive application of the Ring decision, which addressed the imposition of the death penalty. Overall, the distinction between conviction and sentencing is deemed irrelevant for constitutional considerations involving facts that elevate a defendant's punishment.

The fundamental meaning of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee requires that all facts essential to a defendant's punishment, whether labeled as elements of the offense or sentencing factors, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the Summerlin Court determined that the Ring decision does not have retroactive application, this was not due to its impact on sentencing decisions. The argument presented is that the requirement for factfinders to determine sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt rendered Booker a new rule of criminal procedure, essential for ensuring accurate convictions, as emphasized by the Supreme Court's long-standing recognition of the reasonable-doubt standard's importance in reducing factual errors. The excerpt also discusses Justice Stevens's opinion in Booker, which deemed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional due to the mandatory nature that forced judges to find facts increasing sentences based on a preponderance of evidence. However, Justice Breyer's opinion remedied this by making the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, which did not constitute a significant procedural change enhancing the accuracy of sentencing. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit and other courts have noted that the essence of sentencing remains largely unchanged, with only increased judicial discretion under the advisory regime. Therefore, since Booker is considered a "new" but not "watershed" procedural rule, it does not apply retroactively to initial motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for judgments finalized prior to January 12, 2005.

The August 11, 2004 order of the District Court dismissing Lloyd's 2255 motion is affirmed. The discussion differentiates between the "Blakely rule" and the "Booker rule," emphasizing that the appropriate reference is the "Booker rule," established by the Supreme Court's Booker decision, which clarified the status of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The distinction between new substantive and procedural rules is noted, with the Supreme Court categorizing the Apprendi line of cases, including Booker, as new procedural rules. Courts of appeals have uniformly ruled that while Apprendi introduced a new procedural rule, it does not apply retroactively to final judgments. Justice Stevens' explanation of Blakely highlights its implications for sentencing under the Sixth Amendment. The text also details that Booker does not meet the Teague exception for retroactivity, as it does not place specific conduct beyond the criminal law-making authority. The Supreme Court has declined to apply numerous new procedural rules retroactively, and no "watershed rule" has been identified since the standard was set. A recent ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 confirms that Booker has not been recognized as retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, and any suggestion of retroactive applicability is strongly countered by the Court's decision in Summerlin. The need to analyze the "watershed rule" exception is acknowledged.