Harold Leroy Page v. Ken Burger, Warden

Citations: 406 F.3d 489; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7524; 2005 WL 1005000Docket: 04-2339

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; May 2, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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Harold Leroy Page was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree robbery in Iowa. After the Iowa courts upheld his convictions and denied post-conviction relief, Page filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. The district court denied this petition but issued a certificate of appealability. On appeal, Page argued that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because the Iowa state court allowed him to represent himself without adequately warning him of the consequences. The Eighth Circuit Court found no error in the state court's decision and affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Prior to his trial, Page expressed a desire to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se, leading the trial court to permit this while appointing standby counsel. A colloquy between Page and the court revealed confusion regarding his representation and the timeline of his arraignment. The court emphasized the importance of having legal representation in a timely manner while acknowledging Page's ability to represent himself. Ultimately, the court's actions were deemed appropriate, with no violation of Page's rights identified.

Mr. Page, the defendant, expressed his intention to represent himself during court proceedings, despite the court's suggestion to consider hiring Mr. Garrison as a private lawyer. The court acknowledged Page's right to self-representation but appointed Attorney Tom Isaac as standby counsel to ensure that Page could not later claim he was denied legal representation if convicted. Page maintained his pro se status, although Attorney Isaac conducted voir dire and examined most witnesses during the trial, with Page occasionally asking questions. Attorney Isaac also filed motions, including for a new trial, after Page was convicted and sentenced to consecutive life terms for first-degree murder and robbery.

On direct appeal, Page contended that he did not validly waive his right to counsel and that his self-representation infringed upon his Sixth Amendment rights. The Iowa Court of Appeals determined that Page was properly represented by Attorney Isaac, who acted as co-counsel. In federal habeas proceedings, the district court concurred that Page was adequately represented during the trial but treated the pre-trial phase as if he had only standby counsel. The court concluded that Page understood his right to counsel and voluntarily waived it for pretrial representation, but it granted a certificate of appealability concerning his Sixth Amendment claim.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts can grant habeas relief if a state court's decision is contrary to or involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or is based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented (28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1, 2)). A mere disagreement with the state court's application of law is not sufficient; the decision must be objectively unreasonable (Green v. Norris, 394 F.3d 1027, 1029). A state court's ruling is considered "contrary" only if it applies a rule that directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent with materially indistinguishable facts (Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405).

Page's argument references two Supreme Court cases: Faretta v. California and Iowa v. Tovar. In Faretta, the Court established that a defendant has the constitutional right to waive counsel and represent themselves, provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary, as further clarified in Godinez v. Moran. Specifically, the waiver must be made with an understanding of the dangers of self-representation (Tovar). If a court permits self-representation without adequately warning the defendant of the potential consequences, the waiver is invalid. Courts must assess the individual circumstances of each case, including the defendant's background and experience (Moore v. United States). Miranda warnings may suffice to inform a defendant of self-representation risks during post-indictment questioning (Patterson v. Illinois). For guilty pleas, constitutional requirements are met when the defendant is informed about the charges, the right to counsel, and the potential penalties (Tovar).

In Page's case, the Iowa Court of Appeals determined that he was adequately represented by Attorney Isaac throughout the proceedings, which distinguishes it from Tovar and undermines Page's argument regarding self-representation.

The Iowa Court of Appeals' decision was examined to determine if it contradicted or unreasonably applied established federal law, specifically regarding a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The ruling established that a trial judge's appointment of standby counsel does not violate these rights, referencing McKaskle v. Wiggins. A pro se defendant's consent to substantial counsel participation implies acceptance of counsel's role, and a defendant must clearly communicate any desire to revert to self-representation. In this case, Page's inconsistent stance on self-representation allowed Attorney Isaac to perform significant pretrial duties, including motions and jury selection, which indicated Page's acceptance of counsel’s involvement. Page even requested that Attorney Isaac take over the trial fully, undermining his claim to exclusive self-representation. The Iowa appellate court concluded that Page was adequately represented in a hybrid manner, which the trial court can permit at its discretion. Despite concerns about the trial judge's encouragement of self-representation, the appellate court's findings regarding Page's fluctuation in invoking his rights and his effective representation were consistent with federal law. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of Page's habeas corpus petition was affirmed. Additionally, Page's subsequent request to dismiss appointed counsel was denied, as the court found his representation to be competent and vigorous.

The district court found that Page adequately raised a Sixth Amendment claim concerning both trial and pretrial proceedings, but noted that the Iowa Court of Appeals did not address the pretrial aspect. However, the district court applied the deferential AEDPA standard, which is inappropriate when a state court has not considered an issue, as established in Cox v. Burger and Armstrong v. Kemna. Despite this, the Iowa Court of Appeals determined that Page had representation during pretrial proceedings, as he was fully represented by attorney Isaac. Consequently, the district court's application of the AEDPA standard was justified. Additionally, while acknowledging the Supreme Court's ruling that the Sixth Amendment grants the accused the right to self-representation, Page did not claim a violation of his Faretta right; instead, he contended that he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel.