Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; August 9, 2005; Connecticut; State Supreme Court
Scott Cancel was found guilty of murder as an accessory following the strangulation death of Robert Schmidt. The trial court upheld the jury's verdict, and Cancel appealed, questioning whether the trial court erred by not replaying all requested testimony during jury deliberations. The appeal was denied, affirming the trial court's judgment.
Key facts include the discovery of Schmidt's body on December 20, 1989, by Reverend Kenneth Gray, with the cause of death determined to be asphyxia due to ligature strangulation, alongside a puncture wound to the forehead. The victim's death was estimated to have occurred between 9 p.m. and midnight on December 19-20. Schmidt had been driving his sister's Honda Civic, which was later found at the restaurant where he worked.
Though the police lifted thirteen prints from the vehicle, none were positively identified. The FBI, investigating prior armored car robberies, linked Schmidt and his employer, Jeffrey Stenner, as suspects. Despite efforts, the murder case went cold until it was reopened in 2000. Advancements in forensic technology allowed the identification of a fingerprint from Schmidt’s car, belonging to John Grzeszczyk, who was associated with Cancel.
In 2001, Grzeszczyk confessed to his involvement in the murder and named Cancel, Stenner, Salvatore Zampi, and Gilberto Delgado as co-conspirators. Grzeszczyk, Zampi, and Delgado testified against Cancel in court, claiming that Cancel ordered the murder at Stenner's request.
Stenner had a dual motive for murdering the victim: to silence him regarding their involvement in armored car heists and to collect on a life insurance policy he had taken out on the victim, naming himself as the sole beneficiary. To carry out the murder, Stenner enlisted the defendant, a friend from the gym, who organized a group including Zampi, Grzeszczyk, and Delgado. On December 19, 1989, they convened at the defendant’s apartment to plot the murder, ultimately deciding on strangulation using rope, with a backup plan to inject an air bubble into the victim’s bloodstream.
Stenner identified the victim to Grzeszczyk, who later picked him up under the pretense of running an errand. During the drive, Delgado strangled the victim while Grzeszczyk struck him in the face. After the victim succumbed, they disposed of his body in a church parking lot and discarded their clothes with Zampi's help. The defendant and Delgado were arrested in August 2001, followed by Stenner, Zampi, and Grzeszczyk. The defendant's trial began on May 13, 2002, featuring testimonies from law enforcement and witnesses, particularly Grzeszczyk, Delgado, and Zampi, who detailed the defendant's involvement in the murder. Jury deliberations started on May 23, 2002, after the court provided instructions on how to request testimony for review.
A jury requested playback of witness testimony on four specific topics related to a case. The topics included: 1) who lived at 86 Austin Street on December 19, 1989; 2) attendees at a "point out" meeting at Banquer’s restaurant; 3) the removal and disposal of certain clothing after a murder; and 4) details of interviews conducted by investigator Skinner that led to arrests. After discussing the request with the jury foreperson, the court excused the jury for the day and reconvened them the next morning, explaining the complexity and time required to fulfill the request. The court encouraged the jury to refine their request to expedite the process. Subsequently, the jury sent a second note narrowing their request to testimony from Grzeszczyk during "direct and redirect" examinations and all of Zampi’s testimony regarding the residents of the first floor at 86 Austin Street on the specified date. The jury indicated they would continue to review their initial request and preferred to start with the narrowed one. The foreperson later clarified the desire to hear Grzeszczyk's direct and cross-examination but still wanted all of Zampi's testimony. After a recess, the court arranged for the playback of the requested testimony. Later, the court learned that all testimony regarding the "point out" meeting and the disposal of clothing had been retrieved. However, the state’s attorney objected to asking the jury about their interest in that testimony, claiming the second note superseded the first, indicating that the jury would communicate further if they wanted additional testimony.
The state’s attorney opposed providing additional information to the jury, arguing they had not requested further testimony. In contrast, defense counsel maintained that the jury intended to pursue its initial request for testimony and urged the court to inform the jury of the available testimony and confirm if they still wished to hear it. The court decided against querying the jury about their desire to rehear specific testimony but indicated it would honor any future requests. Upon reconvening, the court reminded the jury of its intention to narrow its initial request and stated it would respond to any additional correspondence. Later, the jury sent a third note requesting testimony regarding a specific meeting, which the court promptly arranged to be replayed. Subsequently, the jury reached a guilty verdict for the defendant as an accessory to murder, resulting in a sixty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion by not replaying all requested testimony from the jury's initial note, arguing the request was reasonable and the unplayed testimony was material and exculpatory. The state countered that the jury had effectively abandoned its initial request with its second note, indicating it would make further requests if desired. The court agreed with the state’s position.
The trial court has the discretion to grant a jury's request to review testimony, as outlined in Practice Book 42-26 and supported by case law. The specific portions of the record submitted for jury consideration fall within the court's sound judicial discretion, which should be presumed correct unless there is a clear abuse or harmful prejudice. The review process includes examining the jury's requests for testimony related to four specific topics.
In the case at hand, the jury initially sought to review the testimony of five witnesses regarding who lived at 86 Austin Street on December 19, 1989, but later narrowed its request to only the direct and redirect examination of Grzeszczyk and all of Zampi’s testimony. After confirming this request, further confusion arose regarding whether the jury meant to include cross-examination testimony for Grzeszczyk. The court clarified the distinctions between direct, cross, and redirect examinations and confirmed that the jury only wanted Grzeszczyk's direct and cross-examination testimony.
The court then replayed the appropriate testimonies but did not replay all of Grzeszczyk's testimony as the defendant claimed it should have, arguing that the jury's initial request warranted this. The law, however, states that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to rehear only the testimony it specifically requested. Consequently, the court's decision not to replay all of Grzeszczyk's testimony was upheld, as there was no indication that failing to do so would result in an injustice.
The jury requested to rehear testimony about attendees at the "point out" meeting and the disposal of Grzeszczyk’s and Delgado’s clothes. After retrieving this testimony, a discussion occurred regarding how to proceed with it based on the jury's second note. The state’s attorney argued that the second note replaced the initial request, suggesting the jury should only be informed of the testimony if they expressed a desire to review it. Conversely, defense counsel contended that the initial request remained valid, and the court should ask if the jury still wished to hear the testimony. The court acknowledged both arguments but leaned toward the state’s interpretation, concluding that the second note superseded the first. It reconvened the jury, reminding them to send further correspondence regarding their decisions but did not specifically ask if they wanted to rehear the earlier testimony. The defendant appealed, claiming the court abused its discretion by not inquiring further. However, the appellate review concluded that the trial court reasonably interpreted the jury’s second note as indicating they would first address the specified request before deciding on the other topics. The second note indicated the jury intended to narrow their focus and would send additional correspondence about further requests.
The court affirmed the trial court's interpretation of the jury's notes, noting that the jury's third note did not request testimony on previously mentioned topics but instead sought information regarding a different meeting from December 19, 1989. This indicated the jury deemed it unnecessary to rehear earlier requested testimony to reach a verdict on the defendant’s guilt. The court emphasized the standard of reviewing for abuse of discretion, which favors the trial court's rulings unless found arbitrary or unreasonable, and concluded the trial court acted appropriately in not inquiring further about the earlier requested testimony.
The defendant's claim regarding the failure to replay testimony from investigator Skinner's interviews was deemed without merit, as there was no record of notification to the court that such testimony was available before the verdict. Even if there had been such notification, the trial court could reasonably interpret the jury's notes as a desire not to rehear additional testimony until explicitly requested. The judgment was affirmed, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Sullivan and Justices Katz and Vertefeuille. The defendant argued that the unplayed testimony was material and exculpatory, claiming a violation of his rights to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article First, Section 8, of the Connecticut Constitution.
The court concludes that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court regarding the defendant's claims. The defendant's constitutional claim for a fair trial lacks sufficient legal analysis or support and is therefore not subject to review. The court emphasizes the necessity of proper briefing and analysis to preserve issues for appellate review. The testimony surrounding the living arrangements at 86 Austin Street on December 19, 1989, is noted, including conflicting accounts from Cruz and Torres about residency and the defendant's actions leading to the murder. The court addresses the jury's request for testimony review, clarifying that the reasonableness of this request is not the central issue; rather, it is whether the trial court's interpretation of the jury's intent in their second note was reasonable. The dissenting opinion argues differently regarding the jury's intentions but fails to reconcile this with the jury's indication that they would send further correspondence. Ultimately, the court finds no need to debate the dissent's interpretation to affirm the trial court's decision.
A thorough examination of the jury’s second note and its context supports the conclusion that the trial court's interpretation was reasonable. The dissent argues that, even if the interpretation was reasonable, the trial court abused its discretion by not simply asking the jury if they wished to rehear the testimony they had initially requested. The dissent claims this failure constituted an abuse of discretion. However, it is contended that trial courts are permitted to interpret jury communications regarding requests for testimony and make decisions based on those interpretations, which aligns with established principles allowing such discretion.
Although the dissent focuses on the jury's expectations from its communications, it fails to reconcile its position with subsequent events where the jury heard the requested testimony and reached a verdict without further information. This indicates that the jury did not believe they required all initially requested testimony to make their decision. Furthermore, referencing the case of State v. Hinds, while an Appellate Court found an abuse of discretion for not informing the jury about retrieved testimony, it also determined that the error was harmless, suggesting that the jury's ability to reach a verdict without that information implies it was not critical to their decision.
