Reginald Jackson v. Ernest Edwards, Superintendent of Otisville Correctional Facility

Citations: 404 F.3d 612; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6163; 2005 WL 851683Docket: 03-2805

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; April 14, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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Reginald Jackson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after being convicted of second-degree manslaughter and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon for the 1997 shooting death of Selwyn Anthony Brown. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted Jackson's petition based on two claims: (1) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process due to the trial court's refusal to allow a justification defense, and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, as his attorney cited irrelevant case law.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, led by Circuit Judge B.D. Parker, upheld the District Court's decision on the due process claim, which rendered the Sixth Amendment claim unnecessary for consideration. The incident leading to Jackson's conviction began late on March 7, 1997, when he, as the superintendent of an apartment building in Brooklyn, learned that unauthorized individuals were in a supposedly vacant apartment. After attempting to secure the apartment by changing the lock, an altercation occurred between Jackson and Ula Hall over the ownership of food in the refrigerator, leading to escalating tensions and ultimately the fatal shooting. The case underscores issues of legal representation and procedural rights in criminal convictions.

Brown and his nephew, George Adams, encountered Ula in the stairwell of their apartment building after hearing noise. Ula initially urged Brown to "leave it alone," but when she mentioned needing keys from Jackson, Brown insisted she retrieve them. By early morning on March 8, Brown, Ula, and several others, including Jackson and Patricia Drummond, had gathered near apartment 2E. A heated argument erupted between an intoxicated Brown and Jackson, despite pleas from Bernadette and Mirna Brown for Brown to stop. Witness accounts of the confrontation varied: Ula, Mirna, and Bernadette claimed no physical contact occurred, while George initially stated he saw a "fist fight" but later described only "pushing and shoving." Natalie Hall observed Brown pushing Jackson, whereas Drummond testified that Brown punched Jackson twice, causing him to fall.

During the altercation, Jackson pulled out a gun, which discharged, fatally wounding Brown. Jackson fled the scene and discarded the gun, which was never found. Later, he surrendered to police, waived his Miranda rights, and confessed to the shooting, detailing the events leading up to it and asserting that he acted in self-defense after Brown attacked him. Jackson claimed he had a .38 revolver for protection due to ongoing drug activity in the area. 

At trial, Jackson was charged with second-degree murder. The defense requested a jury instruction on justification under New York Penal Law § 35.15, arguing that Jackson's use of deadly force was necessary for self-defense. The court denied this request, stating that the evidence and applicable case law did not support the claim of imminent assault or burglary, which are prerequisites for such a defense.

Defense counsel argued that Jackson shot Brown accidentally after removing the gun from his pocket, as he was barred from claiming justification. The trial court charged the jury on charges including Murder in the Second Degree and Manslaughter in the Second Degree. The jury acquitted Jackson of second-degree murder but convicted him of second-degree manslaughter and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. Jackson was sentenced in September 1997 to concurrent terms of five to fifteen years for manslaughter and seven and one-half to fifteen years for weapons possession.

Jackson appealed to the Appellate Division, claiming the trial court improperly denied his request for a justification instruction and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating that no reasonable view of the evidence supported a justification charge, and found no ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson's application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied.

On January 26, 2001, Jackson filed a habeas corpus petition in the District Court, reiterating the claims made in his direct appeal. The District Court granted his petition, citing the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on justification and the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. The court reasoned that evidence presented at trial could allow a jury to conclude that Jackson reasonably believed Brown was attempting a robbery or burglary. The District Court determined that the trial court's error deprived Jackson of his right to a fair trial and vacated both his homicide and weapons possession convictions, concluding that a properly instructed jury might find Jackson justified in using deadly force. The court ordered Jackson’s release within sixty days unless the State appealed or retried him. The case is now under appeal, with a de novo review of the District Court's decision for habeas corpus relief and findings of fact being subject to clear error standard.

Eligibility for habeas relief requires that the substance of a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim be exhausted and "fairly presented" to the appropriate state appellate court, as outlined in Picard v. Connor. Generally, a petitioner must meet one of four prongs established in Daye v. Attorney General to demonstrate exhaustion. These prongs allow for the constitutional nature of a claim to be presented through: (a) pertinent federal case law, (b) state cases with similar constitutional analysis, (c) specific constitutional terms, or (d) a pattern of facts within mainstream constitutional litigation. 

The State argues that Jackson failed to exhaust his claim because his appeal only addressed New York law regarding jury instructions on justification, without referencing the federal Constitution or relevant federal case law. However, the District Court found that Jackson's claim involved a constitutional right due to the nature of the facts presented, despite the absence of explicit constitutional references. The State contends that Jackson could not satisfy the fourth prong of Daye, claiming jury instructions are typically a state law matter. 

Ultimately, the conclusion reached is that Jackson did exhaust his claim, as the requirement does not necessitate direct citation of the federal Constitution. The exhaustion doctrine's intent is to afford state courts the opportunity to address potential violations of federal rights, which can occur even if the federal principle is initially framed differently in state proceedings. The Supreme Court's interpretation emphasizes the importance of the similarity between claims made in state and federal courts, illustrating this with Anderson v. Harless, where a federal due process claim was not fairly presented because it was framed solely as a state law issue.

In Duncan v. Henry, the Supreme Court ruled that a habeas petitioner did not exhaust his federal due process claim regarding the trial court's failure to uphold an evidentiary objection, as the state appellate court's inquiry focused solely on state law rather than the broader federal implications. The Court emphasized that the state and federal inquiries, while somewhat similar, were not virtually identical, thus failing the fair presentation requirement. In Baldwin v. Reese, the Court held that a prisoner failed to exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he did not explicitly identify it as a federal claim, despite claiming a federal issue regarding trial counsel. The Court also noted that an argument regarding the similarity of state and federal standards was waived since it was raised for the first time in the merits brief. The critical question remaining from Baldwin is whether a federal claim is fairly presented when the state court rejects it while ruling on the state claim. In the case of Jackson, he relied on state law to argue for a jury instruction on justification but did not raise the federal due process argument. The Appellate Division’s rejection of his claim under state law would have mirrored a federal inquiry, as established in Davis v. Strack, which outlines that determining the entitlement to a jury instruction under state law is a precursor to analyzing any potential violation of federal due process rights. The process involves assessing if a reasonable view of the evidence could support a justification charge and whether the failure to provide such an instruction was significantly harmful to the fairness of the conviction.

The failure to instruct the jury on justification in Jackson's case constituted a denial of due process, as it deprived him of a significant defense that could have led to his acquittal on charges of second-degree murder and weapon possession. Jackson's request to the Appellate Division to consider the justification instruction effectively raised his due process claim, despite not explicitly invoking it. This aligns with the Supreme Court’s "fairly present" standard, which allows for the federal claim to be deemed exhausted if the state law claim is similar enough. The court acknowledges that the absence of a justification defense was critical, making Jackson’s state and federal claims "virtually identical."

To affirm the grant of habeas relief, the court must address three key questions in Jackson's favor: whether he was entitled to a justification charge, whether the lack of such a charge resulted in a due process violation, and if the state court's ruling was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. The court's task is to determine whether the evidence warranted a justification charge under New York law, specifically referencing New York Penal Law § 35.15, which outlines the permissible use of force in self-defense situations. This law stipulates conditions under which physical force can be used, including the necessity of retreating if safe to do so and the circumstances that justify the use of deadly force.

New York Penal Law § 35.20 allows individuals in possession or control of a dwelling to use deadly physical force against someone committing or attempting to commit a burglary, provided they reasonably believe such force is necessary. "Deadly physical force" is defined as force capable of causing death or serious injury. In New York, justification serves as a defense rather than an affirmative defense, meaning the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt when properly raised by the defendant. A justification charge is warranted if evidence could reasonably support the defendant's belief that their actions were justified. The courts have established both subjective and objective components for this defense: the defendant must genuinely believe deadly force was necessary, and a reasonable person must also believe the same under similar circumstances. Additionally, there is a duty to retreat if safe to do so; however, this duty does not apply when defending against robbery or, apparently, when defending against burglary.

Jackson asserts that a jury could find his use of deadly force justified based on three theories: (1) he believed Brown was attempting to forcibly take his keys, constituting robbery under N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b) and § 160.00; (2) he believed Brown was trying to unlawfully enter apartment 2E with the intent to steal the keys, which would amount to burglary per N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(c) and § 140.20; or (3) he believed deadly force was necessary to protect himself from imminent deadly force and could not retreat, according to N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). The District Court determined that a jury could reasonably conclude that Jackson's actions were justified under the first two theories, warranting a justification instruction under New York law. Evidence at trial suggested that Jackson reasonably believed Brown was attempting to commit robbery or burglary. The State, however, argued that a justification charge was not justified, claiming Jackson's use of deadly force was not "necessary" to counter the alleged robbery or burglary. The State referenced New York case law indicating that a justification charge was denied when evidence did not support a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary. Specifically, cases like People v. Cox and People v. Vecchio demonstrated situations where alternatives to deadly force were available, suggesting it would have been unreasonable for Jackson to believe that shooting was the only viable option against Brown's actions.

A jury could reasonably conclude that Jackson believed he needed to use deadly force to defend himself against Brown's robbery attempt. Evidence indicated that a heavily intoxicated Brown, supported by an aggressive crowd, confronted Jackson to take keys. Despite pleas from Ula Hall and Brown's family for him to cease, Brown demanded the keys and attempted to take them by force. Witnesses testified that Brown physically assaulted Jackson, with one noting that Brown punched Jackson twice, knocking him down. Jackson claimed that he was attacked without provocation and felt threatened by the surrounding crowd. Given these circumstances, a jury might find that Jackson was justified in using his weapon, as he had no obligation to retreat under the law. The Appellate Division's conclusion that no evidence supported a justification charge was erroneous. 

The excerpt also addresses whether the denial of a requested justification instruction constituted a violation of due process. It references legal precedents determining that such a refusal can render a trial fundamentally unfair if it significantly impacts the conviction outcome. The discussion emphasizes that in a prior case (Davis), the omission of a justification instruction was deemed a critical error that warranted habeas relief, as it deprived the defendant of a credible self-defense argument. The failure to instruct on justification in Jackson's case could similarly be seen as a harmful error affecting the fairness of the trial.

The District Court's ruling on Jackson's case aligns with the precedent set in Davis, indicating that failing to instruct the jury on justification violated Jackson's due process rights. Similar to Davis, evidence existed that could have led a jury to acquit Jackson of homicide charges based on a justification defense. However, due to Jackson's confession, the jury's ability to acquit was contingent upon receiving proper justification instructions. The jury's conviction of Jackson for second degree manslaughter, rather than murder, suggests they were receptive to his defense, highlighting the likelihood that a properly instructed jury would have favored Jackson on the homicide charge.

The State's reliance on Blazic v. Henderson is misplaced, as Jackson's case differs significantly. In Blazic, the justification defense hinged solely on his testimony, which the jury largely rejected, whereas Jackson's defense was supported by multiple witnesses and his confession, providing a stronger basis for a justification claim. Additionally, unlike Blazic, whose conviction implied intent to murder, Jackson was acquitted of second degree murder, suggesting a more favorable stance toward his justification defense. Consequently, the failure to instruct on justification not only undermined the homicide charge but also tainted the jury's assessment of the weapons possession charge, which is affected by the justification standard under New York law. Overall, the omission of the justification instruction constituted a critical error that compromised the integrity of the trial.

The defense of justification applies to the use of physical force in homicide cases, but in weapons possession offenses, the focus is on the intent to use a weapon unlawfully rather than its actual use. A defendant may be justified in using a weapon in a specific instance yet still possess it unlawfully if there was a prior intent to use it in an unlawful manner. The New York law does not allow justification as a defense for weapons possession, which could impact the outcome of a trial. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on justification for the homicide charge could significantly affect the verdict for weapons possession. If the jury had acquitted Jackson of homicide, they might have found him not guilty of unlawful possession as well, since there was no evidence of unlawful intent during the time he possessed the weapon before the incident. Jackson's history of carrying the weapon for protection against threats further supports the argument that he lacked unlawful intent. If properly instructed, the jury might have concluded that Jackson was only guilty of a lesser charge, such as fourth degree criminal possession, rather than second degree criminal possession, which necessitates intent to use the weapon unlawfully.

The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of justification regarding the homicide count adversely affected both of Jackson's convictions. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts cannot grant habeas corpus relief for claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts unless the decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal law, as established by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's ruling in *Williams v. Taylor* clarifies that a state court's decision can be deemed an "unreasonable application" if it misapplies the correct legal rule to the facts of a case. In this instance, the state court unreasonably applied the precedent set by *Cupp*, which requires consideration of whether the lack of a justification instruction compromised the trial's integrity and violated due process. Given the evidence, Jackson had a clear right under New York law to have the jury assess his defense, and the trial's denial of this right was incompatible with due process standards.

The court found that the error affected not only the homicide conviction but also the weapons possession count. Although some language in *Davis* could suggest a different outcome, the circumstances of Jackson's case were materially distinct. In *Davis*, the claim regarding justification for weapon possession was not valid under state law. Conversely, Jackson's case warranted a justification instruction for the homicide count, and the absence of this instruction tainted the entire trial. Thus, the court concluded that this error constituted an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court law, granting Jackson entitlement to habeas relief. The District Court's judgment was subsequently affirmed.

Petitioner established that there was "no significant difference" between state and federal standards for ineffective assistance, indicating that state courts had a fair opportunity to evaluate the federal claim. The Supreme Court previously addressed a similar issue in Howell v. Mississippi, where the petitioner claimed that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to the refusal of the Mississippi courts to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense in a capital case. The Court determined that the federal constitutional claim was inadequately presented to the Mississippi Supreme Court, as the petitioner did not cite the Constitution or relevant cases. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, federal law challenges must be properly presented to state courts before the Supreme Court can consider them. The petitioner argued his claim was raised "by implication" because the state-law rule was nearly identical to the federal standard from Beck v. Alabama. However, the Court noted that Mississippi's rule regarding lesser-included-offense instructions was not identical to the interpretation of Beck, leaving open the question of whether presenting nearly identical claims in state and federal courts could satisfy the proper presentation requirement. Additionally, under New York law, a justified act results in a not guilty verdict for homicide, as justification negates the criminality of the use of force. The case is factually distinct from Davis, where the petitioner actively sought to prevent harm, contrasting with the justification claim in the current matter.