State v. Gaines

Citations: 257 Conn. 695; 778 A.2d 919; 2001 Conn. LEXIS 345Docket: SC 16272

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; August 28, 2001; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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Norman Gaines appeals his conviction for capital felony, two counts of murder, and conspiracy to commit murder. He argues that: 1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to a conflict of interest involving his public defender, making the probable cause hearing constitutionally defective; 2) the state improperly charged him with conspiracy with Ronald Marcellus, who had been acquitted of related charges; 3) the state improperly presented conspiracy evidence between him and Marcellus; and 4) the jury was not adequately instructed that it could not convict him of conspiracy with Marcellus. The court rejects these claims and affirms the trial court's judgment. 

Evidence presented at trial included witness accounts from Carl Wright and Tyrell Allen, who observed the shooting on Maplewood Avenue on October 29, 1996. Two individuals fired multiple shots into a parked car, resulting in the deaths of Marsha Larose and Gary Louis-Jeune. Medical examiners determined the victims died from gunshot wounds, and police recovered .22 and .45 caliber casings from the scene.

Edward Jachimowicz, a firearms examiner, testified that all .22 caliber casings from a crime scene were fired from the same gun, while a separate gun was responsible for all .45 caliber casings. He identified .22 caliber bullets from the victims and indicated they likely came from a Ruger or Browning semi-automatic pistol. Leo Charles recounted an encounter with the defendant, Marcellus, and “Nunu” Shipman before October 31, 1996, during which he gave his car keys to Marcellus, who intended for Shipman to drive. However, Shipman could not drive the standard shift car, prompting Charles to demonstrate. During this time, Charles observed Shipman with a .45 caliber gun and the defendant with a .22 caliber Ruger. Later, Shipman and the defendant took Charles' car, returning 45 minutes later, with Shipman throwing a black sweatshirt to Charles.

Torrance McClain testified that before October 31, 1996, Shipman had been given access to a basement containing a .45 caliber gun and a .22 caliber gun. After a shopping trip with Eleanor Figueroa, McClain returned home to find the defendant and Shipman present. Shipman requested a ride to a payphone, after which they briefly visited the crime scene. Upon returning, the defendant expressed satisfaction about a killing, claiming Shipman used the .45 caliber gun and he used the .22 caliber gun. Shipman later returned the guns to the basement. Figueroa provided an account of her shopping trip with McClain and mentioned that the defendant, while incarcerated on unrelated charges, stated that Larose was killed to prevent her from being a witness and indicated that he was promised $1500 for the killings but never received payment due to his incarceration.

Figueroa testified that the defendant called her from jail, instructing her to tell Shipman’s uncle to dispose of a .22 caliber gun used in a shooting, coinciding with Marcellus' arrest for the killings. She noted that the defendant's attitude regarding his involvement changed to a more serious tone after Marcellus' arrest. Additionally, the defendant claimed to have disposed of the clothes he wore during the incident. During cross-examination, Figueroa revealed that she and the defendant sold drugs at 31 Laurel Court, where drugs and guns were stored. She encouraged the defendant to confess his involvement and offered to connect him to a police officer for that purpose. On redirect, Figueroa stated that the defendant and McClain were selling drugs for Marcellus, with McClain identified as Marcellus' lieutenant.

Sergeant James Tyler, leading the investigation, believed the defendant and Shipman were involved in the killings, with Marcellus as an accomplice. The defendant, who had moved in with McClain and Figueroa in July 1996, testified that he sold drugs to pay Figueroa rent and that Figueroa provided him with the drugs. He indicated a dispute with McClain over the amount of drug proceeds he had given McClain, contradicting McClain's claim. While in prison on unrelated charges, Figueroa pressed him to admit guilt regarding the shooting, leading him to believe he was next to be arrested after learning of Marcellus' arrest and statement against him.

The defendant had been jailed twice in fall 1996 on unrelated charges, with Marcellus posting bail each time. He maintained his innocence regarding the killings, asserting he had no motive or request to kill the victims. The defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal were denied by the trial court, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The court merged the murder counts with the capital felony count, sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of release and an additional twenty years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently. The defendant appealed the decision according to General Statutes 51-199 (b) 3, with further facts and procedural history to follow as needed.

The defendant argues that his probable cause hearing was flawed due to a conflict of interest involving his attorney, who was part of the public defender's office, while a key witness for the state, McClain, was also represented by the same office. This purported conflict led the defendant to claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that he is entitled to a new probable cause hearing and a new trial. The probable cause hearing took place on April 17, 1997, with the defendant represented by Preston Tisdale, an assistant public defender, while McClain testified against him. McClain, who was incarcerated on drug charges, had been represented by public defender Susan Cococcia and had recently received a new lawyer, Jason Gladstone, who was unaware of McClain's intent to testify. 

On July 31, 1997, Tisdale filed a motion for the appointment of a special public defender due to the conflict of interest, which was granted by the court. However, Aspinwall, the appointed special public defender, later sought to withdraw his representation, citing the defendant's dissatisfaction with his advice. The court eventually granted this request and appointed Alexander Schwartz as a new special public defender.

The state contends that Gladstone was a special public defender and not a public defender, countering the conflict claim. Although the defendant acknowledges that his conflict of interest argument was not preserved during the probable cause hearing, he seeks review under the criteria established in State v. Golding, which requires the record to support the claim, the claim to be of constitutional significance, the existence of the alleged constitutional violation to be clear and detrimental to the defendant's fair trial, and a failure by the state to demonstrate harmlessness of the violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant argues that his probable cause hearing was flawed due to his attorney's conflict of interest, leading to two key issues: 1) whether the court should have independently investigated the conflict, and 2) whether an actual conflict negatively impacted his attorney's performance. The court finds that the first two prongs of the Golding test are satisfied, allowing for review of the first issue, but concludes that the defendant's claim fails under the third prong of Golding. Regarding the second issue, the court determines that the record does not provide sufficient information for review.

The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees effective counsel, which includes representation free from conflicts of interest. This right extends to all critical stages of criminal proceedings, including probable cause hearings. A trial court is obligated to investigate potential conflicts when it is aware or should reasonably be aware of them. A defective probable cause hearing warrants a new hearing and trial.

A conflict may arise if the defendant's counsel has represented a state witness. The defendant cited prior representation of two witnesses, including the victim, by the public defender's office, but no conflict was found since the witnesses waived confidentiality. A trial court must inquire about conflicts under two conditions: if there is a timely objection during trial or if the court is aware of a conflict. Failing to inquire in these instances can lead to a reversal of conviction. However, if no objection is made at trial, the defendant must prove that a conflict adversely impacted their attorney's performance to secure a reversal.

A trial court is obligated to inquire about a potential conflict of interest only when there is sufficient evidence to alert a reasonable judge that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel may be compromised. Silence from the defendant and their attorney can be taken as an indication that no conflict exists, as established by precedent. Defense counsel have an ethical duty to avoid conflicts and must notify the court if one arises. Typically, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be addressed through habeas corpus rather than direct appeal due to the need for a comprehensive evidentiary record.

In this case, the defendant argues that a conflict of interest arose because both he and another defendant, McClain, were represented by public defenders, Tisdale and Gladstone, during the probable cause hearing. He also claims a conflict existed as McClain had previously been represented by Cococcia, a public defender from Tisdale’s office. Furthermore, the defendant contends that Cococcia had represented both defendants in earlier, possibly ongoing, criminal matters unrelated to this case.

The court, led by Judge Hartmere, was not required to conduct a sua sponte inquiry regarding a potential conflict. The defendant asserted that the presence of public defenders should have alerted the court to a conflict, especially after McClain identified Cococcia as his former attorney. However, the defendant conceded that the record does not clarify whether Gladstone was a public defender or a special public defender, which undermines the argument that the trial court should have assumed a public defender status that would necessitate an inquiry.

The trial court's record does not indicate any assumption regarding a conflict of interest involving the defendant's counsel. It remains unclear whether Gladstone was a special public defender, and the defendant did not raise any objections or inquiries regarding a potential conflict during the hearing. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that a reasonable trial judge would have recognized a jeopardy to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. The mere identification of Cococcia, the defendant's former attorney, during cross-examination did not sufficiently indicate a conflict. The court found no obligation to investigate potential conflicts during the probable cause hearing or when the defendant later requested the appointment of a special public defender. The defendant failed to inform the court about the prior probable cause hearing or express concerns regarding a conflict at that time. Thus, the filing of the motion alone did not alert the court to any potential conflict. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance due to a conflict, the defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict adversely impacted his attorney's performance. However, the record lacks clarity on essential points, such as the timeline of representation by Cococcia and Gladstone, the nature of their assignments, and whether the defendant was made aware of any potential conflict. There is also no indication of how the alleged conflict might have affected the defense counsel's performance. Therefore, the evidence does not support the existence of an actual conflict of interest or its adverse effects on counsel's performance at the probable cause hearing.

The defendant challenges the conspiracy charge on three grounds: 1) the trial court improperly allowed the state to charge him with conspiring to commit murder with Marcellus, who had been acquitted of related conspiracy charges; 2) the court allowed evidence of a conspiracy between him and Marcellus; and 3) the jury was not instructed that it could not convict him based on the alleged conspiracy with Marcellus. The defendant acknowledges that his jury instruction claim was unpreserved but seeks review under State v. Golding. All claims are rejected.

Key procedural facts include the state's amended information filed on November 17, 1999, which charged the defendant with conspiracy alongside Marcellus and Shipman. The defendant moved to dismiss this charge, arguing that Marcellus's acquittal barred prosecution. The court denied the motion to dismiss and also the motion in limine to exclude hearsay evidence from Marcellus, indicating that such issues should be addressed during the trial. During the trial, the defendant raised objections to some evidence regarding Marcellus but failed to object to other similar evidence, and he himself introduced testimony about Marcellus's involvement.

The jury was instructed that to convict the defendant of conspiracy, it needed to find intent to commit murder, agreement with others to engage in the crime, and an overt act in pursuance of the agreement. The court cited State v. Colon, which overruled prior precedent (State v. Robinson), indicating that the state can prosecute a defendant for conspiracy even if an alleged coconspirator has been acquitted. Thus, the state was not barred from prosecuting the defendant for conspiring with Marcellus, and the jury could convict him if the conspiracy was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Marcellus was properly identified as a coconspirator in the amended information.

The information provided to the defendant was sufficiently clear to enable him to prepare his defense and guard against unexpected prejudice. It also allowed him to plead a prior acquittal or conviction to prevent future prosecution for the same offense, fulfilling its constitutional role. The court determined that evidence relating to Marcellus’ involvement in the killings was admissible to establish a conspiracy between him and the defendant. The court did not need to address whether the defendant waived any evidentiary claims by failing to object or by introducing testimony himself, nor did it need to assess the admissibility of that evidence for other elements of the charged offenses. Furthermore, the court found that the defendant's claims regarding improper jury instructions could be assumed reviewable, but concluded the instructions were appropriate. If the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly defined conspiracy existed between the defendant and Marcellus, it could convict the defendant on that basis. The judgment was affirmed with concurrence from other justices. Relevant statutes were cited, including General Statutes 53a-54b, which defines capital felony, and 53a-48, which details conspiracy. The court also acknowledged motions regarding judicial notice of court files and proceedings, granting both the state's and the defendant's requests. However, it remained unclear whether Cococcia was representing the defendant during the relevant probable cause hearing.

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the accused the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, while the Connecticut Constitution similarly affirms the right to be heard personally and by counsel. The case involves McClain’s testimony regarding his expectations of favorable treatment based on prior representation by Cococcia. It remains unclear whether McClain’s attorney, Gladstone, was a public or special public defender, complicating the validity of McClain’s claims. The court acknowledged its allowance of the state's motion to take judicial notice of McClain's request for a special public defender due to a conflict of interest within the public defender's office but clarified that it cannot draw inferences from that request regarding Gladstone’s appointment or McClain’s expected testimony at a probable cause hearing.

The defendant challenged the inclusion of Marcellus's name in the conspiracy charge, although he sought to dismiss the entire conspiracy to commit murder charge rather than just the portion related to Marcellus. The court determined that even if this challenge was preserved, the state had appropriately included Marcellus’s name. The defendant also sought to exclude evidence regarding the relationship between Marcellus, Shipman, and himself but failed to specify any improperly admitted hearsay testimony from Marcellus.

The trial court instructed jurors on conspiratorial liability, explaining that once a defendant's involvement in a conspiracy is established, they are accountable for the criminal acts of co-conspirators that further the conspiracy. Thus, if the jury finds the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, they must establish whether Shipman, another co-conspirator, committed murder within the conspiracy's scope, which would also implicate the defendant in that murder.

A defendant found to be a member of a conspiracy charged with murder is guilty of that murder if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder committed by a co-conspirator falls within the scope of the conspiracy. The state is not required to prove which specific shot caused either victim's death, as long as the defendant was involved in a common purpose to commit murder. The crime of conspiracy is distinct from the substantive crime it aims to commit—in this case, murder—and consists of an agreement to engage in criminal conduct followed by one or more overt acts in furtherance of that agreement. According to Section 53a-48a of the General Statutes, conspiracy requires three elements: (1) intent to commit murder, (2) an agreement with one or more individuals to commit the crime, and (3) the commission of at least one overt act by any of the conspirators to advance the conspiracy. The intent must be criminal, and the agreement can be explicit or implicit; it suffices that the defendant knew of the existence of an agreement to commit murder. Evidence of conspiracy can be shown through direct testimony or circumstantial evidence, recognizing that conspiracies typically operate in secrecy. Lastly, at least one member of the conspiracy must perform an overt act furthering the conspiracy's goals.

The legal standards for convicting a defendant of conspiracy require that at least one conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the illegal agreement, regardless of whether the defendant personally executed the act. An overt act must manifest the intent of the conspiracy and occur after the agreement's formation. To secure a conviction, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant intended to commit murder; (2) he agreed with one or more individuals to engage in that crime; and (3) either he or another conspirator performed an overt act furthering the conspiracy. A guilty verdict for conspiracy can be reached if any one of the charged acts is supported by sufficient evidence, even if the evidence for other acts is lacking. Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for conspiring with Shipman, even if the evidence against Marcellus is insufficient.