Kish v. Nursing & Home Care, Inc.

Citations: 248 Conn. 379; 727 A.2d 1253; 1999 Conn. LEXIS 78Docket: SC 15907

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; April 6, 1999; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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The appeal centers on whether an employee, Rosemary Kish, can receive workers’ compensation for an injury incurred while not adhering strictly to her employer’s policy. Multiple legal bodies, including the workers’ compensation commissioner, the compensation review board, and the Appellate Court, concluded that Kish was entitled to compensation. Kish, a registered nurse, typically used her own car for patient visits, maintained her own schedule, and was reimbursed for mileage. On April 26, 1994, after noting that a patient’s commode was unsafe, she decided to retrieve a replacement despite her supervisor’s instructions to have the patient’s caretaker do so. During this trip, Kish stopped to mail a personal greeting card and was struck by a car. Although there was an unwritten policy against nurses picking up items for patients, this was not explicitly prohibited in the official policy manual. The commissioner determined that Kish acted reasonably in retrieving the commode and that her quick stop to mail a card was minor enough not to affect her employment status. The commissioner ruled that her actions did not demonstrate willful disregard for the policy, making her injuries compensable. The two-part test for workers' compensation claims requires proof that an injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, which Kish satisfied according to the commissioner, the board, and the Appellate Court. The defendants sought permission to appeal this decision, which was granted.

The appeal centers on the Mazzone requirement for establishing whether an injury occurred in the course of employment, which is assessed through three factors outlined in Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. The claimant must prove that the injury occurred (a) during the employment period, (b) at a location where the employee may reasonably be, and (c) while fulfilling employment duties or incidental activities. The first factor is not contested, so the focus is on the latter two.

The defendants argue that the commissioner could not reasonably conclude that the plaintiff met these prongs. However, the court emphasizes the deference afforded to the commissioner as the trier of facts, stating that findings must be upheld unless there is a misapplication of law or unreasonable inference. The determination of whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is fundamentally a factual matter for the commissioner.

In this case, the court finds that the plaintiff was at a location where she was entitled to be as it was necessary for her job. The employer authorized her to drive in the area of the injury and compensated her for travel time, which supports her claim. She was also acting as a professional nurse attempting to secure medical necessities for a patient at the time of her injury. 

The commissioner’s decision to award compensation was upheld, as was the affirmation from the board and Appellate Court. The defendants' argument regarding the plaintiff's method of seeking benefits for her patient was deemed irrelevant, as the act remained within the scope of her employment.

The plaintiff was injured while engaged in her primary role of delivering medical care to a patient at home. On the day of the incident, she noted the patient's deteriorating condition, necessitating the urgent acquisition of a commode. This decision was based on her extensive experience as a nurse and was supported by her supervisor, establishing that the trip to New Canaan was essential for fulfilling her employment duties. The defendants argued that the plaintiff was mailing a greeting card at the time of her injury, but this assertion was found to be irrelevant since injuries occurring while an employee is reasonably performing their job or incidental to it are compensable. The distinction between acceptable work-related activities and substantial deviations is fact-dependent, and various factors such as time, place, and the nature of the deviation must be considered. A minor deviation for personal reasons does not remove the employee from the course of employment unless it is insignificant. The defendants incorrectly claimed that employer permission is essential for an activity to be considered incidental to employment; relevant case law does not support this assertion as it does not analyze this aspect of the employment relationship.

Several cases referenced in the defendants' brief seem to support the notion that acquiescence is essential for determining if an action is incidental to employment; however, this interpretation is misleading. The 'course of employment' test, particularly the 'incidental to employment' aspect, has varied significantly across different cases. Historically, it has been acknowledged that no universal definition exists for what constitutes an act incidental to employment. The current case seeks to clarify this legal framework, emphasizing that 'incidental' can refer to two types of deviations: (1) minor deviations that can be considered insubstantial, and (2) substantial deviations that are deemed incidental due to employer acquiescence. If a deviation is minor enough to be deemed insubstantial, the lack of acquiescence does not affect the claim. This principle aligns with the fairness inherent in workers’ compensation laws, which assume that employers accept minor deviations as part of normal work behavior. For instance, denying compensation for an injury sustained while briefly conversing with a colleague would be unjust. In the present case, the absence of permission does not invalidate the plaintiff's claim, as the action of stopping to mail a personal card was ruled as inconsequential and within the scope of employment. This rationale is supported by legal treatises that categorize such minor diversions as compensable actions. The Appellate Court's judgment is upheld, with all justices concurring. The certification granted pertains specifically to whether the commissioner, board, and Appellate Court correctly determined that the plaintiff met the necessary criteria for being within the course of employment at the time of her injury.