Pearl Murphy, Theodore Murphy v. Arlington Central School District Board of Education, No. 03-7850-Cv

Citations: 402 F.3d 332; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5074; 1 Accom. Disabilities Dec. (CCH) 11Docket: 332

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; March 28, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether a prevailing plaintiff can recover expert fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that expert fees are compensable as costs under the IDEA, which allows for the awarding of "costs" as per 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The court also established that future applications for expert or consultant fees must include contemporaneous time records maintained by the service provider.

The case originated in August 1999 when Pearl and Theodore Murphy filed a complaint on behalf of their son, seeking tuition reimbursement from the Arlington Central School District. The Murphys won their case in the district court, which was later affirmed by the appellate court. In 2003, the Murphys requested reimbursement for litigation-related fees, including $29,350 for educational consultant Marilyn Arons. Arlington opposed this request, arguing that Arons's fees should be denied based on several factors, including her lack of expert testimony and insufficient time records.

The district court partially granted the Murphys' fee application, stating that the IDEA permits reasonable attorneys' fees for prevailing parties and allows individuals with specialized knowledge to accompany and advise parties during due process hearings.

The district court aligned with the Third Circuit's ruling that individuals with specialized qualifications, like Arons, cannot receive "attorneys' fees" for attorney-like work but can be compensated for expert consulting services. It agreed with previous district court decisions indicating that while the Murphys could claim Arons's fees, such claims would be subject to a significant discount. The court found Arons's time records adequate despite the absence of contemporaneous documentation, as the record-keeping requirements for experts differ from those for attorneys. Arons's fees for consulting were deemed compensable from September 3, 1998, when the Murphys requested an impartial hearing, until March 1, 2000, when they became "prevailing parties" under the IDEA. The court did not consider the date of its ruling's affirmation since Arons was represented by counsel at that time, and no evidence indicated Arons provided advice during the appeal. Evaluating the compensability of Arons's services within that timeframe, the court set the market rate for her services at $200 per hour. The court denied claims for mileage costs related to Arons's lack of a driver's license and ruled out pre-judgment interest since the Murphys had not yet compensated Arons. Ultimately, the court awarded the Murphys $8,650 for Arons's fees from Arlington. Arlington subsequently filed a timely appeal of the court's decision. The review standards established that attorney fee awards under the IDEA are generally assessed for abuse of discretion, while legal interpretations of the fee statute are reviewed de novo. A key legal question arose regarding whether prevailing parties under the IDEA can recover fees for expert consultations, with Arlington contending that the Murphys could not recover Arons's fees since she is not an attorney, while the Murphys argued that the term "costs" in the IDEA encompasses expert fees.

Two sister circuits have determined that while the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) includes a fee provision suggesting costs encompass more than attorney's fees, it does not explicitly authorize the recovery of costs or define recoverable items. As a result, federal courts must adhere to the limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920 regarding expert witness fees. Despite the textual focus, it is argued that relying solely on the text may lead to unintended outcomes. The legislative history and Supreme Court precedent indicate that Congress intended to allow reimbursement of expert fees in IDEA cases. 

The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, which restricted reimbursement for expert witness fees to the limits set by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) absent specific statutory authority, was applied to civil rights fee-shifting statutes in Casey. In Casey, the Court ruled that while prevailing parties could recover reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, there was no explicit authority for recovering expert fees. However, the Court noted that the IDEA's legislative history, particularly a Conference Committee Report, indicated an intention to include expert witness fees and related costs as recoverable under the IDEA. Thus, the IDEA is construed to allow reimbursement for expert evaluation costs, distinguishing it from typical fee-shifting statutes and reflecting Congress's intention to enable prevailing parties to recover such costs.

The Supreme Court's decision in Casey indicated that for expert witness fees to be awarded as costs under the 1988 Civil Rights Act, Congress would need to amend the statute. However, no amendment was necessary for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) since the Conference Committee report explicitly authorized expert witness fees as recoverable costs. Following Casey, Congress amended the 1988 Act to allow compensation for expert fees in civil rights cases but did not make similar changes to the IDEA, suggesting that Congress believed the existing language sufficiently allowed for such fees under the IDEA. The use of legislative history, particularly the Conference Committee report, is deemed authoritative and indicative of congressional intent, even acknowledged by Justice Scalia, who was generally skeptical of such approaches. The report is recognized as the final agreement between both legislative houses and serves as strong evidence of legislative intent, reinforced by precedents indicating the reliability of conference reports in statutory interpretation. The court emphasizes that the Conference Committee Report's acceptance by the Supreme Court, its reliability, and the legislative expectations following Casey support the interpretation that expert fees are recoverable under the IDEA.

The holding aligns with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which aims to ensure that children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education tailored to their needs and to protect the rights of these children and their parents. Expert testimony is essential in IDEA cases, which investigate the child's disability and the adequacy of educational provisions offered by school boards. Procedural safeguards under IDEA enable parents and children to benefit from their rights, including the right to counsel and individuals with special knowledge in related matters. The IDEA includes a fee-shifting provision that allows prevailing parents to recover reasonable attorneys' fees, which encompasses compensation for expert witnesses. Denying such fees would undermine IDEA's objectives, making it harder for parents to pursue their claims, ultimately decreasing access to necessary education for children with disabilities. The conclusion that expert fees are recoverable under IDEA is supported by the Third Circuit, which previously addressed a similar issue involving expert fees in the case of Arons. While the Third Circuit denied recovery of legal fees for a non-lawyer advocate, it affirmed the right to compensation for expert consulting work, emphasizing that the IDEA does not obstruct such compensation and recognizing the complexities in delineating compensable versus non-compensable services.

New Jersey's prohibition on non-lawyer advocates collecting legal fees does not interfere with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as parents can seek reimbursement for expert fees as part of the costs incurred under the IDEA. District courts in this Circuit have consistently ruled that expert fees are compensable under the IDEA, supported by its legislative history. This interpretation is also upheld by district courts in the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, despite some decisions in other Circuits finding expert fees non-compensable. The court affirmed that expert fees are indeed compensable under the IDEA.

Regarding the district court's fee award of $8,650—less than requested—the appellants argued that it was an abuse of discretion due to the absence of contemporaneous time records for the expert's fees. While such documentation is required for attorneys, the court determined no similar requirement exists for experts or consultants. However, moving forward, applications for expert fees in IDEA actions should generally be accompanied by contemporaneous time records. The court decided not to retroactively apply this requirement to the current case, thus affirming the district court's discretion in not requiring such records from the expert. After reviewing the record and the expert's bills, the court found no errors in the district court’s decision, ultimately affirming the Memorandum Opinion and Order.

The procedural history and facts regarding the IDEA claims are detailed in referenced cases. The district court erroneously cited an outdated version of Section 1415, but this mistake does not affect the appeal's issues. Arlington contends that the court should defer a decision on the compensability of expert fees under IDEA since Ms. Arons did not provide expert testimony guided by an attorney. However, this argument is flawed; the district court's ruling did not classify Arons as a testifying witness but allowed her to receive compensation for specific expert activities, including consulting services, in line with Third Circuit precedent. Additionally, Congress has made several amendments to the IDEA since the Casey decision, the latest being in December 2004.